Tag Archives: mariupol

International News, Russia-Ukraine War

The Most Successful Russian Military Leaders are Demoted, Detained, Dismissed, or Deceased

Since Russia expanded its war of aggression against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, The Russian Federation Armed Forces have only had a handful of operational successes turn into strategic victories. While Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu and Chief-of-Staff Valery Gerasimov have maintained their stature in the Kremlin despite repeated failures, there is a common thread among the men who have been able to achieve victories. Without exception, they are either demoted, detained, dismissed, or deceased.

Colonel General Mikhail Mizintsev

Accomplishment: The Capture of Mariupol

General Mizintsev is known as the Butcher of Mariupol and is responsible for 25,000 to 100,000 civilian deaths caused during the 86-day siege of the city. He is accused of setting up the filtration camp structure and ordering attacks on mutually agreed green corridors. On September 24, 2022, the future looked bright for Mizintsev when he was reassigned to Deputy Minister of Defense and charged with overseeing logistics.

Within the Kremlin, Mizintsev was already known to be an ally of Private Military Company Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin. In September, this wasn’t viewed as a liability, but as tension between the Kremlin and Prigozhin reached a boiling point, there were signs that Shoigu was leading a quiet purge of Wagner allies. Mizintsev was dismissed by Russian President Vladimir Putin on April 27, 2023, with no official reason given. There was immediate speculation that Mizintsev had been leaking information to Prigozhin for months about how the Minister of Defense was actively interfering with ammunition and weapons shipment to PMC Wagner. Additionally, there were unsubstantiated claims that Mizintsev had used his position to increase the Shoigu-restricted allocation of munitions to Wagner mercenaries in Bakhmut.

A week after being dismissed, Mitzintsev joined Wagner Group’s Council of Commanders and, on May 3, did a frontline inspection of supply, logistics, and Wagner mercenaries in Bakhmut. A day after his inspection, Mitzintsev reportedly briefed the Council of Commanders as the siege of Bakhmut entered its ninth month. Hours later, Prigozhin announced he was withdrawing from Bakhmut by May 10 due to a lack of ammunition and the failure of Russian military units to protect his flanks.

The status of Mizintsev is unclear. There were unsubstantiated claims that he was detained after the Prigozhin Insurrection of June 23 and has not been seen publicly since the failed revolt.

Lieutenant General Mikhal Zusko

Accomplishment: The capture of Kherson, the only large Ukrainian city captured intact

General Zusko led the 58th Combined Arms Army, which advanced from Crimea on February 24, 2022, and captured the city of Kherson on March 2 with the loss of less than 300 soldiers. The 58th CAA had assistance from Russian-aligned collaborators in Crimea and Kherson, who helped set conditions for the lightly contested advance. Shortly after capturing the critical Antonovskyy Bridge and occupying the city of Kherson, Zusko’s forces continued to advance, reaching the outskirts of the city of Mykolaiv and passing the administrative border of Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk, where Ukrainian forces established an effective defense. Zusko was rumored to have been arrested on March 31, 2022, accused of dereliction of duty due to mounting losses. It wasn’t verified until June 2022 that Zusko had been arrested for failing to capture Mykolaiv and was accused of providing Ukrainian military leaders with information on Russian positions due to his alleged use of unsecured communication channels.

General of the Army Alexander Dvornikov, Colonel General Gennady Zhidko, and Colonel General Alexander Lapin

Accomplishments: The capture of the Luhansk Oblast, including Severodonetsk and Lysychansk

The story of the three generals is intertwined due to their overlapping commands from April to October 2022.

The Kremlin ended its group command structure after Russia suffered strategic defeats at Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Kharkiv in late March 2022. On April 8, it named General Dvornikov the first theaterwide commander of Russian forces in Ukraine.

Reportedly, Dvornikov was ordered to capture the remainder of the Donbas – Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts – by May 9. What the Kremlin got on May 8 was news of a disastrous wet crossing attempt at the Siverskyi Donets River near Bilohorivka. At least 500 Russian troops were killed, and over 80 military vehicles were lost, mostly due to artillery. On the same day, Russian troops supported by the Private Military Company Wagner Group captured Popasna. The crossing at Bilohorivka was supposed to create the second part of a pincer surrounding Ukrainian forces defending Severodonetsk.

With the pincers broken, Dvornikov started a brutal war of attrition on May 10, which led to the capture of the Luhansk Oblast at the expense of the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of Russia, Syrian volunteer groups and Chechen Akhmat forces, which were all combat destroyed by the beginning of July. Chechen Akhmat and the 2nd Army Corps of the so-called Luhansk People’s Republic, now officially part of the Russian Ministry of Defense, never recovered.

Dvornikov fell out of public view in the third week of May, and between May 26 and June 22, Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed him as theaterwide commander, ending his 44-year military career. Although the capture of the Luhansk Oblast didn’t happen while he was the theaterwide commander, his tactics, which closely resembled World War II Russian Marshal Georgy Zhukov’s, did.

General Zhidko was named the new theaterwide commander of Russian troops, but it is unclear when his command officially started and ended. The first proof that Zhidko was the new theaterwide commander was on June 22, when he appeared with Shoigu. Zhidko was reportedly dismissed on July 12, but the Kremlin didn’t publicly name a new theaterwide commander until October 8. While he likely started theaterwide command around June 1, based on the official Kremlin announcements, Zhidko’s tenure as commander of all Russian troops may have been as short as 17 days. There were reports that he was dismissed from command due to a sharp increase in health issues related to chronic alcoholism. Zhidko, age 57, died on August 16, 2023, after a “long illness.”

Intertwined with Dvornikov and Zhidko was General Lapin. Lapin was the commander of the Central Military District of Russian Forces, serving as an area commander through April 8, 2022, before becoming a subordinate of Dvornikov, followed by Zhidko. On July 4, one day after Russia announced it had captured the Luhansk Oblast, Lapin was awarded the title of Hero of Russia by President Putin.

WBHG News analysts concluded in early June that Russia could capture the regions of Luhansk and Donetsk in the short term but lacked sufficient forces to hold territorial gains. As Russia’s combat potential decreased due to the nature of attritional warfare and the June arrival of NATO-provided guided multiple launch rocket systems (GMLRS), better known as HIMARS, Dvornikov or Zhidko pulled reserve forces of the Central Military District from Kharkiv and Donetsk into Luhansk. By early August of 2022, the units under Lapin’s command were exhausted, and near Izyum, equipment and ammunition shortages continued to worsen.

When Ukraine launched the Kharkiv Counteroffensive on September 5, Lapin was accused of abandoning his forces and incompetence by Chechen Colonel General Ramzan Kadyrov and PMC Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin. On Telegram, Kadyrov wrote, “If I had my way, I would demote Lapin to a private, deprive him of his awards and, with a machine gun in his hands, send him to the front line to wash away his shame with blood.” The Chechen warlord, who has never stepped foot in Ukraine, also accused Lapin of cowardice for commanding from the rear.

A divide within the Kremlin spilled out into public view. Some military leaders and analysts accused Kadyrov and Prigozhin of playing politics and positioning themselves to gain deeper control of the Ministry of Defense. Kadyrov and Prigozin leveraged Wagner Group’s bot farms and faux news organizations, a network of Russian milbloggers, and their own social media channels to run an organized smear campaign against Lapin and to advocate for General of the Army Sergey Surovikin to be named the new theaterwide commander. Although Lapin was never the theaterwide commander, Zhidko’s unclear status created a vacuum, contributing to Lapin receiving an oversized portion of the blame for the failures in Kharkiv, at Izyum, and the Russian retreat from Lyman.

On October 8, 2022, Surovikin was named the theaterwide commander, and on October 29, Lapin was dismissed by President Putin. The only commander to still have a career after his fall, the Gerasimov-connected Lapin was named the chief of staff of the Ground Forces of the Russian Federation on January 10, 2023.

General of the Army Sergey Surovikin

Accomplishments: Successful retrograde operation from western Kherson, building the defensive structures in occupied Crimea, Kherson, Zaporzhzhia, and southern Donetsk, instilling basic discipline into Russian troops

On the same day General Surovikin was named the commander of all Russian forces in Ukraine, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) blew up the Kerch (also known as the Crimean) Bridge. Two days later, Ukraine requested a total communications blackout in Kherson, and the second phase of the Kherson Counteroffensive started 48 hours later.

During his ascent, Surovikin negotiated to execute three campaigns: first, the withdrawal of Russian forces west of the Dnipro River in Kherson; second, executing the same air campaign he ran in 2017 against Syrian civilians, targeting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure; and third, taking the forces that withdraw from Kherson and achieving a strategic victory on another axis by December 31. In the public information space, state media started setting conditions with the Russian people to accept a withdrawal from Kherson as both a goodwill gesture and a move to more strategically advantageous positions.

On October 10, the first widescale Russian missile attack against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure was launched. Between November 8 and 11, Surovikin executed a masterful retrograde operation from Kherson, preserving up to 25,000 Russian troops and their equipment, slipping across the Dnipro River and suffering less than 500 casualties.

The biggest legacy of Surovikin’s command was ending the Kremlin policy of sending mobiks with no training to the frontline and instilling military discipline among the Russian troops in Ukraine. This was accomplished by brutally enforcing existing military rules and protocols and creating busy work. Thousands of mobiks were involved in constructing the Surovikin Line, a network of defenses with up to three echelons 35 kilometers deep across occupied Crimea, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and southwestern Donetsk. The static defenses have stymied Ukraine’s summer offensive, forcing Kyiv to change tactics twice since June 4 to overcome the Russian network of minefields, antitank traps, trenches, tunnels, and bunkers.

Surovikin also tried to end sending untrained and ill-equipped Russian troops to the frontlines. The quality of Russian forces had improved significantly, as have their tactics, but since August, there appears to be a return of sending poorly trained, mobilized soldiers into battle.

During his tenure as commander of all Russian forces in Ukraine, Surovikin kept his “day job” as commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS), which included air defense. On December 5, 2022, the Engel-2 and Dyagilevo military airfields deep within Russia were attacked by Ukraine. Two Tu-95 strategic bombers and one Tu-22M3 bomber were damaged, and up to six Russian servicemembers were killed. On December 26, Engels-2 was attacked for a second time. During this period, the relationship between the Kremlin and Prigozhin had become toxic, and Russian troops had been in retreat for months except at Bakhmut, where daily advances were measured in the 10s of meters. It had become clear there would be no major victory for Russia for New Year’s celebrations.

On January 11, 2023, Surovikin was relieved of command and named a Deputy of Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov. The next day, PMC Wagner claimed they had captured Soledar, with the Russian Ministry of Defense not crediting the Wagnerites in their daily morning report.

Surovikin’s alignment with PMC Wagner was well known, and the relationship between the Kremlin and Prigozhin was already souring in October 2022. In May 2023, when Priogzhin threatened to leave Bakhmut by May 10, there were accusations that Surovikin was warning Wagner’s leader that the Kremlin was actively working to dismantle his company.

During the failed Prigozhin Insurrection on June 23, 2023, Surovikin made a video appeal to Prigozhin to stop his actions while holding a submachine gun on his knee. Shortly after, Surovikin was arrested, reportedly briefly held at Lefotovo Prison, before being transferred to an apartment where he remains under house arrest. On August 22, 2023, he was officially dismissed as the commander of the Russian VKS, and his future is unclear.

PMC Wagner Group Leaders Yevgeny Prigozhin and Dmytry Utkin

Accomplishments: The capture of Popasna, Soledar, and Bakhmut and proved Russian penal units could be useful in battle

Private Military Company Wagner Group was asked to support the expansion of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine in March 2022, and up to 1,000 mercenaries arrived on March 19. Wagner Group’s first action was in the Hirske-Zolote region and took a leading role in the capture of Popasna. That Russian advance ultimately severed the T-513 Highway between Lysychansk and Bakhmut in early June 2022, strangling Ukrainian logistics.

Also in May, Wagner’s mercenaries joined the Russian forces advancing in the direction of Bakhmut and Soledar from the Svitlodarsk Bulge. In early June, Prigozhin convinced Russian President Vladimir Putin to allow him to create a battalion of penal soldiers assigned to PMC Wagner. One thousand convicts were recruited from Russian prisons and deployed east of Bakhmut in late June. The initial group suffered catastrophic losses of up to 90% killed and wounded, but the Kremlin believed the program was successful. Project K was born, and Prigozhin was given open access to Russia’s 335,000-plus prisoners. From July to December 2022, 49,000 criminals were recruited into the ranks of PMC Wagner. Recruiting of penal mercenaries peaked in October, but the numbers dropped sharply in November as word spread through the prison population of poor training, heavy losses, and penal units used for human wave attacks. In June 2023, the Council of Commanders reported that from March 2022 to May 2023, Wagner’s casualty rates were 82.5%.

While the September 2022 information war against General Lapin led by Prigozhin and Kadyrov was successful, politically, it was costly. The crumbs of goodwill between Prigozhin and Shoigu blew away like dust in the wind. Prigozhin was furious after the Russian Ministry of Defense snubbed Wagner Group in January 2023 and did not credit his mercenaries for the capture of Soledar. Hours later, the Kremlin released a clarifying statement, acknowledging that the ground fighting was accomplished by PMC Wagner and not just “volunteers.”

The political fallout was swift, and it became clear that President Putin was pulling away from his former caterer turned warlord. Shoigu effectively ended Project K, blocking PMC Wagner from further recruitment at Russian penal colonies. Wagner Group was already facing a recruiting crisis among its regular ranks because the pool they would normally recruit from – Russian soldiers – were dying at an alarming rate, didn’t want to return to Ukraine, and were facing stop-loss orders from the Kremlin, which was extending their service contracts. Days later, Shoigu created his own penal unit PMC called Storm-Z.

In February 2023, Prigozhin infamously threatened to leave Bakhmut, releasing a video with dozens of dead Wagnerites in the background, claiming their deaths were caused by the Russian Ministry of Defense withholding ammunition. Reactions in the Russian information space were mixed, with some Russian commanders claiming that Wagner was not being singled out for special treatment, stating that ammunition shortages were an issue theaterwide. Others criticized Prigozhin, asserting that PMC Wagner had been given preferential treatment at the expense of other axes and that the successes in Bakhmut were not due to superior training and tactics but an excess of ammunition that had been normalized. Others defended the mercenary leader, pointing out that the Wagnerites were the only force achieving operational success in Ukraine.

Prigozhin and Kadyrov hinted that the Chechen military leader provided some ammunition to Wagner Group in mid-February. In late February, the stalemate appeared to break when a lull in Russian artillery fire missions in the Bakhmut and Soledar areas of operation ended.

On May 5, Prigozhin made another video again standing in front of dozens of corpses, claiming they were Wagner mercenaries unnecessarily killed. He infamously growled, “Shoigu! Gerasimov! Where’s the fucking ammo,” claiming the Kremlin had cut off his ammunition supplies and that elite Russian forces who were supposed to defend his flanks in Bakhmut were doing nothing. Prigozhin declared that if he didn’t get sufficient ammunition within 48 hours and Russian forces defending his flanks didn’t rejoin the battle, he would withdraw his forces.

WBHG News analysts noted that the April deal between the Russian Ministry of Defense and PMC Wagner, which transferred the defense of the flanks to Russian units while Wagnerites continued fighting within Bakhmut, was meant to destroy Wagner. The Kremlin only tasked Russian forces to hold the existing defense lines and focused on using artillery to protect themselves as Wagner mercenaries fought house-to-house in bloody attritional warfare. Moscow was repeating its policy of using indigenous and proxy forces to fight in the most difficult areas while preserving their own units, and Prigozhin could not or refused to see the true nature of the agreement.

It is also important to note that unlike in February 2023, when there was a noticeable decrease in Russian artillery fire, there was no such decrease in May. Prigozhin wasn’t facing an ammunition shortage. He was facing a staffing crisis caused by an appalling casualty rate and his inability to recruit new penal mercenaries.

The mercenaries that joined the ranks of Wagner Group in October and November who weren’t dead or badly wounded were reaching the end of their six-month contracts. While some analysts believed that Prigozhin would arbitrarily extend their contracts beyond six months, the team at WBHG News accurately predicted that would not happen. Prigozhin was a former convict who deeply believed convicted criminals could create a new life after prison. Prigozhin understood that if he didn’t honor his contracts with the penal mercenaries he always called “his boys,” he would break one of the foundations of the unwritten Russian convict code.

After Prigozhin’s May 5 video, General Kadyrov, who days earlier had called Prigozhin “his good friend” and said that the pair had planned surprises for Ukraine, lashed out at his former partner and questioned his loyalty to Russia. Two days later, while taking another swipe at Prigozhin and his “ego,” Kadyrov claimed that the pair had agreed for Chechen Akhmat to take over the offensive in Bakhmut. In a video posted on his Telegram channel, Kadyrov showed his letter to the Kremlin sent on May 7, which Moscow rejected.

On May 8, Prigozhin announced that the Russian Ministry of Defense told him that if his forces left on May 10, he and his mercenaries would be arrested for treason. Trapped militarily, legally, and politically, he announced the Wagnerites would stay until Bakhmut was captured. At the time of his capitulation, Wagner Group controlled 93% to 95% of the city. On May 20, Prigozhin announced the mission was accomplished, even if the victory claim was dubious. There has never been a picture of Russian troops in the Litak region of Bakhmut, the last Ukrainian stronghold in the southwest corner, and very few pictures and videos from Russian state media, troops, or Wagnerites west of the railroad tracks that split the city.

On June 1, Wagner started its withdrawal, and on June 10, the city was handed over to Russian forces. The Kremlin announced that all Private Military Companies would no longer be commanded independently and would have to sign contracts with the Ministry of Defense by June 20, accepting to be under the command of the Russian Federation Armed Forces effective July 1. Up to two dozen PMCs fighting on behalf of Russia had been created since the start of 2023, and the mandate also impacted General Kadyrov. Kadyrov made a clean break from Prigozhin politically, throwing his loyalty back to Shoigu as he announced he was the first leader to sign a transfer of control with the Kremlin.

Prigozhin refused, and as the June 20 deadline passed, it was clear that a clash between PMC Wagner and the Kremlin was inevitable. Late on June 21, he released a rambling video accusing the Kremlin of lying about attacks on civilians in the Donbas, claiming the war against Ukraine was escalated so that oligarchs had more access to natural resources and that the entire invasion of Ukraine was based on a lie. If Prigozhin was the leader of a nation, his words were tantamount to the breaking of diplomatic relations and a prelude to a declaration of war.

On June 22, Prigozhin made a dubious claim that his camps in occupied Luhansk were attacked by Russian missiles, causing over a thousand casualties. A video released as proof across multiple Wagner Telegram channels did not support his claim. Twelve hours later, Prigozhin and Wagner founder Dmitry Utkin led an insurrection specifically targeting Shoigu and Gerasimov while pledging their loyalty to President Putin.

Wagner mercenaries took control of Rostov-on-Don and surrounded the Southern Military District headquarters, barely firing a shot. Utkin led a brigade of Wagnerites in a convoy that advanced 670 kilometers in 12 hours toward Moscow. The so-called “March for Freedom” ended as quickly as it started, with Prigozhin asking his followers to stand down on June 24.

In the end, 15 to 22 Russian soldiers died, and seven helicopters and an Il-22M command and control plane were shot down. Part of a refinery was in flames, one highway bridge was destroyed, and at least three civilians were killed on June 24 when the Russian VKS started to bomb highways indiscriminately.

President Putin was invisible through the insurrection, but after it ended, he called the attempted rebellion treason and promised swift justice. Just 48 hours later, it was announced that Prigozhin would not face criminal charges, and two days later, Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko announced he had created a peace deal between himself, Prigozhin, and Putin. PMC Wagner would relocate to Belarus, where Prigozhin would live in exile. WBHG News analysts never believed this was a firm deal and warned that previous history shows that anyone disloyal to Putin had ended up imprisoned, dead, or hiding after surviving an assassination attempt. Even among Putin’s former closest allies, there had never been an exception to this, and in 2018, Putin told a reporter that “betrayal” was unforgivable.

In early July, a camp to accommodate up to 8,500 Wagner mercenaries was built in Tsel, Belarus, and on July 15, Prigozhin posted a selfie showing himself in his underwear at the Belarus encampment. On July 19, PMC Wagner released a video showing Prigozhin and Utkin addressing a group of Wagnerites about the organization’s future, with the media-shy Utkin declaring in English, “Welcome to Hell!”

But just under the surface, the claims that 25,000 Wagner mercenaries would occupy Belarus to supplement Lukashenko’s army were questionable, and by mid-August, it was clear that if there ever was a three-way deal, it was over. All recruiting was suspended on July 30, with Prigozhin claiming they had “plenty” of mercenaries in their ranks. Wagnerites that had arrived two weeks earlier were leaving Belarus due to deployments in Libya, recruitment efforts by other PMCs, or a lack of pay as Wagner’s finances fell apart.

Prigozhin also stunned analysts and his detractors when he appeared in St. Petersburg, Russia, on July 28 at the periphery of the Russia-Africa Summit. The sting of the non-response from the Kremlin over the dead Russian airman was barely a month old, and some publicly wondered how Prigozhin, who was supposedly exiled, could be walking around in St. Petersburg as a free man.

On August 23, just hours after General Surovikin was formerly dismissed as the commander of the Russian VKS, Prigozhin’s Embraer Legacy 600 private jet was either shot down or destroyed by an explosive device over the Tver region of Russia while it was en route from Moscow to St. Petersburg. It is reported that Prigozhin, who carefully guarded his travel plans, decided at the last minute not to swap to the second private jet operated by PMC Wagner, an Embraer Legacy 650, that was also bound for St. Petersburg.

Ten people were killed, including the pilot, co-pilot, and a flight attendant operating on a one-day contract because she needed to travel to St. Petersburg. Among the seven members of PMC Wagner that were killed,

  • Yevgeny Prigozhin – figurehead and leader focusing on media, social media, psychological operations, and commercial catering
  • Dmitry Utkin – creator of the name “Wagner,” known white nationalist, and the military leader of PMC Wagner
  • Valery Chekalov – Head of logistics operating under the title of “business advisor”

None of the dead have been officially identified, but President Putin referred to Prigozhin in the past tense in a formal statement, as did Kadyrov. The Wagner Group’s Council of Commanders declared they would not make a formal statement until after the Kremlin provided its official reason for the downing of the airplane.

Of the eight Russian military and mercenary leaders who achieved key objectives since February 24, 2022, three are dead, two are held in custody, one is missing, one was dismissed, and one, General Lapin, was reassigned. Putin’s protection of Shoigu and Gerasimov is unwavering despite their unwavering loyalty, despite the documented corruption and repeated mistakes. For any other Russian or Russian-aligned senior military leader who finds success on the battlefield in Ukraine, it comes with the occupational hazard of falling out of favor or, worse, from the sky.

National, Russia-Ukraine War, Think About It

Anatomy of a botched false flag attack at Detention Camp 52

1 Comment

Editor’s Note: An earlier version of this story referenced the converted warehouse where POWs from the Azov Battalion were being kept in the northeast corner – that should have been northwest. Thank you for your understanding.

[UKRAINE] – (MTN) – On July 28, the self-declared leaders of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic accused Ukraine of attacking the Olenivka Penal Colony, located 16 kilometers from the line of conflict. Over the span of 12 hours, Russian leaders, Russian state media, and unaffiliated pro-Russian journalists shared horrifying pictures, painting the Ukrainian armed forces as the executions of their people. The evidence they showed the world and their own casualty reports painted a different picture. One that potentially and accidentally documented in vivid detail the worst war crime against POWs in Europe since the Kosovo War in 1998.

The history of the Detention Camp 52

The dark history of Olenivka started in 2014 when the camp, situated in wheat fields and rolling hills just west of the village of Molodizhne, became a filtration camp for Crimean Tartars after the Russian occupation of the Crimea Peninsula. A 2015 United States Department of State annual report on Human Rights in Ukraine documented extrajudicial imprisonment and justice, torture, and executions. Conditions in the colony were squalid where disease ran rampant, and potable water was scarce.

After the Russia-Ukraine War started in February, Detention Camp 52, as it is officially known, took on a new role as a filtration camp for Ukrainian citizens in captured territory. During the siege of Mariupol, people who tried to leave the city went through a filtration process in the towns of Manush and Bezimenne. Many of those who were taken away for additional filtration ended up in Olenivka.

Women who went through filtration and were released reported being held in concentration camp conditions. They were held in areas so cramped they had to sleep sitting or, worse, in shifts. There was little heat, no blankets, and no beds. Disease was rampant, food was scarce, and drinking water was withheld, sometimes for more than a day. Hygiene products were barely provided, and female hygiene products were not to be found.

The world got its first look inside Olenivka in April when Russian state media and Pro-Russian social media accounts circulated pictures of alleged Ukrainian POWs from Mariupol. Our team analyzed and geolocated the videos. The video wasn’t recorded in Mariupol – it was recorded in Olenivka.

Photo credit – Russian State Media – a still image from a video released on April 14 shows alleged Ukrainian POWs from Mariupol. Russian state media claimed the video was recorded in Mariupol but in the Olenivka Penal Colony.

Editor’s Note: We have elected not to blur the faces of these prisoners in the hope that the continued sharing of their faces and identities can help keep them alive.

An analysis of the video showed only a few men in military uniforms moved to the front while the rest wore civilian clothing. Some of the men didn’t wear the uniforms of Ukraine but of Russian separatist militias. Most of the men did not resemble the numerous pictures from Russian state media and dark corners of Telegram showing dead Ukrainian soldiers who were mostly younger and more fit than their Russian conscript counterparts.

Photo Credit – Google Maps – satellite image of Olenivka Penal Colony – 47°49’38.9″N 37°42’41.4″E

The penal colony is easily found on a map. The prison is double-walled and covers over 114,000 square meters. The perimeter is 1.5 kilometers with buildings for administration, guards, and worse surrounding the facility. In the northwest region, the warehouse that was partially converted into housing for prisoners of the Azov Battalion was still unused and had holes in its roof at the time of the Google satellite image.

From filtration camp to POW colony

On May 15, almost three months after the siege of Mariupol began and three weeks after Russia had declared victory within the port city, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that a deal had been reached that would permit the safe surrender of the Ukrainian forces remaining inside the Azovstal Metallurgical Factory.

Confusion spread through the news channels as Pro-Russian social media accounts spread disinformation, and officials remained silent. Deputy Defense Minister of Ukraine, Anna Malyar, released a brief statement in the morning saying, “Thanks to the defenders of Mariupol, Ukraine gained critically important time. They fulfilled all their tasks. But it is impossible to unblock Azovstal by military means.”

Initially, the deal negotiated through United Nations and Red Cross intermediaries appeared to be a win for Ukraine and Russia. Ukraine found a way out for up to 2,200 marines, territorial guards, foreign volunteers, and local police. Russia was able to end its siege without having to storm the fortress that was Azovstal. It would take 7,000 to 10,000 troops to defeat the 2,200 remaining defenders, resulting in heavy losses. Russia’s offensive in Luhansk was bogged down, and they needed a way out.

On May 16, the first 264 Ukrainian troops left Azovstal and into Russian captivity. Among them were 53 seriously wounded soldiers that would face death without care from a hospital. Reporters from Russian state media and western media documented the evacuation and followed the convoy of hospital buses to Bezimenne. The other 211 soldiers faced an uncertain future as a convoy of five buses headed northeast to Olenivka.

On May 16, we wrote in our Situation Report, “The soldiers were likely taken to the infamous detention camp 52, between Olenivka and Molodizhne.” Video released by Russian state media on May 17, showed the convoy of busses arriving in the morning hours at the filtration center turned POW camp.

The deal that was brokered between Russia and Ukraine through the United Nations and Red Cross would facilitate a prisoner of war transfer. The Red Cross would be able to document the information on each prisoner, notify their family members, be a conduit of communication, and would monitor their care and treatment.

As the last of as many as 2,200 remaining soldiers, foreign volunteers, and police left the bunkers of Azovstal, the deal was already falling apart.

A history of war crimes

There were already rumors and whispers about the conditions within Detention Camp 52 as Mariupol POWs streamed in. The Red Cross never received its promised access, and multiple requests to inspect Olenivka and the prisoners were denied. Officials weren’t even permitted to document all of the prisoners that were removed from Azovstal, with a large discrepancy between the numbers claimed by the Russian Ministry of Defense and human rights observers.

Before the group from Mariupol arrived, the stories were consistent for the few who could leave the walls. Men taken to Olenivka fell into three groups.

For those found to be part of the military, the government, or had a prior history with the military or as a government employee, beatings, torture, and disappearances awaited. A release could be found through forced conscription for able-bodied men from 18 to 65 with no prior military or government connections and no pro-Ukrainian tattoos or ideation on digital devices. Those that refused faced deprivation, beatings, and torture until they disappeared or joined the Donetsk People’s Republic militia as forced conscripts. For the rest, slave labor in dangerous conditions awaited while living in squalid conditions without enough food and limited access to clean drinking water. The Red Cross and United Nations brokered a deal that committed POWs to concentration camp conditions.

On June 29, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense announced that a prisoner swap had been arranged, and 144 POWs held at Olenivka were being exchanged for 144 Russian POWs. Among those released were 95 defenders from Azovstal and 43 members of the Azov Battalion. Pro-Russian social media erupted with outrage. Outside of the bots, troll farms, and the consumers of their social media content, hope emerged for more swaps on both sides. Despite the issues, it seemed possible that civility would prevail and that the stories were exaggerations. The hope was short-lived.

Photo credit – Ukrainian Ministry of Defense – former Ukrainian POWs await transport back to Ukraine during a June 29, 2022 prisoner exchange

Many of those released were in poor health and were still healing from wounds now six weeks old. Some had to be taken away in ambulances. The Ukrainian government said that those released were getting the medical and psychological care they needed and asked for respect and privacy. Soon after their release, new whispers emerged within the medical community.

Beginning on July 8, our e-mail and social media inboxes became flooded with requests to validate reports that many of the soldiers released on June 29 had been castrated. On July 10, we made a public response that in order to confirm the reports, we would require first-person accounts from Ukraine with the cooperation of doctors and former POWs willing to go on the record. We would need access to medical records and permission from the Ukrainian government. We would need assistance and support from individuals trained to interview victims of torture and former prisoners in an ethical and respectful way.

We started working through our network to make that happen and planning a trip in late September or early October. On July 27, we received our forms from the Ukrainian government to get our press credentials. We wouldn’t need them. Hours later, the world had all the evidence it needed.

Photo credit – left – Russian state media – right – PMC Wagner Group – on the left is the person accused of torturing and executing a Ukrainian POW – on the right is a still image of the torture where the POW was beaten, castrated, mutilated, and executed

On July 28, a disturbing video emerged of a bound Ukrainian POW being castrated with a box cutter and then stomped on by a soldier in the Chechen Ahmat Unit, possibly in Severodoentsk, sometime in June. The POW was bound and restrained by multiple mercenaries and made blood-curdling screams as he was hacked for more than 45 seconds in the horrific video. After severing the genitals, the mercenary holds it up to the camera and tosses it on the ground by the man’s head. The video started circulating on Pro-Russian Telegram channels before spilling over to Twitter, YouTube, and others. The video has been deemed authentic, and the perpetrator in the video has been identified. A few hours later, a second part of the video emerged. The Ukrainian POW, who was likely already fatally wounded from his torture, was shot in the head at point-blank range.

The whispers of castration weren’t just rumors. They were unthinkably true.

A false flag to clean up a big mess

During the week of July 25, the leaders of Detention Camp 52 moved up to 200 members of the Azovstal Batallion to their own quarters. The area was walled off from the larger warehouse. It was a single room with a high ceiling and a corrugated metal roof. The building was brick and cinderblock construction.

PMC Wagner Group had at least one major problem, and possibly two. A squad recorded themselves torturing and executing a Ukrainian POW. The participants in the war crime wore surgical gloves, and the leader of the atrocity had a box cutter. In less than two minutes, they coordinated and moved in a way that indicated this was not the first time this had been done.

Worse, he was almost instantly identified because of his distinct clothing and the perpetrator appearing in earlier Russian state news reports, revealing distinguishing characteristics. Within 24 hours, the video had been validated by multiple sources, including our own team. The United Nations, European Union, and government officials condemned the action labeling it a war crime and a terrorist act.

Within the walls of Olenivka were there other prisoners who had been castrated, but instead of their testicles and penis removed to the prostate gland, only had their testicles cut off? The world will likely never know.

Hours after an undetermined explosion in the new barracks and Russian accusations of it being a HIMARS strike, the Ukrainian Directorate of Intelligence accused PMC Wagner Group of destroying the building. Local officials in Donetsk reported that 47 POWs had been killed and up to 130 wounded on July 28. Ukrainian intelligence claimed that the order to destroy the building came directly from Yevheny Prigozhin, the head of PMC Wagner Group.

There were reports that inspectors from the Russian Ministry of Defense were coming on September 1 to check on the conditions on Olenivka and do an audit of funds given to Wagner Group to expand the strained facilities.

In a statement on Telegram, Ukrainian Intelligence wrote, “The explosions in Olenivka are a deliberate provocation and an undeniable act of terrorism by the occupying forces side. According to the available information, they were carried out by mercenaries from the Wagner Group private military company (PMC) under the personal command of the nominal owner of the specified PMC, Yevheny Prigozhin.”

As the Kremlin and leaders of the self-declared Donetsk People’s Republic tried to turn the horror into a public relations coup, likely in an attempt to cripple western sanctions and arms support, the story quickly disintegrated. Not a single person with the Russian military, separatist militias, terrorists from the Imperial Legion, PMC Wagner Group, Chechen territorial guard, local territorial guard, or area police were injured or killed in the attack. No camp administrators or support staff were killed or wounded. The building, which held up to 200 POWs, was void of any guards or other authorities.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy held a meeting with Ukrainian heads of staff and the Verkhovna Rada Commissioner of Human Rights regarding the terrorist attack in Olenivka, which was deliberately staged by Russian occupation forces. The Red Cross submitted a formal request to inspect the site and conduct an investigation.

The European Union condemned the incident, with EU foreign affairs chief Josep Borrell stating Russia’s actions constitute “severe breaches of the Geneva conventions and their Additional protocol and amount to war crimes.”

The Red Cross, which was supposed to have unfettered access as part of the May agreement, submitted a formal request to inspect the site and conduct an investigation. In a later statement, the Red Cross said it would conduct a full investigation if “all parties” would agree.

The evidence doesn’t support there was a rocket attack

Ukrainian officials have known about Olenivka since 2014. The camp, 16 kilometers from the line of conflict, has never been shelled since Russia annexed Crimea and separatists started fighting in February 2014. The settlements around the camp have also never come under artillery or rocket fire, nor have ever been bombed or attacked by aircraft. Our research team was aware of Detention Camp 52 by early March and was working on documenting and validating ongoing abuse claims.

We spoke with a former Gebirgspionier with the German Bundeswehr with explosives experience for their evaluation.

“It’s impossible that a HIMARS fired M30 or M31 warhead was used in the strike on the POW camp. No usual shrapnel pattern on the walls; they are almost virgin. Even the bodies don’t show shrapnel wounds but typical blast injuries. The roof is almost intact, which is near impossible for the corrugated metal roof material. The roof would have been blown almost entirely.

Photo credit – Russian state media – a July 29 still image from a video showing damage and charred bodies still inside the Olenivka Penal Colony

The bunk beds would have been expected to fall over and be torn apart, at least in the center of the blast radius. However, the burn marks on the walls and the spalling in their center remind me of directional charges (like one or two MON-90 hanging from or laying on the metal roof) attached to a gasoline canister. In my assessment, this caused the spalling on the wall: an impact of that metal canister where [an accelerant] splashed and formed those significant brand markings, as you would expect when searching a burned house for the source of a fire.”

Photo credit – Russian state media – a July 29 still image from a video showing damage and charred bodies still inside the Olenivka Penal Colony

Photos from the exterior also do not support the claim of a rocket attack. The building has no shrapnel damage. The corrugated metal roof has been blown outward, not smashed down and blasted away. The blast damage and fire damage are all from the interior. Metal bars and window frames are not blown out but show damage consistent with an interior building fire.

The section of the building directly adjacent to where the Azovstal prisoners were held is also undamaged, with no blast damage through the concrete block wall.

Photo credit – Russian state media – a July 29 still image from a video showing damage to the outside of the Olenivka Penal Colony, which is inconsistent with a rocket, missile, or artillery attack

But the most damning evidence came from Russian state media and PMC Wagner Group. On July 27, a video circulated of a school in Izyum that had been converted into a military base after it had been attacked with rockets fired by HIMARS. That building was more soundly constructed than the Olenivka warehouse and had multiple interior rooms that would have contained the blast. The damage to the building doesn’t match the impact on the penal colony. The roof has been smashed from the top and blown out by the detonation. The building has been blown apart, with debris strewn in multiple directions. Whole window frames were blown out and lay meters away.

Photo credit – Russian state media – a July 27 still image from a video showing a school converted to a military base by PMC Wagner Group in Izyum after it was destroyed in a HIMARS strike

In another clumsy attempt to claim Ukraine committed a war crime by destroying a school, Wagner Group’s drone video showed trenches, tank scrapes, and firing positions on the school grounds and, from at least one point, still partially intact after the strike. The video also provided clear evidence of what a HIMARS strike looks like and the damage it causes.

Epilogue

Ultimately we cannot arbitrate if this was an interior or exterior explosion. That will have to be left to the experts and investigators. It is unlikely that third-party investigators will be allowed onto the scene until it was been sanitized and prepared more, if ever.

Was the building destroyed to cover up torture and mutilation? Was the explosion rigged to mass execute Azov Battalion members while painting Ukraine as the perpetrators to fracture western support? Was PMC Wagner Group covering up more war crimes and potential corruption?

One day, we may know. In war, the victor writes the history.

National, Russia-Ukraine War

With Battlefront Frozen, Russia Terrorizes Civilians – July 15, 2022 Ukraine Update

[KYIV, Ukraine] – MTN It has been 3,060 days since Russia occupied Crimea on February 27, 2014.

Luhansk – We continue to assess Bilohorivka and Zolotarivka in the Luhansk oblast as contested. Neither belligerent has provided definitive proof they control either settlement.

A Russian ammunition depot in Kadiivka, Luhansk, was hit by High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) munitions. Multiple secondary explosions were recorded on video, with Grad or Smerch rockets launching from all directions. Thermite munitions were also launched from the burning depot, raining back down on the surrounding area.

Northeast Donetsk – Pro-Kremlin sources dismissed claims that the 2nd Army Corps of the Luhansk People’s Republic had advanced into and captured Siversk, calling the reports “premature.” The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine reported that troop positions in Hryhorivka were shelled by Russian forces with artillery and rockets fired from Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS).

The July 13 Russian offensive on Verkhnokamyanske was costly, forcing Russian troops to pull back to reconsolidate units.

West of Popasna, Russian forces made a small advance on Bilohorivka [Donetsk] and were unsuccessful. The settlements of Berestove and Vesele were also shelled. The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine claimed that Russian troops had been pushed out of Spirne.

The update posted on Telegram by FSB Colonel and war criminal Igor Girkin appears to be the most accurate assessment of current Russian combat operations. Russian forces are exhausted, lacking human capital and equipment, and are still in an operational pause.

Bakhmut – Russian forces shelled Pokrovske, Vesela Dolyna, Bakhmut, and Chasiv Yar to set conditions for a future offensive. The death toll from the Russian Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) strike on Chasiv Yar remained at 48.

In the Svitlodarsk Bulge, Russian forces attempt to advance on Kodema and Vershyna while shelling Luhanske, Zaitseve, and the Vuldehar Power Plant. None of the advances were successful.

Southwest Donetsk – Zaporizhia – Southwest of Horlivka, elements of the 1st Army Corps of the Donetsk People’s Republic were partially successful in advancing into Kamyanka but, by sunset, had been pushed back to the original line of conflict.

Ukraine has claimed that high-ranking Russian commanders were killed in targeted HIMARS attacks over the past week. Russian state media reported that two deputy commanders of the Russian 106th Airborne Division, Colonels Sergei Kuzminov and Andrey Vasiliev, were killed on July 9.

Otherwise, fighting was limited to artillery exchanges and airstrikes from Horlivka to Donetsk city to Velyka Novosilka in the Donetsk oblast and Hulyaipole to Orikhiv in the Zaporizhia oblast.

Mariupol – In Russia-occupied Mariupol, city streets and yards remain littered with unexploded ordnance and landmines. Local residents report that elements of the 1st Army Corps of the Donetsk People’s Republic and Chechen proxy forces stopped clearing mines and explosives from civilian areas.

Insurgents in Mariupol set the Satelit Factory on fire. Resistance leaders said, “It’s better to let it burn than to let the Russians loot and steal.”

Kherson – Russian and Ukrainian forces exchange artillery, rockets, and air strikes from Oleksandrivka [Mykoaliv] to Osokorivka. There weren’t any documented changes in territorial control.

There are strong indications that Ukrainian forces have started to advance south of Kyselivka.

Ukrainian Special Operation Forces raided a Russian POW camp at an undisclosed location in the Kherson oblast, rescuing Ukrainian POWs and civilian captives in the raid.

Mykolaiv – Ten Russian cruise missiles slammed into two universities in Mykolaiv. After one of the strikes, a video showed no additional fires, secondary explosions, military vehicles, or troop presence.

Dnipropetrovsk – A Russian cruise missile destroyed a school in Synelnykove. There were reports of casualties, but no additional information was given.

Kharkiv – Northeast of Kharkiv, fighting was limited to Dementiivka, north of Kharkiv city. There was no change in territorial control.

Sumy – Russian forces stepped up cross-border attacks in the Sumy oblast, striking eight Ukrainian settlements. The towns of Myropil, Yunakivka, Esman, Nova Sloboda, Khotin, Shostka, Krasnopillia, and Velyka Pysarivka were attacked by artillery, mortars, MLRS, and small arms fire. There was no information on casualties.

Izyum – South of Izyum, Russian forces were pushed out of Kurlka by Ukrainian Special Operation Forces (SOF). There were no other territorial changes, with Russian forces once again attempting to secure the contested settlement of Bohorodychne. Ukrainian SOF, small units, and artillery continue to interdict Russian Ground Lines of Communication (GLOC – supply lines) on the western front of the Izyum axis.

Vinnytsia – The death toll in Vinnytsia from the Russian cruise missile attack remained at 23, with over 60 wounded. Nine people remain missing.

Daily Assessment

  1. The Russian Ministry of Defense is systematically terrorizing Ukraine’s civilian population, purposely targeting non-military targets and timing strikes in daytime hours to maximize casualties.
  2. The Kremlin, LNR leaders, and Pro-Russian accounts have significantly overstated Russian gains over the last week, which have been minor.
  3. Ukraine continues to progress steadily in the Kherson oblast advancing along the entire axis, where Russian forces continue to struggle to hold defensive positions.

To read the rest of our report, become a Patreon! For as little as $5 a month, you get access to the daily Russia-Ukraine War Situation Report. The report provides analysis, maps, detailed information about all the axes in Ukraine, international developments, information about war crimes and human rights, and economic news. As an added benefit, you get access to flash reports, breaking news, and our Discord server.

Become a Patreon today!

National, Russia-Ukraine War

Russia-Ukraine War Update for July 10, 2022

[KYIV, Ukraine] – MTN It has been 3,053 days since Russia occupied Crimea on February 27, 2014.

There was no change in territorial control across Ukraine, with fighting limited to reconnaissance, spoiling attacks, and ad hoc offensives with groups of soldiers from squad to company-sized.

Lysychansk – Severodonetsk – Fighting continued on the Luhansk-Donetsk oblast border. However, the operational tempo slowed significantly. Fighting for control of Bilohorivka continued, with Russian forces making incremental gains. Russian forces also attempted to advance on Hryhorivka but were unsuccessful.

Northeast Donetsk – Russian forces tried to advance into Zolotarivka and Verkhnokamyanske from the Verkhnokamyanka oil refinery and were unsuccessful. Pro-Russian social media account Rybar reported, “The Russian Federation Armed Forces are fighting on the eastern outskirts of Verkhnokamyanske,” aligning with the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and local reports.

There was no additional noteworthy combat activity south of the Verkhnokamyanka oil refinery to the Svitlodarsk bulge.

Russian forces fired artillery and rockets at Berestove, Ivano-Darivka, Novoselivka Verknokamianske, Siversk, Bilohorivka [Donetsk], Soledar, Fedorivka, Paraskoviivka, and Kurdiumivka. The Russian air force fired unguided rockets at the settlement of Spirne.

Ukrainian forces shelled Russian-occupied Yampil, Dibrova, Kreminna, Pshenychne, Vovchoyarivka, Mykolaivka, Oleksandropillia, and Komyshuvakha.

Southwest Donetsk – Zaporizhia – There were scattered artillery exchanges from Horlivka to Donetsk city to Velyka Novosilka in the Donetsk Oblast and Hulyaipole to Orikhiv in the Zaporizhia Oblast.

Elements of the 1st Army Corps of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) attacked Ukrainian positions in Avdiivka and Marinka. Neither attack was successful.

NATO-provided High Mobility Rocket Artillery System (HIMARS) rockets hit eleven high-value targets in the Donetsk region overnight. An ammunition depot in Russia-controlled Chystiakove, 75 kilometers behind the known line of conflict, was destroyed.

Ukrainian forces also destroyed an ammunition depot in Shakhtarsk, 65 kilometers behind the known line of conflict. There are massive secondary explosions, including surface-to-air missiles, and local officials are evacuating the city.

An ammunition depot in Russian-controlled Zuhres, east of Donetsk, was also destroyed in a rocket attack.

An ammunition depot in Ilovaisk, southeast of Donetsk, was also destroyed. There was a massive explosion after four rockets hit the ammunition stockpile. The blast shattered windows up to 7 kilometers away.

A Russian ammunition depot was also destroyed at the Kalinin Mine in Horlivka. The Kalinin Mine is the largest coal mine in Ukraine.

NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) indicated the Kirovs’kyi fuel depot, hit by artillery or HIMARS-delivered rockets three days ago, continued to burn.

In Mariupol, at least three Russian Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) engineers were killed in the area of the Azovstal Metallurgical Plant. Efforts to demine Azovstal and the Illich Iron and Steelworks caused an accident setting off a large explosion and secondary fires from ammunition cooking off.

Adviser to the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Anton Gerashchenko, reported that the Almaz-Antey Company in Russia had drawn the ire of the Russian Ministry of Defense over the inability of Russian S-400 air defense systems to intercept High Mobility Rocket Artillery Systems munitions. It is reported that the head of the company, former Russian prime minister Mykhailo Fradkov, assured the Kremlin the S-400 antiaircraft system would be capable of intercepting rockets launched from the NATO M-142 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS). We cannot verify the report’s veracity, but we can verify that the Pantsir-1, S-300, and S-400 air defense systems have been very ineffective against the HIMARS launched rockets.

Kherson – Russian forces sent squad-sized reconnaissance units toward Olhyne and Knyazivka. Both groups were discovered and eliminated. Russian forces continue to struggle to hold defensive positions across Kherson with the volume of artillery, rocket, and missile strikes slowing.

Russian forces fired six S-300 surface-to-air antiaircraft missiles, using them in a surface-to-surface capacity. The S300 has limited capabilities as a surface-to-surface weapon, but the fragmentation warhead and inertial guidance systems are not suited for this role.

Dnipropetrovsk – Three missiles struck the settlement of Radushne.

Kharkiv – Northwest and north of Kharkiv, Russian forces conducted reconnaissance in force and spoiling attacks on Dementiivka and Male Vesele. Neither attack was successful. There were reports of Ukrainian forces advancing toward the Russian stronghold of Kozacha Lopan. We cannot confirm the veracity of the report.

Izyum – Russian forces made piecemeal attacks on the settlements of Krasnopillia and Dolyna. Neither attack was successful. Russian forces shelled Chepil, Bohorodychne, Dibrovne, Adamivka, and Slovyansk.

Sumy – Russia and Ukraine continue to exchange cross-border shelling in the Sumy oblast. The settlements of Shalyhyne, Khotin, Esman, and Myropillia were attacked, with five civilians injured.

Odesa – Black Sea – Ukraine has reopened the Danube-Black Sea Canal after emergency restoration work to abandoned Soviet-era river ports and infrastructure. The canal’s opening will permit grain to be loaded at one newly restored river port. Bulk carriers could sail south from Ukraine to the Bosphorus Strait and beyond.

Beyond Ukraine – Ukrainian ground forces started building minefields on the border with Belarus and installing engineered barriers. Belarus has ongoing military exercises planned to end on July 8 but were extended through July 15 – 16.

Daily Assessment

  1. Russian forces do not have a short-term answer to the NATO-provided M142 HIMARS rocket attacks, devastating ammunition depots, command and control, and critical transit hubs in Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Kharkiv.
  2. After the operational pause concludes, we maintain that Siversk is the most likely location for major fighting in northeastern Donetsk.
  3. Supply interdiction by Ukrainian forces is impacting Russian military operations in Kherson.

To read the rest of our report, become a Patreon! For as little as $5 a month, you get access to the daily Russia-Ukraine War Situation Report. The report provides analysis, maps, detailed information about all the axes in Ukraine, international developments, information about war crimes and human rights, and economic news. As an added benefit, you get access to flash reports, breaking news, and our Discord server.

Become a Patreon today!

National, Russia-Ukraine War

Russia-Ukraine War Update for July 1, 2022

[KYIV, Ukraine] – MTN It has been 3,045 days since Russia occupied Crimea on February 27, 2014.

Odesa – Multiple Xh-22 air-to-sea cruise missiles hit the seaside resort town of Serhiivka, southwest of Odesa striking a rehabilitation center run by Moldova, an apartment building, and a hotel, killing 21 civilians and wounding more than 30. Ukrainian rescuers were still searching for survivors. The missiles were launched by Russian Tu-22M3 strategic bombers, hours after the Russian garrison on Snake Island was evacuated.

Moldovan Health Minister Alla Nemerenko reported that one employee of the Children’s Rehabilitation Center of Moldova was killed in the attack. The center, approximately 100 kilometers from the international border with Moldova (63 miles) was for children and their families to relax on the Black Sea while the child received medical treatment and emotional support.

Severodonetsk – Lysychansk – Russian forces continue to make incremental but critical gains in their attempt to push Ukrainian forces out of Severodonetsk.

Major General Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that Chechen and Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) separatist forces achieved a wet crossing at Pryvillia and now control half the settlement.

The line of conflict south and southwest of Lysychansk is little changed in the last 24 hours. Russian forces have not advanced further in the southeastern lowlands, held at the edge of Bila Hora to the children’s hospital and the rubber factory. After seven days, Russian forces ended their siege of the gelatin plant and retreated to Pidlisne to regroup.

Russian forces now control the southeast and northwest regions of the Verkhnokamyanka oil refinery and continue to hold the area west of the Bakhmut-Lysychansk T-1302 Highway Ground Line of Communication (GLOC – aka supply line). Ukrainian forces have stabilized their positions within the refinery and have prevented further advances.

Russian forces renewed their efforts to advance on Bakhmut from Klynove but did not advance beyond the eastern edge of the settlement.

In the Svitlodarsk bulge, Russian forces attempted to recapture Dolomitne and Novoluhanske and were unsuccessful. Fighting for control of the Vuhledar Power Plant continued.

Mariupol – An Ondatra class Project 1176 Akula amphibious assault ship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet hit a mine near Mariupol. There was no information on casualties or the amount of damage to the vessel.

South Donbas and Zaporizhia – Russian forces attempted to launch an offensive on Hulyaipole, likely from Marfopil, as a spoiling attack to slow the Ukrainian advance toward Polohy. Russian forces suffered severe casualties and not only withdrew but lost territory.

Kherson – Ukrainian forces continue to advance in the Kherson Oblast along three fronts. The region west of the Dnipro River is steppe with mostly small settlements in open farmland, making measuring gains by liberated settlements challenging.

Kharkiv – North of Kharkiv, Russia made a third attempt to recapture  Dementiivka but was unsuccessful. Positional battles were fought in Udy, Prudyanka, Tsupivka, and Velyki Prokhody. There were no changes in territorial control.

Izyum – Slovyansk – South of Izyum, Russian forces launched ad hoc attacks against Kurulka, Dolyna, Krasnopillya, and Bohorodychne. None of the offensives were successful.

To read the full report, become a Patreon! For $5 a month, you get access to the daily Russia-Ukraine War Situation Report. The report provides analysis, maps, detailed information about all the axes in Ukraine, international developments, information about war crimes and human rights, and economic news. As an added benefit, you get access to flash reports, breaking news, and our Discord server.

Become a Patreon today!