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Part 7: The complex history of Islamic extremism and Russia’s contribution to the rise of Al Qaeda and ISIS

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This is part seven of a ten-part series that explains the rise of modern Islamic extremism. From 1951 to 2021, a series of key geopolitical events, many independent of each other, caused the Islamic Revolution, the rise of Al Qaeda and ISIS, the creation and collapse of the caliphate, and the reconstitution of ISIS as ISKP. While Western influence and diplomatic blunders are well documented through this period, the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation are equally culpable. The editors would like to note that a vast majority of the 1.8 billion people who are adherents to some form of Islam are peaceful and reject all forms of religious violence.

Read Part Six: The complex history of Islamic extremism and Russia’s contribution to the rise of Al Qaeda and ISIS

Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush become partners in the ‘War Against Terror’

The Rise of Al Qaeda

The first al Qaeda plot to attack the United States was uncovered in November 1990 when the FBI arrested operatives who were planning to blow up skyscrapers and government buildings. It would be an aspiration that Osama bin Laden would maintain for 11 more years.

In 1992, two bombs tore through Aden, Yemen, intending to target United States troops staying at the Gold Mohur and Aden Movenpick Hotels. In the first bombing, the small group of troops had already left for Somalia, and in the second, the bomb went off prematurely.

Then, on February 26, 1993, a truck bomb exploded in the underground parking garage of the World Trade Center in an attempt to topple the towers. The blast caused extensive damage, killing six and wounding over 1,000. Officially, Al Qaeda didn’t order the attack, but the chief architect, Ramzi Yousef, was trained by the terrorist organization.

Heavy equipment excavating the site of the World Trade Center parking garage bombing – February 1993
Credit – Photographer unknown – public domain

The group involved in the planning and execution was exposed when Mohammad Salameh, who rented the truck used to deliver the bomb, returned to the rental agency in New Jersey trying to get his $400 cash security deposit back.

The Saudi government accused bin Laden of being behind a November 1995 bombing in Riyadh that killed five American and two Indian soldiers and wounded 60. Three years later, two bombings targeting the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killed 224 and wounded more than 5,000 people.

The Millennium Plots and 9/11

Each successful attack drew more money and members to Al Qaeda’s ranks. A wave of terror that was planned for the year 2000 New Year celebrations, dubbed the Millennium Attack Plots, was mostly thwarted, partially by luck.

Jordanian officials uncovered a plot to attack four locations during New Year, including the Radisson Hotel in Amman, the Christian church on Mount Nebo, the border crossing between Israel and Jordan, and a holy site on the Jordan River where it is believed profit John the Baptist baptized Jesus of Nazareth. One of the plotters was Al Qaeda operative Abu Musab al Zarqawi, who would go on to be the founder of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

On December 12, 1999, Jordanian security forces arrested 16 people involved with the plot, eventually putting 28 people on trial. However, Al Zarqawi fled to Pakistan before he could be arrested. Twenty-two defendants were found guilty of the plot, including six with Al Qaeda, who were all sentenced to death. Another architect of the plot, Saudi national Abu Zubaydah, was the mastermind behind attacks planned in the United States.

Algerian national Ahmed Ressam traveled from Montreal, Canada, and attempted to enter the United States on a ferry through Port Angeles, Washington. Ressam raised suspicion among customs officials who searched his car and found enough explosives to produce four small bombs, timers, and detonators. He was arrested on December 14, 1999, and told investigators that Zubaydah was orchestrating the bombing of LAX Airport in Los Angeles under the order of bin Laden. Further investigation found that the Space Needle in Seattle, the Transamerica Tower in San Francisco, and Ontario Airport in the Los Angeles area were also planned targets.

On the other side of the world, Al Qaeda operatives hijacked Indian Airlines Flight 814 on December 24, 1999, and crisscrossed the Greater Middle East for a week, stabbing one passenger to death, a German, and wounding 17 others. The Indian government gave in to their demands, releasing convicted Al Qaeda-aligned terrorists Maulana Masood Azhar, Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh, and Mushtaq Ahmed Zargar. Sheikh would go on to be one of the chief planners of the 9/11 attacks on the United States. Over the next 20 years, Azhar would lead three terror attacks in India, killing hundreds.

On New Year’s Eve in Syrian-occupied Lebanon, 300 members of the terror group Takfir wal-Hijra secured dozens of villages in northern Lebanon, attempting to establish the first Sharia law-based caliphate in the mountainous region. Over 13,000 troops were deployed to quell the uprising with fighting continuing until January 6, 2000. Twenty-five terrorists were killed, and another 55 were captured. Bin Laden was credited with financing Takfir wal-Hijra through shell companies and a bank in Beirut. The surviving fighters who escaped disappeared into the Palestinian refugee camp in Ain al-Hilweh, Lebanon. The 55 who were captured were sentenced to ten years to life in prison, with all receiving pardons in 2005.

The rift between al Qaeda and those who sought an even stricter interpretation of Shari law may go back as far as the mid-1990s. It is alleged that an offshoot of Takfir wal-Hijra in Sudan plotted to assassinate bin Laden in 1995 due to his liberal views on Sharia law and the formation of a caliphate. Despite the rift, the group led over a dozen terror attacks in Africa in coordination with Al Qaeda, mostly in Sudan.

The last part of the plot was an attack on the Arleigh Burke-class Aegis guided-missile destroyer USS The Sullivans on January 3, 2000, while it was refueling at the Yemeni port of Aden. The attack failed because the small boat, loaded with over 400 kilograms of plastic explosives, sank due to the amount of weight in the bow.

Damage to the guided-missile destroyer USS Cole after the October 12, 2000, Al Qaeda terrorist attack in Aden, Yemen
Credit – Photographer unknown – public domain

Al Qaeda learned from its mistake and, on October 12, attacked the guided-missile destroyer USS Cole while it refueled at Aden. Two small fiberglass boats were used, distributing more than 450 kilograms of C4 plastic explosives, and each only had a single suicide bomber onboard. Both boats struck the Cole, tearing a 40-foot-long gash into the port side and sparking a large fire. Seventeen crew members were killed and 39 wounded, and it took three days for damage control to stabilize the ship. U.S. officials would later find the Sudanese government to be complicit in working with Al Qaeda and seized over $13 billion in assets.

Eleven years after the first al Qaeda plot to destroy American skyscrapers was uncovered, bin Laden would achieve his goal. On September 11, 2001, two hijacked commercial airliners struck both towers of the World Trade Center in New York, collapsing the buildings. A third hijacked aircraft struck the Pentagon, and a fourth crashed in Pennsylvania when passengers tried to regain control. The attacks killed 2,996 and wounded over 6,000. Two decades later, hundreds more would die from illnesses attributed to the 9/11 attacks.

Initially, bin Laden denied any involvement in the 9/11 attacks, but in 2004, as part of a brief manifesto, he wrote, “God knows it did not cross our minds to attack the Towers, but after the situation became unbearable—and we witnessed the injustice and tyranny of the American-Israeli alliance against our people in Palestine and Lebanon—I thought about it. And the events that affected me directly were that of 1982 and the events that followed—when America allowed the Israelis to invade Lebanon, helped by the US Sixth Fleet. As I watched the destroyed towers in Lebanon, it occurred to me to punish the unjust the same way: to destroy towers in America so it could taste some of what we are tasting and to stop killing our children and women.”

A thirst for revenge fuels Vladimir Putin’s ascendency

When the Red Terror and Soviet Famine ended in 1922, the Soviet Union entered a brief period of reform which ended some of the oppressive Tzarist policies. Vladimir Lenin, who was already in declining health, eased restrictions on the Soviet republics, allowing them to reembrace their original culture, including language, religion, and art. Individuals were permitted to have small businesses within the guidelines of the Soviet government, blending Communism and Socialism.

The economy started to improve, and after decades of repression, deportations, war, famine, revolution, and civil war, the new Soviet society appeared to be finding its feet. All of this came to an end in late 1924 when Joseph Stalin became the Secretary-General, despite Lenin’s warnings. Seventy-five years later, history wouldn’t repeat, but it would rhyme.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the newly created Russian Federation entered a tumultuous period. Moscow struggled to contain inflation and wild swings of the rouble. The new country would face the 1993 Constitutional Crisis, and the economy would collapse in 1994 and 1998. For the connected and the bold, the underlying chaos was an opportunity for those seeking wealth and the growth of organized crime. However, unlike the turmoil of the Depression and Prohibition Era in the United States, where organized crime bosses fought over the control of bootleg alcohol, gambling, and illegal weapons, the new oligarch class fought for control of the now privatized industrial sectors of Russia—coal, steel, oil and gas, grain, construction, heavy equipment, and technology. Fueled by endemic government corruption, the Yeltsin administration and the now weakened state security services not only ignored the Game of Thrones happening in open view but, for the right price, participated in it. One of the men who grew allies during this period was the now-former KGB agent Vladimir Putin.

In 1991, an embittered Putin resigned from the KGB, refusing to work for the newly created Federal Security Agency (AFB). President Yeltsin dissolved the KGB in November 1991 in response to a failed coup d’etat that was led by Soviet hardliners earlier in the year, including the head of the KGB, Vladimir Kryuchkov. Yeltsin would go on to sign two more decrees, one creating the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation in January 1992 and the second in December 1993, forming the Federal Counterintelligence Service of the Russian Federation (FSK). Each decree further eroded the legacy power structure created by the KGB.

Putin returned to his native home of St. Petersburg and, using information the KGB had gathered during the Soviet era, blackmailed Mayor Anatoly Sobchak to gain a job in the city government. He started as a reformer in name only, investigating corruption, but in reality, he was Sobchak’s political strongman.

Putin’s career was unremarkable until 1994 when he was named deputy mayor. He and Deputy Vladimir Yakovlev went on to run the city, with Putin building a circle of influence and earning future favors among the influential, wealthy, and the criminal underground. Sobchak’s initial popularity faded from 1995 to 1996 as public services deteriorated, crime increased, and allegations of corruption within the city government grew.

Putin became the local leader of the politically liberal and fiscally conservative Our Home–Russia Political Party in 1995 and ran the reelection campaign for Sobchak. Sobchak lost to his deputy Yakovlev in a close election, putting Putin out of a job. Sobchak would become the focus of a corruption investigation in 1997 and would flee to France.

Using his contacts and network, Putin moved to Moscow in early 1997 and was named the deputy chief of the Presidential Property Management Department. Less than a year later, he joined President Yeltsin’s staff and quickly maneuvered himself through a number of roles before becoming the leader of the FSK replacement, the 1995 Yeltsin-created Federal Security Service of Russia (FSB), on July 25, 1998.

Putin only led the FSB for 13 months, but he implemented a complete restructuring and dismissed almost all of the leadership, installing former Soviet-era KGB agents loyal to the ideals of Kryuchkov and his vision of restoring Russia to its former glory.

Like Lenin in 1922, Yeltsin was in declining health in 1998. Presidential elections were coming in less than two years, and potential candidates were starting to position themselves and build alliances. Within the Kremlin, Yeltsin’s inner circle started to warn him about Putin’s restructuring of the FSB, his growing influence and connections, and his desire to return to restore Soviet-style state controls. His aspirations were supported by a growing list of oligarchs, who viewed Putin as someone they could control while leveraging his vision of state security to grow and protect their wealth.

On August 9, 1999, Putin was appointed as one of three deputy prime ministers of the Russian Federation and endorsed by Yeltsin as his future successor in the upcoming 2000 elections. Eight days later, the State Duma confirmed Putin as the acting Prime Minister.

In the span of 2 1/2 years, Putin had gone from a failed St. Petersburg deputy mayor to the unelected prime minister of the second most powerful country on the planet. Even before Yeltsin’s endorsement, alarm bells were going off within the corners of the FSB and in the pages of the newly created free press about Putin and his plans.

To help his rise to power, Putin makes a series of deals with Islamic terrorist leaders

In the Sixth Part of this series, Chechen terrorist leader Shamil Basayev and his connections to Pakistan and Afghanistan and his encounters with organizations adjacent to Al Qaeda were lightly touched.

A young Basayev arrived in Azerbaijan in 1992 with an estimated 1,000 Chechen militants to fight in the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, leading a call for jihad with Chechen leader Salman Raduyev. Basayev left for the Abkhazia region of Georgia in late 1992, while Raduyev continued to command the Chechen contingent. Reportedly, Basayev ordered the withdrawal from the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan in 1993 due to a series of military defeats and a lack of support for the call to jihad.

Chechen leader and terrorist Shamil Basayev – 1995
Credit – Photographer Natalia Medvedeva – public domain

Basayev would fight on the side of the Moscow-backed Abkhazia separatists, and he would go on to lead up to 1,500 volunteer fighters of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus (CMPC). Basayev is accused of overseeing the ethnic cleansing of Georgians in the breakaway Abkhazia Republic, the September 27 to October 11, 1993, Sukhumi Massacre, and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions for the mass executions of captured Georgian soldiers.

This is where Basayev’s history becomes murky. He is believed to have defended Russian President Yeltsin during the failed August 1991 coup d’etat, occupying the barricades of the Russian White House with other Yeltsin supporters. There are many allegations that during the War in Abkhazia, Basayev and up to 200 Chechens within the CMPC received training and arms from the Main Defense Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (GRU). The CMPC would fall apart at the end of the War in Abkhazia, with different factions supporting the Moscow-backed breakaway republic and others aligning with Chechnya and other radical Islamic factions. And despite having a death warrant on his head, Basayev was able to freely travel between Chechnya, Georgia, and the Russian Federation.

Basayev would go on to run for president of Chechnya, coming in second place. He was then appointed deputy prime minister by newly elected president Aslam Maskhadov and actively worked to undermine his government. During a six-month period in which he was symbolically named the acting president of Chechnya, he gutted government oversight, shut down numerous ministries, and turned a blind eye to the theft of natural resources. By the end of 1998, Basayev was a warlord leading a rival faction against Maskhadov and had aligned himself with Afghanistan mujahideen veteran and Al Qaeda leader Ibn al-Khattab, a Saudi national. Al-Khattab had also broken away from President Maskhadov despite being named the Chief of Military Training for the Chechen Armed Forces in 1996.

Basayev met with Putin in March 1999 and agreed to help the Kremlin topple Maskhadov’s Chechen government and support a Russian invasion. Putin would reverse the failure of the First Chechen War with a quick success by taking just the northern third of the republic to the Terek River. Transcripts of phone records would show that Putin and his associates had numerous phone calls with almost a dozen radical Muslims and were using the FSB to orchestrate both kinetic and information warfare plans.

Al-Khattab and Basayev, along with Raduyev, openly called for the occupation of the Russian Federation Republic of Dagestan and the formation of a single state under Islamic Sharia law, declaring the final goal of expelling all Russians from the Caucasus. Putin had reached 20 years into the KGB past to tap the fears of long-dead Soviet leaders that Iranian-style radical Islam would spread to the Caucasus.

Independent of Putin’s plan, in April 1999, the Emir of the Islamic Djamaat of Dagestan (IDD), Bagauddin Magomedov, called for jihad to liberate “Dagestan and the Caucasus from the Russian colonial yoke” and created an unusual and doomed alliance. Magomedov and the IDD were aligned with Wahhabism, while Al-Khattab formed the Islamic Legion, comprised of foreign fighters, with a significant number aligned with the doctrine of Al Qaeda.

In July, Turpal-Ali Atgeriyev, the Deputy Prime Minister of National Security for Chechnya, and Deputy Prosecutor-General Adam Torkhashev traveled to Moscow to meet with Putin and warn him of the imminent invasion of Dagestan, which Putin was well aware of and counting on. Shortly after the Moscow meeting, an article in the Russian newspaper Moskovskaya Pravda warned that the Kremlin was preparing a series of false flag attacks in Moscow to undermine President Yeltsin and cited leaked documents.

The War in Dagestan and false flag attacks in Russia bring Putin to power

On August 4, the IDD launched its first attacks, and three days later, the Muslim Legion invaded the Republic of Dagestan. In an ironic twist, Basayev and al-Khattab were not greeted as liberators and instead were met with fierce resistance. Shortly after, President Yeltsin ordered the bombing of Chechnya. On August 19, newly minted acting prime minister Putin set a deadline for Russian forces to crush the rebellion by the end of the month. In the same speech, Putin threatened to start bombing Dagestani rebels “hiding in Chechnya.” In reality, airstrikes on Chechnya started on August 8, but the Kremlin didn’t acknowledge the bombings until August 26. By September 11, major fighting in Dagestan was over, and the Second Chechen War had started. What Basayev didn’t know is he had been double-crossed by Putin, who had cut another deal. He didn’t want a third of Chechnya; he was going to take it all.

Yeltsin and Putin intentionally delayed the response of Russian ground troops, preferring to let Dagestani forces exhaust themselves while prolonging the raids coming from Chechnya. By the end of August, a wave of terror attacks would spread across Russia, with history revealing the FSB executed most of them under the order of Putin.

The first attack was on August 31 at an arcade in the Manezh Square Shopping Mall in Moscow, adjacent to the Kremlin. Three phone calls allegedly from the Liberation Army of Dagestan took credit for the attack. Future investigations would blame the Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade, an Islamist mujahideen organization co-created by al-Khattab and Basayev.

The next bombing was on September 4 in Buynaksk in Dagestan. The apartment building served as housing for Russian border guards and their families and was destroyed by a car bomb. Sixty-four people were killed, and another 133 were wounded. A second car bomb containing 2,700 kilograms of explosives was found by the Russian Army Hospital and defused.

On September 9, a bomb estimated to weigh 400 kilograms exploded in a Moscow apartment building. The nine-story brezhnevka was destroyed, killing 106 and wounding 249. The next day, Putin called United States President Bill Clinton and told him he was confident the bombing was executed by Chechen terrorists, adding that he believed the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Africa were not executed by Al Qaeda but by Chechnya.

At 5 a.m. on September 13, the next bomb exploded, destroying an eight-story apartment building, killing 119 and wounding 200. Due to poor planning, the false flag plot started to fall apart.

After the second bombing, Moscow businessman and landlord Achemez Gochiyaev had a horrifying realization. An acquaintance of his who was a former FSB agent had requested to rent the basement areas of four apartment buildings. The two blasts were in his buildings. Believing he was being set up, he contacted the Ministry of Internal Affairs, explaining what had happened and warning that bombs were likely in two more buildings. Moscow police searched the basements, finding massive bombs made of RDX.

As the smoke was still rising over the apartment block on Kashira Road, State Duma Deputy Gennadiy Seleznyov announced that there had been a third bombing in Volgodonsk in the Rostov-on-Don region of Russia. There had been no such explosion, but on September 16, a third bomb destroyed a nine-story brezhnevka in Volgodonsk, killing 17 and wounding 69.

On September 22, a man in the Russian city of Ryazan reported seeing two suspicious men carrying sacks into the basement of an apartment building from a car with partially obscured Moscow license plates. Police found 150 kilograms of white powder in three sacks with detonators and timers. Onsite testing identified the contents of the bags as the explosive RDX. The next day, Putin ordered the bombing of the Chechen capital of Grozny in response to the allegedly most recent attempted terrorist attack, declaring “no sympathy for the bandits.”

A quick investigation and telephone records traced the car and two men to a telephone number linked to the FSB office in Ryazan. The Ministry of Internal Affairs arrested three people who identified themselves as FSB agents from Moscow. Putin’s operation was in crisis, as Moscow had declared that the explosives were real to justify the bombing of Grozny. On September 24, the Kremlin declared the bags were filled with sugar, and the entire event was an FSB training exercise that ended in success due to the quick reaction of local authorities.

President Boris Yeltsin naming Vladimir Putin acting President of the Russian Federation – December 31, 1999
Credit – Press office of the Russian Federation – photographer unknown

Despite the obvious mistakes pointing to a government plot, Putin’s popularity soared. On December 31, Yeltsin resigned and named Putin acting President. Riding a wave of popularity due to the response to the so-called terror attacks and the initial success in Dagestan, Putin cruised to victory when Russians went to the polls on March 26, 2000.

Looking into Putin’s soul

The United States held elections in November 2000, and George W. Bush was elected the 43rd President in a contested election. On June 16, 2001, President Bush and President Putin met for the first time in Brdo Pri Kranju, Slovenia. Almost the entire world believed the Cold War was over, and despite the U.S. intelligence reports about Moscow’s ties to Islamic terror and the false flag attacks on Moscow, President Bush took his own path.

“This was a very good meeting. And I look forward to my next meeting with President Putin in July. I very much enjoyed our time together. He’s an honest, straightforward man who loves his country. He loves his family. We share a lot of values. I view him as a remarkable leader. I believe his leadership will serve Russia well. Russia and America have the opportunity to accomplish much together; we should seize it. And today, we have begun.”

The Western press asked hard questions after Bush and Putin made their separate remarks. It was a question directed at Putin, which led to a pivotal moment in U.S.-Russian relations.

“A question to both of you, if I may. President Putin, President Bush has said that he’s going to go forward with his missile defense plans basically with or without your blessing. Are you unyielding in your opposition to his missile defense plan? Is there anything you can do to stop it? And to President Bush. Did President Putin ease your concern at all about the spread of nuclear technologies by Russia, and is this a man that Americans can trust?”

Bush directed the question to Putin first, and when the question of trust was addressed, the Russian President said, “Can we trust Russia? I’m not going to answer that. I could ask the very same question.”

There was a brief but awkward pause caused by Putin’s response, with Bush breaking the sudden tension.“I will answer the question. I looked the man in the eye. I found him to be very straightforward and trustworthy. We had a very good dialogue. I was able to get a sense of his soul, a man deeply committed to his country and the best interests of his country. And I appreciated so very much the frank dialogue. There was no kind of diplomatic chit-chat, trying to throw each other off balance. There was a straightforward dialogue. And that’s the beginning of a very constructive relationship. I wouldn’t have invited him to my ranch if I didn’t trust him.”

Russian troops stand over a mass grave in Chechnya – February 2000
Credit – Natalia Medvedeva – Creative Commons 3.0

During their private meeting, Bush and Putin discussed Chechnya, Dagestan, and Russia’s response to Islamic terrorism, among many other topics. Putin was right to refuse to answer the trust question because he wasn’t negotiating honestly. Over a year ago, Putin cut another deal with the Chief Mufti of Chechnya, Akhmad Kadyrov. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation had completed the first phase of its occupation of Chechnya in June 2000, and Putin named Kadyrov the head of the administration of the Chechen Republic.

For Al Qaeda, which was at its apex of power, this was the ultimate betrayal.

Next installment: A second wave of Islamic terror spreads across Russia, and this time, the attacks are real. The Second Chechen War continues for another eight years. Osama bin Laden’s influence fades, and Al Qaeda fractures. The ISIS caliphate rises and falls as Syria becomes the next Russian battleground.

International News, National

Part 6: The complex history of Islamic extremism and Russia’s contribution to the rise of Al Qaeda and ISIS

Leave a comment

This is part six of a ten-part series that explains the rise of modern Islamic extremism. From 1951 to 2021, a series of key geopolitical events, many independent of each other, caused the Islamic Revolution, the rise of Al Qaeda and ISIS, the creation and collapse of the caliphate, and the reconstitution of ISIS as ISKP. While Western influence and diplomatic blunders are well documented through this period, the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation are equally culpable. The editors would like to note that a vast majority of the 1.8 billion people who are adherents to some form of Islam are peaceful and reject all forms of religious violence.

Read Part Five: The complex history of Islamic extremism and Russia’s contribution to the rise of Al Qaeda and ISIS

The Russian Civil War the West ignored—The First Chechen War

A very brief history of Chechnya 

From March 1990 to September 1991, 11 Soviet republics that used to be countries broke away from the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics. What made the revolution in the Checheno-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic unique was that the region had never been its own country.

During the Caucasus Wars, the Imperial Russian Empire fought a loose association of vassal states and the Ottoman Empire from 1819 to 1864. During the 45-year conflict, hundreds of thousands were forced to flee to the Middle East, the Ottoman Empire, and Persia. Ultimately, the Caucasus was absorbed into the Empire, and fighting between the Ottoman Turks and Russia continued.

When the Russian Imperial Empire collapsed in 1917, Chechens made their first attempt to form their country but were defeated in 1922 at the end of the Red Terror and became part of the Soviet Union. In 1936, Joseph Stalin arbitrarily created the Checheno-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, located on the northern border of Georgia and Azerbaijan and deported, arrested, and executed thousands during the 1937 Great Purge.

During World War II, Nazi Germany occupied parts of the republic from 1942 to early 1944 during Hitler’s campaign to secure the Caucasus natural resources. After the Nazi withdrawal, Stalin ordered the republic to dissolve, accusing the residents who were living under occupation of collaborating with Germany. Over 500,000 were deported to slave labor camps in Siberia, imprisoned, and executed, accused of disloyalty to the state. The region was divided between three bordering republics.

In 1957, Soviet Secretary General Nikkita Kruschev reversed Stalin’s order of deportation, permitting survivors of Stalin’s genocide to return and reestablish the Checheno-Ingush Autonomous Republic.

Chechens seek independence

Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev – date unknown
Credit – Photographer unknown – public domain

On November 27, 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the Checheno-Ingush Autonomous Republic declared itself as a sovereign state and adopted the name of the Checheno-Ingush Soviet Socialists Republic. Led by Dzhokhar Dudayev, the First Chechen National Congress met in June 1991, despite the Committee and the Supreme Soviet of the Checheno-Ingush Autonomous Republic still being seated.

In Russia, the failed coup d’etat by the Soviet Union Communist Party from August 19 to 21, 1991, saw the dissolution of the Communist Party and ultimately led to the final collapse of the Soviet Union four months later. Dudayev saw an opportunity to take advantage of the chaos.

In a third meeting of the Chechen National Congress at the beginning of September, the Committee and the Supreme Soviet of the Checheno-Ingush Autonomous Republic were removed, and political control was transferred to the Chechen National Congress Executive Committee.

On September 6, Dudayev declared the existing Soviet political and power structure had been dissolved. Armed supporters stormed TV and radio stations and the House of Political Education, where the Supreme Soviet was holding legislative meetings. Over 40 deputies were beaten, and the Supreme Soviet of the Grozny City Council was thrown out of a window. On September 15, the last meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the Checheno-Ingush Autonomous Republic dissolved Parliament and handed over control to the Chechen National Congress Executive Committee.

Elections were held on October 27 to install a new government despite a warning from Moscow that doing so would be illegal. Dudayev overwhelmingly won and, on October 28, formerly declared independence from the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.

The President of the Soviet Union, Boris Yeltsin, had survived the August coup largely due to poor organization and planning. Fearing he would look politically weak and concerned that other Oblasts and Republics within the RSFSR would declare independence, he ordered Russian Air Assault forces (VDV) deployed to the capital of Grozny to restore order and reestablish the Supreme Soviet of the Checheno-Ingush Autonomous Republic. Irregular troops loyal to Dudayev surrounded the airport, forcing the VDV to leave just three days later.

In June 1992, the self-declared Checheno-Ingush Soviet Socialist Republic split in two. The Republic of Ingushetia was formed along the Georgian border and joined the newly created Russian Federation, and the Chechen Republic was formed.

Old wounds and civil war

Dudayev severed economic and political ties with Moscow, collapsing the economy of the newly created republic. In the neighboring Republic of Ingushetia, old wounds caused by Stalin’s 1944 expulsion from the region exploded into ethnic violence between North Ossetians and Ingushetians. Yeltsin ordered Russian troops deployed to the Chechen border to stop arms shipments to Ingushetia, which Dudayev saw as a prelude to a Russian invasion. Chechnya didn’t test the border blockade, choosing to negotiate with Moscow to withdraw their troops.

The fighting in Ingushetia spilled over into Chechnya, which found itself in a low-grade civil war. There were four factions, including those loyal to Dudayev, those loyal to Moscow, those looking to settle old scores with Russians who were moved into the area by Stalin from 1944 to 1953, and those fighting in support of Ingushetia. Dudayev survived two coup d’etats—one in April 1993 and the second in December. After the failed second attempt, opposition leaders created a Provisional Council and asked Moscow for military assistance. By this time, Dudayev had transferred power to himself and in January 1994, renamed the Chechen Republic to the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.

Moscow failed in its threat assessment in the run-up to the First Chechen War. Yeltsin and his advisors believed that the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation were well-trained and equipped, that Chechen separatists were of poor quality, and that Chechen citizens would welcome Russian troops as liberators.

Law and order were collapsing in 1994, and Moscow used a strategy of sending Russian troops as “little green men,” arming pro-Moscow separatists, and providing close air support using unmarked aircraft. Backed by the Russian Federation, opposition forces attacked Grozny in October and November, with both attempts ending in failure. During the second attack, forces loyal to Dudayev captured 20 Russian Federation soldiers and up to 50 members of Russian state security, exposing Moscow’s direct involvement.

On November 29, President Yeltsin issued an ultimatum. All factions were to disarm and the captured Russians must be released. Dudayev refused, and on December 1, Russia started a bombing campaign of Chechnya to set conditions for a land invasion. The First Chechen War had started.

Russian tactics breed a terroristic response

The Russian Federation started its ground attack on December 11. The Minister of Defense of Russia, Pavel Grachev, boasted that a single regiment could end the separatist movement and that major fighting would be completed by December 20.

A destroyed column of Russian tanks in Dolinskoye, Chechnya – December 1994
Credit – Photographer unknown – public domain

Russian forces advanced to the outskirts of Grozny, and on December 29, a ten-day aerial bombardment and artillery campaign shattered the city, killing thousands of civilians. Russia accused Chechen separatists of using civilians as human shields, while Russia was accused of attacking civilians fleeing the assault. Grachev’s prediction of a nine-day special operation became a distant memory, and it was not until March 6, 1995, that Russian troops secured the remains of Grozny. Between 27,000 and 35,000 civilians were killed, with former Soviet Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev condemning the assault.

The peak of Russian control of Chechen was reached in March 1996, followed by a series of crushing defeats, including the loss of control of Grozny. In less than two years, Russian losses were halfway to the Russo-Afghan War, and the campaign had become very unpopular. President Yeltsin was looking for an exit.

On August 19, the Russian Federation issued an ultimatum that it would use strategic bombers and ballistic missiles to destroy the rest of Grozny if Chechen separatists did not leave the city. The declaration created panic, and thousands of civilians were killed during the Russian shelling as they tried to flee. Three days later, Yeltsin’s national security advisor brokered a ceasefire and dismissed the previous ultimatum as a “joke.”

Despite numerous reports of war crimes and human rights atrocities in the newly created free press in the Russian Federation, Moscow officially tolerated the tactics of its military. The worst incident was the Samashki Massacre in 1995, where 300 civilians were executed and burned alive by Russian troops using flame throwers, machine guns, and grenades.

In 95% Muslim Chechnya, Jihad is declared

In 1991, Jordanian-Chechen Sheikh Ali Fathi al-Shishani returned to Grozny. Al-Shishani had fought with the mujahideen in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union, and in 1993, he formed the Salafi Islamic Jamaat in Chechnya, recruiting Jordanian-Palestinians to the cause.

In addition to the faction created by al-Shishani, as early as 1992, Muslim extremists in Chechnya were being supported by the Afghan Taliban-aligned Haqqani Network. Chechens and exiled Chechen nationals traveled to Pakistan and Afghanistan for training and engaged in illegal arms shipments, reportedly supported by the Pakistan intelligence services. Fighters, arms, and recruits moved across the Azerbaijani border. The Haqqani Network collaborated with Osama bin Laden during the Russo-Afghan War and, in 1995, pledged their loyalty to Al Qaeda.

In the first half of 1994, the first terror attacks carried out by the Salafi Islamic Jamaat and their supporters included the hijacking of airplanes and buses, mostly to draw attention to the situation in Chechnya. As al-Shishani grew his ranks and influence, he caught the attention of the Chief Mufti of Chechnya, Akhmat Kadyrov, and in December 1994, they formed the Chechen Mujahideen. A month later, Kadyrov, the father of Chechen warlord Colonel General Ramzan Kadyrov, announced a global Jihad against Russia and all its interests, declaring, “There are a million Chechens and 150 million Russians. If every Chechen kills 150 Russians, we will win.”

For the remainder of the First Chechen War, al-Shishani acted as a conduit between Al Qaeda and Chechen militants and recruited Arab fighters. Islamic militants from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan fought against Russian troops while simultaneously waging a terror campaign against the non-Muslim minority in Chechnya.

On June 14, 1995, a group of Chechen militants led by terrorist leader Shamil Basayev stormed the city of Budyonnovsk in the Stavropol Krai region of Russia. A month earlier, a Russian airstrike killed 12 of his family members, including his mother. The Budyonnovsk raid was the first major terror operation conducted within Russia.

The group took control of the City Council building and the Ministry of Internal Affairs before Russian troops arrived. Basayev led a withdrawal to the city hospital, where up to 2,000 hostages were taken, including 150 children. Moscow accused the militants of executing up to 100 civilians as they moved from the city center to the hospital.

The next day, when Russian negotiators did not meet Chechen demands, a hostage was executed, followed by five more. Elite Russian units attempted to storm the hospital on June 16 but failed to gain control of the building and killed dozens of hostages. A brief ceasefire was declared, and 225 hostages were released.

Moscow negotiated a ceasefire on June 18, including within Chechnya. Over the next two days, the remaining hostages were released, and the militants were allowed to withdraw, including Basayev. It was a humiliating defeat for Russia and bolstered Chechen resistance. Between 130 and 170 hostages were killed by Chechen and Russian forces during the hostage crisis, and approximately 35 Russian police officers and soldiers. The international community condemned the Chechen militants and the Russian response, which President Yeltsin dismissed at the G8 meeting in Halifax, Canada.

As the fighting in Chechnya raged, terrorist leader Basayev contacted a Russian reporter and told her to look for a buried package in Moscow’s Izmailovsky Park. On November 23, she made a shocking discovery. Basayev had hidden a container holding 32 kilograms of medical-grade radioactive Cesium-137 that had been stolen from the Budyonnovsk Hospital. The find received little publicity, but Russian and Western intelligence interpreted the incident as a warning that Chechen militants were prepared to make a dirty bomb and use it.

On January 9, 1996, 200 Chechen separatists, led by Chechen Salman Raduyev, seized the Russian Federation military airfield in Kizlyar, Dagestan, taking over 2,000 people, mostly civilians, hostage. An agreement to release the women and children was quickly reached, and Moscow negotiated in bad faith for the Chechens to withdraw. One hundred and fifty civilians were taken as human shields, with the convoy of 13 buses ambushed by Russian VDV forces at the Dagestan-Chechen border, forcing the convoy to fall back to the village of Pervomayskoye.

Up to 500 troops repeatedly attacked the village despite the 150 hostages and up to 1,200 civilians caught in the middle. Nine days of fighting killed hundreds, with a majority of the Chechen militants able to break out of the encirclement. The village was destroyed in the fighting and Raduyev became internationally famous for leading the raid.

During the siege at Pervomayskoye, two Chechen terrorists and three Turks, including Erdinç Tekir, who was trained by Basayev from 1992 to 1993 in the Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict, hijacked a ferry boat and threatened to kill the 119 Russian nationals on board. Despite Russian demands that Turkey attempt an armed rescue of the hostages, negotiations continued. The crisis ended on June 19, the same day Chechen militants withdrew from Pervomayskoye, with the terrorists surrendering to Turkish authorities. By the end of 1997, all five had escaped Turkish custody.

In February 1996, Yeltsin ordered the capture and extrajudicial executions of Dudayev, Basayev, and Raduyev. Raduyev would surprise being shot in the head by a sniper in March of the same year, and Dudayev would die in a targeted Russian airstrike a month later.

Raduyev would go rogue, defying acting Chechen President Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, and is credited with at least six terror attacks. In June, a bomb blast in the Moscow Metro killed four and wounded 12. In July, two bombings of electric trolleys wounded 23. Several days later, Raduyev took credit for the explosions and vowed that if Russian troops did not withdraw from Chechnya, more acts of revenge would continue.

There were two more major incidents before Russian troops withdrew in accordance with the August 31 ceasefire agreement. Chechen gunmen hijacked an airplane in March 1996 and surrendered peacefully in Germany, and on November 18, a terrorist attack on a Russian base in Dagestan killed 56, with Chechen leaders claiming they had no involvement.

As part of the ceasefire, Moscow agreed to revisit the issue of Chechen independence in 2001. On January 5, 1997, the last Russian troops withdrew. It was a humiliating defeat after the failure of the Russo-Afghan War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War. Over 8,000 Russian soldiers were killed, and up to 40,000 more wounded. The Russian military had lost more tanks in Grozny than in its attack on Berlin in April and May of 1945.

Chechens collect the bodies of dead civilians in Grozny – December 1995
Credit – Photographer Mikhail Evstafiev – used under Creative Commons License

In Chechnya, the violence from 1994 to 1997 left an estimated 100,000 civilians dead, 500,000 displayed, and thousands missing. The republic and the economy were in tatters, and thousands of Islamic militants who had fought against the Soviet Union and Russia for more than a decade were looking for a new fight.

Terrorism didn’t end with the end of the First Chechen War

There is significant evidence that Al Qaeda and sympathetic Islamic terrorist groups helped arm, finance, and supply Chechen factions during the First Chechen War. Russian intelligence warned the CIA that bin Laden was working directly with Chechnya in an attempt to acquire Cesium-137 to build a dirty bomb but never specified a target. The 1995 Moscow incident dramatically increased efforts within Russia, with support from the West, to secure its reserves of refinied radioactive materials.

After the initial declaration of independence by Chechnya in 1990, the territory became increasingly radicalized. Much like in the Soviet Union’s war in Afghanistan, executions, torture, rape, and the destruction of towns and villages fueled a radical Islamic response. In early 1995, Dudayev was deeply unpopular and faced a no-confidence vote, which he stopped by absorbing all political power. The successful terror attacks against Russia, combined with Russian brutality, drew thousands to the Chechen cause while introducing even more radical elements into the mix. Dudayev’s transition of Chechnya to Islamic law resulted in additional support from his Al Qaeda and other terror network financiers. For the Western conscious, the violence in Chechnya was little more than a footnote.

The end of hostilities did not bring an end to terrorism committed by radical Islamist Chechens. On April 21, 1997, on the one-year anniversary of the death of President Dudayev, Basayev was credited with the bombing of the Armavir Railroad Station in the Krasnodar Krai region of Russia, killing three and wounding eight. He is also believed to be behind the planning of the April 28 train station bombing in Pyatigorsk, which killed two and wounded 17. In that incident, the Federal Security Service of Russia (FSB) arrested two Chechen militants. The two women would be sentenced by a Russian court in March 1999, sparking Dudayev to vow a new wave of terrorism.

Although peace was achieved within Chechnya, the open issue of full Chechen independence had been pushed back. It is highly unlikely that Moscow negotiated in good faith, and an embittered Vladimir Putin was building his own inner circle within the Russian oligarch class. He had political aspirations. Chechnya’s shattered economy and infrastructure plunged the country into chaos, where rival Muslim factions ranging from traditionalists to those seeking to establish a caliphate fought for control.

Much like Europe and the United States, Russia got its first taste of Al Qaeda-supported terrorism in the 1990s. Decades of misguided foreign policy by the new post-Cold War allies served to strengthen the ranks of multiple terrorist organizations.

By the end of 2001, Russia and the United States would be united in their mutual war against terror, and both countries would have new Presidents. One could be described as overly idealistic, and the other was plotting the return of the greatness of the Russian Imperial Empire.

Tomorrow’s installment: Al Qaeda spreads terror to four continents, killing thousands, leading to the 9/11 attacks. The Second Chechen War starts, and a new American President sees the new Russian Federation President, Vladimir Putin, as an ally in the war against terror.

Read Part Seven: The complex history of Islamic extremism and Russia’s contribution to the rise of Al Qaeda and ISIS

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Part 5: The complex history of Islamic extremism and Russia’s contribution to the rise of Al Qaeda and ISIS

This is part five of a ten-part series that explains the rise of modern Islamic extremism. From 1951 to 2021, a series of key geopolitical events, many independent of each other, caused the Islamic Revolution, the rise of Al Qaeda and ISIS, the creation and collapse of the caliphate, and the reconstitution of ISIS as ISKP. While Western influence and diplomatic blunders are well documented through this period, the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation are equally culpable. The editors would like to note that a vast majority of the 1.8 billion people who are adherents to some form of Islam are peaceful and reject all forms of religious violence.

Read Part Four: The complex history of Islamic extremism and Russia’s contribution to the rise of Al Qaeda and ISIS

Iraq invades Kuwait, Al Qaeda prepares for terror, and storm clouds brew over Chechnya

Prologue 

In 1990, the Soviet Union was in collapse, and its influence on the world stage was greatly diminished as General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev focused on internal issues. Western news reports told a story of a peaceful transition from Soviet rule in the Eastern Bloc nations and the Soviet Republics.

The reality was very different from what played on American TV sets, with Soviet troops and security forces continuing to use brutality to try and hold the USSR together. Republics that were previously countries were allowed to slip away. But when the idea of freedom from Soviet rule started to spread to historical Russian Imperial Empire lands, that was a bridge too far—which will be the topic in the sixth installment. This detour to explain the roots of the First Gulf War is critical to understanding what caused the full radicalization of Osama bin Laden, which led to the creation of ISIS and two decades of Islamic extremist terrorism within the borders of the Russian Federation.

Saddam Hussein prepares for another war 

At the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein intensified his brutal suppression of Shia and Sunni Muslims and Iraqi Kurds. While the Ba’aathist government aligned with the idea of Pan-Arab nationalism in the Greater Middle East, it rejected Sharia law and fundamentalist Islam. As the only secular Arab government in the region, Iraq was a terror target for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) of Iran and condemned by the newly formed Al Qaeda Arab Legion led by Osama bin Laden. Due to its secular lean and opposition to Iran, the West opted to ignore Hussein’s brutality and pro-Soviet stance and maintained cautious diplomatic ties.

The Iran-Iraq War had been fought to a stalemate, but the core of Iraq’s military might and Hussein’s Republican Guard was not only left intact but had grown. Shunning repayment of the debts Baghdad accumulated, Hussein went on a spending spree, purchasing over $10 billion of tanks and other heavy equipment from the Soviet Union ($25.5 billion in inflation-adjusted dollars) and additional equipment from France. He expanded his chemical weapons program and invested in domestic weapons production using dual-use goods.

Hussein wanted Kuwait back, in alignment with the long-standing Ba’aathist goal of reunification, whether through negotiations or military force. A new war was coming to the Middle East.

The creation of Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia and the start of the First Gulf War

At the end of World War I, as the Ottoman Empire collapsed, the British took control of large swaths of the Middle East. Due to centuries-old territorial disputes, fighting erupted between the Kingdom of Kuwait, which was loosely part of Iraq, and the House of Najd, which would become part of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1923.

In an attempt to resolve the regional disputes, the British High Commissioner in Baghdad, Percy Cox, arbitrarily defined the borders between Iraq, Kuwait, and Nejd. Many Kuwaitis and Iraqis were against the split, and there were significant reunification movements, leading to an armed revolt in 1939. At the behest of Great Britain, Shaikh Ahmad al-Sabah, the tenth ruler of the Sheikhdom of Kuwait, put down the rebellion.

Kuwait would remain a British protectorate until June 19, 1961. Iraq refused to recognize Kuwati’s independence but backed down less than a month later after the detente by the Arab League backed by Britain. A treaty of friendship was signed in 1963, and on May 14, the U.N. formally recognized Kuwait’s sovereignty. Tension between Iraq and Kuwait remained high, with a series of minor border crises and skirmishes through the mid-1970s.

Economic warfare, a 70-year-old border dispute, and a diplomatic blunder leads to war

During the eight years of the Iran-Iraq War, Kuwait had loaned $65 billion to Iraq for economic and military assistance. Iraq claimed it couldn’t repay, and Hussein demanded that Kuwait forgive the debt because it had defended the region from the spread of Iranian radicalism. Kuwait refused and escalated the situation by implementing a 40 percent increase in oil production.

In 1990, Baghdad accused Kuwait of slant drilling into Iraqi oil fields and ignoring OPEC-set limits on oil production. During the late spring and summer, the Iraqi military started building up on the Kuwait and Saudi borders.

Washington was alarmed, and on July 25, 1990, United States Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, met with Hussein for an explanation. During the meeting, Glaspie told him, “I know you need funds. We understand that, and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country. But we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait.” Hussein promised that Baghdad would look for a diplomatic solution but framed the issue with Kuwait as an existential crisis, declaring that Iraq would “never accept death.”

History continues to debate if Hussein interpreted Glaspie’s words as a green light to invade Kuwait. In 1991 Senate hearings and under oath, she denied even making the statement, but intelligence leaks in 2011 confirmed the content of her conversation with Hussein and that she submitted a positive read of the meeting to Washington.

The next day, OPEC announced that Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates agreed to reduce oil output by 25 percent in an attempt to ease regional tensions. The diplomacy and economic concessions didn’t matter; Hussein had always intended to occupy Kuwait by force, and the slant drilling claim was his casus belli.

An abandoned Iraqi BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicle in Kuwait City – First Gulf War
Credit – Photographer unknown – public domain

On August 2, Iraqi troops crossed the border, defeating the Kuwaiti military in just two days. Under Iraqi occupation, the brutal repression of Kuwaitis and Palestinian refugees living in the country started, including extrajudicial killings, torture, kidnappings, imprisonment, and rape. Hussein’s Republic Guard looted the country, and Saudi officials worried that the historical disagreements between Iraq and the Najd would lead to the invasion of their country.

Aftermath of February 25, 1991, Iraqi Scud missile attack on Dhahran, Saudi Arabia
Credit – Staff Sergeamt Lee F. Corkran – public domain

The concern was not misplaced. U.N. Resolution 678 gave Iraq until January 15 to withdraw from Kuwait. If the resolution was ignored, then enforcement by military force was authorized. When a coalition of 42 nations started their air campaign against Iraq in January 1991, Baghdad responded by launching Scud short-range ballistic missiles at Saudi Arabia, mostly targeting civilians. The attacks killed one Saudi and wounded 78. A missile strike on a U.S. logistics base in Dhahran killed 27 American soldiers and wounded more than 100.

Iraqi forces briefly invaded Saudi Arabia on January 29 but were pushed back. The first coalition forces crossed into Iraq on February 15 to set conditions for the main invasion, which started on February 24. Major fighting ended on March 1, with the Iraqi military shattered. The advance toward the Iraqi capital of Baghdad ended with Hussein pressing for peace and U.S. armored forces reaching the limit of their logistics.

Saudi response to the Kuwait invasion is the final straw for Osama bin Laden

After Iraq invaded Kuwait, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia formally requested military assistance from the U.S. After the request, bin Laden met with him and Minister of Defense Sultan bin Abdulaziz, claiming that he could lead a coalition of former mujahadeen fighters and Al Qaeda to defend Saudi Arabia. Asked how he would respond to a theoretical chemical weapons attack, bin Laden responded, “with faith.”

Fahd and bin Abdulaziz were not impressed.

After bin Laden was rejected, he denounced the Saudi government and royal family, stating that the Qu’ran forbid non-Muslims from stepping foot in Saudi Arabia and that Mecca and Medina could only be defended by Sunni Muslims. His continued criticism, political interference, and repeated attempts to lead Muslim clerics in a fatwa declaration against the Saudi royal family led to his house arrest and eventual exile. Bin Laden’s radicalization was complete. In 1991, he and his Al Qaeda militants left for Sudan, and the Saudis were glad to see him go.

The Soviet Union crumbles

An unknown man protesting in Vilnius, Lithuania, on January 13, 1991, during the Soviet Union’s attempt to stop Lithuanian independence
Credit – Photographer unknown – public domain

On June 4, 1989, the Solidarity Trade Union overwhelmingly won the elections in Poland, starting a series of revolutions, first in the Eastern Bloc, quickly followed by the Soviet Union.

  • May 2, 1989 – Hungary starts to remove its fence on the border with Austria
  • June 4, 1989 – Poland ends Communist Rule
  • August 19, 1989 – the Pan-European Picnic is held near Sopronpuszta, Hungary, with over 800 East Germans crossing the Austrian border
  • October 23, 1989 – Hungary dissolves the Presidential Council
  • November 9, 1989 – the Berlin Wall falls
  • November 28, 1989 – Czechoslovakia eliminates the clause in their constitution declaring Communism holds a “leading role”
  • December 1, 1989 – East Germany ends single-party Communist rule
  • December 25, 1989 – Romanian Communist leader Nicolae Ceaușescu and his wife are executed
  • January 15, 1990 – Bulgaria eliminates the clause that Communism holds a “leading role”

The fall of Soviet power over the Eastern Bloc would have a profound impact on an unassuming 5’6″ tall, Moscow-educated KGB agent assigned to Dresden, East Germany. On December 5, 1989, after a mob stormed the headquarters of the East German Stasi, part of the group broke off, turning their attention across the road to the office of the KGB.

The guards retreated into the building, and a KGB Lieutenant Colonel who was the Soviet Union’s liaison to the Stasi emerged, issuing a warning to the crowd: “Don’t try to force your way into this property. My comrades are armed, and they’re authorized to use their weapons in an emergency.”

It was a calculated bluff, but the warning was enough to convince the group to leave. Afraid that a larger, better-organized mob could return, the KGB officer contacted the headquarters of a nearby Red Army unit, asking for reinforcement. His request was denied, being told, “We cannot do anything without orders from Moscow. And Moscow is silent.”

That 14-year KGB veteran was Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Putin. Putin was a product of Yuri Andropov’s KGB leadership and, at that moment, felt he had been stabbed in the back by Moscow and the West’s interference in Soviet affairs.

In another three months, the political tidal wave that swept Eastern Europe would spread across the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics. From March 1990 to September 1991, eleven Soviet states that were colonized by the Russian Imperial Empire, or occupied as part of the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, or were subjugated under Soviet rule, declared independence.

  • March 11, 1990 – Lithuania
  • April 9, 1991 – Georgia
  • August 20, 1991 – Estonia
  • August 21, 1991 – Latvia
  • August 24, 1991 – Ukraine
  • August 25, 1991 – Belarus
  • August 27, 1991 – Moldova
  • August 31, 1991 – Kyrgrzstan
  • September 1, 1991 – Uzbekistan
  • September 9, 1991 – Tajikistan
  • September 23, 1991 – Armenia

A twelfth, the Checheno-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic also declared independence on September 7. However, Checheno-Ingush was different as it had never been a country. For Moscow, the newly declared Chechen Republic of Ichkeria could not be allowed to exist. Soviet leaders feared that if they didn’t quell the bid for independence, other oblasts and autonomous republics would follow, plunging the country into multiple civil wars.

The quest for Chechen independence started when the head of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of Grozny was murdered. Militants stormed a session of the Supreme Soviet, took over the building, and threw him out a window. One of the men behind the attack who wanted an independent Chechnya was Akhmad Kadyrov.

In November 1991, Moscow sent troops to Grozny in an attempt to regain control. The next 18 years would lead to a civil war and terrorist violence, leaving hundreds of thousands dead. Moscow’s destruction of Chechnya would enrage Osama bin Laden and other militants within the Muslim world.

Tomorrow’s installment: Moscow’s attempt to prevent Chechen independence becomes a brutal war, sparking outrage among radical Islamists. The First Chechen War deepens the ties between Al Qaeda and Islamic militants and Chechen fighters.

Read Part Six: The complex history of Islamic extremism and Russia’s contribution to the rise of Al Qaeda and ISIS

International News, National

Part 4: The complex history of Islamic extremism and Russia’s contribution to the rise of Al Qaeda and ISIS

2 Comments

This is part four of a ten-part series that explains the rise of modern Islamic extremism. From 1951 to 2021, a series of key geopolitical events, many independent of each other, caused the Islamic Revolution, the rise of Al Qaeda and ISIS, the creation and collapse of the caliphate, and the reconstitution of ISIS as ISKP. While Western influence and diplomatic blunders are well documented through this period, the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation are equally culpable. The editors would like to note that a vast majority of the 1.8 billion people who are adherents to some form of Islam are peaceful and reject all forms of religious violence.

Read Part Three: The complex history of Islamic extremism and Russia’s contribution to the rise of Al Qaeda and ISIS

State-sanctioned violence grows in Afghanistan as the Soviets prepare to withdraw

Moscow forces the replacement of their puppet leader in Afghanistan and struggles to find an exit 

When the Soviets assassinated Hafizullah Amin on December 27, 1979, and installed Babrak Karmal as their puppet leader, KGB head Yury Andropov advocated for Mohammad Najibullah to be installed as the head of the state security services of Afghanistan—the KHAD. After his appointment, Andropov immediately started an influence campaign to convince Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and Amin to support expanding Najibullah’s power, which earned him a seat in the Afghanistan Politburo.

When Najibullah took over the KHAD in 1980, he was responsible for 120 people. Six years later, the KHAD was an independent government Ministry with 30,000 highly paid employees trained by KGB advisors. Most of the KHAD budget came from the Soviet Union, and shortly after Andropov became the General Secretary of the Soviet Union in November 1983, he started laying the groundwork to replace Karmal with his protege, Najibullah.

During the six years Najibullah led the KHAD, the KGB funded and trained its staff. Over 16,000 extrajudicial executions were carried out, and 100,000 were imprisoned. The KHAD brutally tortured peasants and tribesmen, burned villages, killed livestock, and destroyed crops in an attempt to identify members of the mujahadeen. In the cities, anti-communists, intellectuals, professors, doctors, and educated professionals were threatened, assassinated, falsely imprisoned, and executed. Flush with funds from the Soviet Union and under Najibullah’s leadership, the KHAD was wildly corrupt.

When Mikhail Gorbachev became the Soviet Premier in 1985, he continued to follow the path created by Andropov, believing that after the Soviet withdrawal, Najibullah would be a stronger leader who would stay loyal to Moscow. The Main Defense Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet Union (GRU) disagreed. In their assessment, Najibullah would be even more polarizing than Karmal and would not be able to build a strong coalition with the various Afghan tribal warlords. Gorbachev was unmoved.

Soviet Union soldiers in Kabul, Afghanistan -1986
Credit – Photographer unknown – public domain

Moscow hoped that their newly installed leader could bring the fractured Afghanistan nation to reconciliation, ending eight years of violence, allowing the exit of Soviet troops, and keeping a pro-Soviet government in place. On May 4, 1986, Najibullah was made the General Secretary of the Afghanistan Politburo, with Karmal remaining as the Chairman of the Revolutionary Council. The assessment by the GRU that ethnic Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Pashtuns would resist cooperating with Najibullah, and the armed factions fighting against Soviet troops would reject him was accurate. Additionally, Karmal fought back, openly questioning Najibullah’s loyalty to Afghanistan, exposing his trail of corruption, and spreading misinformation.

Najibullah complained to Moscow that Karmal was interfering with his rule and asked for guidance, with Gorbachev deciding on a non-violent solution. In November 1986, Karmal was dismissed from the Revolutionary Council and exiled to Moscow. The Kremlin now saw the reconciliation strategy as a failure and decided that negotiating peace was the best option. Gorbachev also believed that due to the improving relationship with the United States, he could push for more favorable terms.

In March 1987, the first round of U.N.-sponsored peace talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan was held in Geneva, Switzerland, with the U.S. and the Soviet Union as guarantors. Pakistan negotiators refused to meet with the Afghanistan delegation because they did not recognize the Soviet-backed and controlled government as legitimate. The first round of negotiations failed, with Pakistan refusing to agree to a 16-month timetable for a controlled withdrawal of Soviet troops, demanding it be eight months. Additionally, the Soviets asked for the immediate end of U.S. arms shipments and financial support to the Afghan resistance as a condition for Soviet withdrawal. Washington refused.

In July, Najibullah made a secret trip to Moscow to meet with Gorbachev. The Soviet leader pressed him to make additional government reforms, hoping that the dead reconciliation plan could be brought back to life. Gorbachev’s council was undermined by the KGB, who advised against implementing some of his recommended reforms. Returning to Afghanistan, Najibullah announced that single-party rule would end. However, there were tight restrictions on what platforms would be acceptable. New parties were required to want to maintain relations with the Soviet Union, had to be Muslim, and had to oppose colonialism, imperialism, Zionism, racial discrimination, apartheid, and fascism. The mujahadeen and all but one armed faction fighting against the Soviet-backed Afghan government boycotted the August elections, but several new leftist parties were formed and were able to gain a handful of government seats.

In September, a second round of peace talks was held in Geneva. While progress was made in establishing the legitimacy of the Afghan government, no progress was made in establishing a timetable for the Soviet withdrawal, and the U.S. again refused to end military and financial aid before the Soviet troop withdrawal was complete.

In November, during the conference of the Afghanistan Politburo, Najibullah proposed accelerating the timetable for the Soviet withdrawal from 16 months to 12. A new constitution was approved, creating the office of the President. On November 30, Najibullah, running unopposed, was elected president of Afghanistan. Under the mandate of the new constitution, the Revolutionary Council would be dissolved and replaced with a General Assembly elected by the people.

On February 8, 1988, Soviet negotiators announced a conditional date of withdrawal from Afghanistan, hoping that the U.S. would agree to the immediate end of military and financial aid to the Afghanistan rebels. Washington rejected the proposal. With the domestic situation in the Soviet Union deteriorating, Gorbachev decided that an unfavorable peace deal was better than remaining in Afghanistan.

On April 14, Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Soviet Union, and the U.S. signed the Geneva Accords. Pakistan and Afghanistan agreed to non-interference and non-intervention, and Pakistan agreed to stop the flow of weapons across its border. The Soviet Union agreed that the withdrawal of the 40th Combined Arms Army would begin on May 15 and be completed by February 15, 1989. The U.S. did not have to end military and financial aid before the completion of the Soviet withdrawal.

On February 15, 1989, the last column of BTR-80 armored personnel carriers of the Soviet 40th Combined Arms Army crossed the Friendship Bridge into Soviet Uzbekistan. General Boris Gromov symbolically walked behind the troops, becoming the last Soviet soldier to withdraw from Afghanistan. Mobbed by reporters, he cursed profusely, later explaining that his anger was directed at “the leadership of the country, at those who start the wars while others have to clean up the mess.”

The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan elevates Osama bin Laden to a cult of personality

There are questions about how much combat Osama bin Laden was engaged in with the mujahedeen, but he did participate in a handful of tactical battles. During his time in Pakistan and Afghanistan, bin Laden used his wealth and influence to promote victories on the battlefield and recruit Arabs to the Islamic cause within Afghanistan. While bin Laden was media-shy, his talent as a leader was well-known in the Middle East, converting his influence into a cult of personality.

Osama bin Laden -1988
Credit – Photographer unknown – public domain

But bin Laden was looking ahead to the future. In 1988, shortly after the signing of the Geneva Accords, he quietly founded Al Qaeda. For him, Afghanistan was the end of the beginning. Al Qaeda would continue its violent jihad against what he perceived were the enemies of fundamentalist Islam and fight to establish Muslim states controlled by Sharia law.

Despite fighting against the Soviet Union, a lot of bin Laden’s beliefs were influenced by his exposure to Soviet propaganda, including late 19th Century Eastern European and Imperial Russia antisemitism. In the simplest of terms, bin Laden believed that Muslim Arabs faced four enemies: the Jews and Israel, the United States, “heretics,” and Shia Muslims, particularly Iranian Shias.

At the time of the Soviet withdrawal, bin Laden believed that the West had wronged Arabs and Muslims worldwide. The Al Qaeda charter established that the people of democratic nations directly participate in their government, making them legitimate military targets due to their complicity in their government decisions. Further, any “good Muslim” civilian who was killed due to their proximity to an attack would be blessed in death and go to paradise.

In 1989, bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia and was given a hero’s welcome along with his Al Qaeda Arab Legion. He continued to lead a triple life, running aspects of the family construction business, continuing to work with Pakistan and Saudi Arabian intelligence agencies, and indirectly and directly supporting jihadist activity in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

Bin Laden would return to Afghanistan to personally lead up to 800 Al Qaeda fighters in Operation Jalalabad, which was an attempt to install a pro-Pakistani mujahadeen government in Kabul. Although Soviet troops had withdrawn from Afghanistan, military aid to the Najibullah government continued. Moscow sent approximately $4 billion in weapons and ammunition, including OTR-21 Tochka-U short-range ballistic missile launchers with Scarab missiles and Su-27 multirole fighter aircraft.

Operation Jalalabad was a complete failure, with the Afghan army using its arsenal to stop the offensive. Up to 500 of bin Laden’s militants were killed, and he was forced to return to Saudi Arabia, further imbittered by another betrayal.

Once back in Saudi Arabia, bin Laden supported opposition movements against the Saudi royal family and ordered the executions of the leaders of the Soviet-backed Yemeni government. He also interfered with reunification talks in Yemen, which has led to decades of civil war, famine, and hundreds of thousands of deaths. The unrest continues to this day, with north Yemini rebels switching from Al Qaeda-oriented dogma to gaining support from the Islamic Republic Guard Corps (IRGC) of Iran. Today, the IRGC-backed Houthi rebels control approximately 30 percent of Yemen and have interfered with global shipping since November 2023 in support of the Hamas-initiated war against Israel.

The increasing influence of bin Laden and his meddling in Saudi government affairs drew the attention of King Fahd and the ire of the then-President of Saudi Arabia, Ali Abdullah Saleh. They now viewed bin Laden as more than a problem they could manage—he was becoming a threat.

The Saudis weren’t the only country warily watching bin Laden and the Al Qaeda Arab Legion. U.S. intelligence was also hearing chatter that his plans weren’t just contained to the Greater Middle East.

It was now 1990, and in less than two years, the first attempted Al Qaeda terror attack on U.S. soil would be stopped, and the Saudi government would send bin Laden into exile.

Over the last four chapters, we’ve outlined a number of events that individually, are completely disconnected. However, in 1991, all roads from the Soviet Union, the U.S., Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan converge to Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda. The only thing missing was the final spark. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was preparing to light that fire.

Tomorrow’s installment: Iraq invades Kuwait, sparking the First Gulf War. The Saudi Royal Family rejects a plan by Osama bin Laden, sending him into exile. The Soviet Union starts to collapse and the Kremlin starts another war.

Read Part Four: The complex history of Islamic extremism and Russia’s contribution to the rise of Al Qaeda and ISIS

International News, National

Part 3: The complex history of Islamic extremism and Russia’s contribution to the rise of Al Qaeda and ISIS

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This is part three of a ten-part series that explains the rise of modern Islamic extremism. From 1951 to 2021, a series of key geopolitical events, many independent of each other, caused the Islamic Revolution, the rise of Al Qaeda and ISIS, the creation and collapse of the caliphate, and the reconstitution of ISIS as ISKP. While Western influence and diplomatic blunders are well documented through this period, the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation are equally culpable. The editors would like to note that a vast majority of the 1.8 billion people who are adherents to some form of Islam are peaceful and reject all forms of religious violence.

Read Part Two: The complex history of Islamic extremism and Russia’s contribution to the rise of Al Qaeda and ISIS

Part Three – Efforts by the Soviets and the United States to contain Islamic extremism only helped it to spread

The rise of Saddam Hussein and the start of the Iran-Iraq War

After the death of his brother in an April 1966 plane crash, Abdul Salam Arif came to power in Iraq. U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson considered Arif a political moderate and saw an opportunity to improve U.S.-Iraq relations with the hope of tugging the Middle Eastern nation away from the Soviet Union. On June 5, 1967, while dialog between Baghdad and Washington was ongoing, the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War started. In response to the U.S. backing of Israel, Arif severed diplomatic relations.

Arif’s political opponents used the Six-Day War as leverage to push his new government to nationalize the foreign-owned Iraq Petroleum Company so he could use oil as an economic weapon. Behind the discord, the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party was plotting a coup, with future president Saddam Hussein among the lead conspirators. On July 17, 1968, Arif’s government was overthrown in a mostly peaceful coup d’etat, installing Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr as president. After taking control, the new Ba’athist government announced it would embrace its current relationship with the Soviet Union and grow relations with the Chinese People’s Republic.

Vice President of Iraq Saddam Hussein (L) and Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, better known as the Shah of Iran (R), during the Algiers Agreement meetings in 1975
Credit – Photographer unknown – public domain

Hussein was named vice president of Iraq and led the full nationalization of the country’s oil industry, which was completed in 1972. At the time of the coup, relations between Iraq and Iran were poor due to Iran’s support of Iraqi Kurdish rebels. In late 1974, Hussein directed the Ba’athist government to improve relations with Iran, which led to the March 6, 1975, Algiers Agreement and two additional treaties also signed in 1975.

The Algiers Agreement aimed to settle maritime and territorial disputes in Iran’s Shatt al-Arab region and Iraq’s Khuzestan Province. Additionally, Iran agreed to end its support of the Kurdish Rebellion. After the agreement was signed, foreign relations significantly improved, ending almost a decade of isolation. The diplomatic success significantly expanded Hussein’s power.

After the signing of the Algiers Agreement, Hussein started an aggressive military modernization program, buying billions of dollars of hardware from the Soviet Union and France. In just 15 years, Iraq would build one of the largest conventional militaries in the world. In 1976, Hussein was named the General of the Iraqi Armed Forces while continuing to hold the office of vice president.

Around the same time, President al-Bakr’s health significantly deteriorated. Behind the veil, Hussein was already wielding presidential power and controlling the economy, the military, and foreign affairs. He used that control to become a feared strongman and started cultivating an inner circle of loyalists to take full control of the Ba’athist Party and the leadership of Iraq.

In 1979, President al-Bakr started negotiating with Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad for unification. If an agreement were reached, al-Assad would become the deputy leader of the combined nations, stripping Hussein of his power. On July 16, 1979, in what could be described as a one-man coup d’etat brought on by a health crisis, Hussein forced al-Bakr to resign and became the President of Iraq. Negotiations with Syria about unification immediately ended.

Despite the signing of the Algiers Agreement and the subsequent treaties, relations between Iraq and Iran were strained. The new leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, repeatedly called for the overthrow of the Iraqi Ba’athist government in jingoistic speeches due to Iraq’s embrace of secularism. The newly minted President Hussein praised the Iranian Revolution and Khomeini and called for renewed Iraqi and Iranian friendship and a mutual pledge to stop interfering with each other’s internal affairs.

The call for better relations was hollow and fell on deaf ears, and the diplomatic situation between Iran and Iraq quickly crumbled. On March 8, 1980, Iran recalled its ambassador and demanded that Iraq do the same. The next day, Iraq symbolically declared Iranian Ambassador Fereydoun Adamyat persona non grata.

Before the Islamic Revolution, Iran’s GDP was the largest among the 36 U.N.-recognized Greater Middle East nations. It had over 300,000 active-duty military personnel and was deep into a modernization program, buying billions of dollars of weapons from the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union.

One of the immediate outcomes of Khomeini’s rise to power was the embargo of parts, munitions, and other materials to maintain Iran’s military. Arrests and executions eliminated skilled and loyal military officers and pushed their subordinates into hiding. Iran’s military readiness was falling apart.

To deal with dissenters and political enemies, Khomeini created a personal guard, the paramilitary Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC), which would go on to be the terrorism-supporting arm of modern-day Iran. On April 30, 1980, Khomeini ordered the creation of the Organization for Mobilization of the Oppressed, better known as the Basij. The all-volunteer paramilitary was comprised of poorly trained and led men, most will little education. Often referred to as the 20 Million, during speeches, Khomeini would boast that with the Basij, no nation could defeat Iran.

During the first eight months of 1980, Iran and Iraq accused each other of over 1,200 border incidents, airspace violations, and maritime disputes. Hussein now viewed the Algiers Agreement as a mistake and recognized that he could use the post-revolution chaos in Iran to his advantage. He also saw an opportunity to engage the U.S. through the enemy of my enemy is my friend politics.

Hussein believed he had an opportunity to quickly take back the disputed Khuzestan Providence and its oil fields while expanding Iraq’s access to the Persian Gulf. On September 10, 1980, using the open issues of the Algiers Agreement as a casus belli, Iraq launched a limited military operation to seize the territories of Zain al-Qaws and Saif Saad. Twelve days later, the limited operation turned into a full-scale invasion of Iran, starting an eight-year war.

The Soviet Union becomes stuck in an Afghanistan quagmire

After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and completed its coup d’etat, Soviet troops launched a series of large-scale attacks in the central, northern, and western states of Afghanistan through 1985. While these large-scale attacks sometimes brought about temporary stability, the mujahadeen would retreat into Pakistan or deep into the mountains and return as soon as the Soviets withdrew.

Moscow had expected the Afghanistan army to do the majority of the fighting, with Soviet forces providing intelligence, logistics, close air support, and artillery. The opposite happened, with the local military units providing little support and frequently running from battles.

Soviet troops supported by the KGB and Afghanistan KHAD instituted brutal programs against the civilian population to try and find mujahadeen fighters, which only built more support for the Islamic rebel forces. However, the war was essentially a stalemate, and fighting against Soviet brutality made for odd bedfellows. With Western and Middle Eastern reporters embedded with mujahadeen, popular support in the Middle East, Europe, the U.S., and China rapidly grew. the mystique of chiseled-faced tribesmen bravely fighting against Russian tanks and helicopters on horseback was embraced as a noble struggle.

For Europe and the U.S., the fight within Afghanistan was seen as an extension of the Cold War. The Reagan Administration sought to destabilize the Soviet Union economically and diplomatically, with the Department of Defense budget swelling to $1.7 trillion in inflation-adjusted dollars.

Mujahideen fighters in Afghanistan, 1985
Credit – Erwin Franzen, Creative Commons 2.0-4.0

The mujahadeen and other factions aligned against the Soviets were backed by the U.S., United Kingdom, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and China. Funding for Operation Cyclone, operated by the CIA, dramatically increased in 1986 and included the supply of Stinger antiaircraft missiles to the Afghan resistance. The Stinger provided SHORAD capabilities to the mujahadeen, tipping the balance of power on the battlefield. Russian aviation was practically grounded, and without air support, the number of Russian casualties increased significantly.

With the Soviet military stuck in an Afghanistan quagmire, another seemingly unrelated event would alter the course of world history. On April 26, 1986, after a failed safety test on Reactor 4 at the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant, technician Leonid Toptunov pushed the AZ-5 button meant to scram the reactor. Instead, due to a design flaw, Reactor 4 exploded, causing the worst nuclear accident in world history.

A combination of a failing and stagnant economy, the inability to keep up with Western defense spending, the war in Afghanistan, and the economic cost of cleaning up the Chornobyl disaster put the Soviet Union irreversibly on the path toward bankruptcy. The metaphorical rusting of the Iron Curtain and the Glasnost programs introduced by Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev permitted public criticism of the ongoing war in Afghanistan. Additionally, Gorbachev had been looking for an offramp since becoming Premier in 1985.

In 1987, with popular support for the war plummeting, Moscow announced it would start a controlled two-year withdrawal. For some, the announcement brought hope of a renewed Afghanistan. However, thousands of Islamic fighters didn’t come to fight for liberation. They choose to go to Afghanistan in response to the fatwas calling for the protection of historic Islamic lands from infidel invaders.

For some, like Osama bin Laden, the Soviet withdrawal announcement wasn’t the beginning of the end; it was the end of the beginning. What almost no one knew was bin Laden was already laying the foundation to form a new organization called Al Qaeda.

The United States embraces the Iran-Iraq War and pushes for a stalemate

In the first three months of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq achieved multiple successes on the battlefield before momentum shifted. With relations already firmly established, Iraq was able to freely buy weapons and ammunition from the Soviet Union, France, and China. While the U.S. didn’t directly supply weapons to Baghdad, Washington lifted dual-use sanctions, which permitted the sale of civilian technology and heavy equipment that could be easily pressed into military service. And while declassified records show that no single nation provided Baghdad with the resources and technology to produce chemical weapons, companies from France, the U.S., West Germany, the U.K., and the Netherlands sold dual-use components, with France selling precursor chemicals to support the production of Sarin nerve gas.

Iran had deeper problems and could only find support from North Korea for weapons and ammunition and one other very unusual ally. Israel provided spare parts and ammunition for the existing Iranian arsenal of U.S. military technology. Tel Aviv believed that if Iraq won the war, its victory could empower Syria, which would present a broader threat to their sovereignty and stability.

Season 3, Episode 15 of the American TV Show American DaD – This Clip accurately explains the Iran-Contra Affair

While those were the publicly visible relationships, the U.S. was supporting both combatants. From 1981 to 1986, the CIA sold weapons to Iran through French shell companies. The profits were given to the Contras, who used the money to buy weapons to fight against the Soviet-backed Sandinista government in Nicaragua. When the Iran-Contra Affair was exposed, it blew up into a political scandal.

In 1986, Iranian forces captured the Fao Peninsula in Iraq, sending jolts through the West. Concern grew that Iran could win the war, spreading racial Islam across the Middle East. Due to support through the Iran-Contra Affair, Tehran started sharing military intelligence with Washington, which was already receiving military intelligence from Iraq. The 1986 Iran-initiated Tanker War didn’t help Tehran’s cause, and Kuwait and Saudi Arabia boosted military support to Iraq. To tip the balance of power back, Washington started sharing the Iranian military plans with Baghdad.

Iraq regained the initiative, pushed Iranian forces out of the Fao Peninsula, and on August 20, 1988, United Nations Security Council Resolution 598 ended the Iran-Iraq War. While both nations were left economically devastated, the Iranian military was an empty shell. One to two million people died, including at least 500,000 soldiers. The majority of the military dead were members of the Iranian Basij. Among the dead were at least 60,000 killed by chemical weapons, including 50,000 Iranians and 10,000 Iraqi Kurds.

For Hussein, the last eight years allowed him to transform into a brutal and feared dictator. With the war against Iran over, Hussein set his sights on a new military objective.

Tomorrow’s installment: The Soviets withdraw from Afghanistan, and Osama bin Laden becomes a cult of personality.

Read Part Three: The complex history of Islamic extremism and Russia’s contribution to the rise of Al Qaeda and ISIS

International News, National

The complex history of Islamic extremism and Russia’s contribution to the rise of Al Qaeda and ISIS

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This is part one of a ten-part series that explains the rise of modern Islamic extremism. From 1951 to 2021, a series of key geopolitical events, many independent of each other, caused the Islamic Revolution, the rise of Al Qaeda and ISIS, the creation and collapse of the caliphate, and the reconstitution of ISIS as the ISKP. While Western influence and diplomatic blunders are well documented through this period, the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation are equally culpable. The editors would like to note that a vast majority of the 1.8 billion people who are adherents to some form of Islam are peaceful and reject all forms of religious violence.

Part One – Russia’s 450-year war against Islam

Introduction

[WBHG News] As Russian officials pick through the remains of the Crocus City Hall concert venue and mall in Moscow, many are left wondering why ISKP (better known as ISIS-K) would want to attack Russia. Unlike the United States War on Terror, which dominated world headlines for more than two decades, Russia’s game of chess with Islamic factions has received far less coverage. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) offshoot ISKP, formed in 2015, has claimed responsibility for the March 22 attack, which killed 137 and wounded 182.

Since its inception, ISKP has been growing in influence, strength, and reach. Its power surged in late 2020 after the Trump Administration created the Doha Agreement with the Taliban, forcing the Afghanistan government to release 5,000 prisoners. ISIS-K has openly and repeatedly declared that the United States, Russia, China, Iran, and the Taliban, which now governs Afghanistan, are their enemies. While the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan government is making a legitimate attempt to govern, like its predecessors, it has been unable to stop the resurgence of religious violence.

ISKP terror cells have spread to Pakistan, eastern Iran, and Tajikistan, and as recently as March 7, 2024, the Federal Security Service of Russia (FSB) claimed it neutralized an ISKP cell from Tajikistan planning to attack a synagogue in Moscow.

The paths that led to the terror attack in Moscow started in Iran in 1951 and have involved every superpower on the planet, their allies, and numerous Middle Eastern nations. The complexity of this road makes it ripe for misunderstanding, which proliferates misinformation and disinformation. In repeated attempts to sanitize Russian history, the Kremlin helped create the environment that made the March 22 attack inevitable.

Troops of the Russian Imperial Army, 1914
Credit – Wikimedia Commons – IWM Public Domain Collection

Historically, Russia has fought wars on ideological and religious grounds against Muslim states since 1568, repeatedly fighting against the Turks. When Russia entered World War I, one of Tzar Nicholas II’s maximalist goals included complete control of the Black Sea and the Bosphorus Straight. Going against the advice of his advisors, the Russian Imperial Empire sided with the Allied Powers, while Turkey aligned with the Central Powers. Over 350 years of war between the Russian Empire and the Ottoman Empire would contribute to the downfall of both.

When Josef Stalin was brought to power in 1924, his policy of Russification included the repression of all religions. During the Great Purge of 1937, thousands of Muslim clerics and adherents were arrested, sent to gulags where they worked to death, tortured, and executed. After the German withdrawal from Crimea during World War II, Stalin ordered the deportation of up to 500,000 Crimean Tatars for perceived disloyalty to the Soviet state. Between 20 to 45 percent were killed in the 18 months that followed. Stalin ordered a second mass deportation in 1949, meant to displace the remaining native population.

Crimean Tatars under forced deportation by the Soviet Union in late 1948
Credit – Wikimedia Commons – Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance

While Stalin’s death saw an easing of religious repression by the Soviet state, Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev interfered with Middle Eastern geopolitics at an equivalent level to the Cold War Western powers.

Today, Russia and its supporters like to boast that the country has the largest Muslim population of any European nation. If you squint, this is a factual statement. However, most of Russia’s Muslims live in the Caucasus and the central and southern republics, far from the European continent. Estimates of the number of Russians who follow Islam vary from nine to 25 million, with most experts agreeing the number is between 15 and 20 million.

On the surface, the Kremlin claims it is a nation of tolerance, but in reality, 71 percent of Russia’s population adheres to the Russian Orthodox Church and has openly embraced a form of Christian nationalism. The Russian slur “Khachs” is used freely—a derogatory term for people from the Caucasus and others that have the stereotypical physical traits of a Muslim. Within the channels of Russian state media, propagandists have complained for years about the influx of migrant workers from the former southern republics of the Soviet Union and the spread of Islam.

In February 2023, when it was announced a mosque that could accommodate 60,000 worshippers in Moscow would be built by a lake considered holy by followers of the Russian Orthodox Church, protests erupted. In April of the same year, the protests expanded to threats, which drew the ire of Chechen warlord Colonel General Ramzan Kadyrov. It was reported that Russian autocrat Vladimir Putin interceded, negotiating with the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, former FSB agent Patriarch Kirill, and Kadyrov. An agreement was quietly reached to build a much smaller mosque on the outskirts of Moscow, defusing tension.

It is a common misconception that terrorism based on Islamic fundamentalist principles follows a singular dogma. The differences between terror organizations are as basic as Sunni versus Shia and as complex as the interpretation of singular passages in the Qu’ran. In the Sahel of Africa, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, rival factions of ISIS and Al Qaeda fight each other while fighting against Iranian-backed militias and terror organizations.

Moscow’s relationships of convenience with these various factions have made Russia a target for Islamic terrorism for decades. Iran’s support of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine by providing Russia with drones, technical support, military trainers, and ammunition makes it a target of ISIS-K. The split between Al Qaeda and ISIS and the factions backed by the Islamic Republic of Iran is simple—at the roots, it is the dogma that divides Sunnis and Shias.

This ten-part story explores how a chain of religious and geopolitical events spanning from 1951 to the present day led to the radicalization of Osama bin Laden, the rise of Al Qaeda, the split that formed ISIS, the creation of the caliphate and its fall, to its rebirth in ISIS-K. It is a story of how every nation that sought to seek soft power and influence during this period—the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation, the United States, the United Kingdom, and China—contributed to the escalating extremism.

The rise and fall of the Shah of Iran and the Iranian Revolution

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, better known historically as the Shah of Iran and part of the Persian Monarchy, was brought into power by a 1954 coup backed by the U.K. and supported by the U.S. The U.K. sought to remove Iranian leader Mohammad Mosaddegh, who rose to power in 1951, due to his nationalization of the oil industry in Iran, which led to the seizure of British Petroleum’s infrastructure and assets.

Initially, British policy was rejected by U.S. President Harry Truman. Washington condemned the British blockade of Iran, while London falsely claimed that Mosaddegh was aligning himself with the Soviet Union. By late 1952, the U.K. had already started its efforts to destabilize Iran and remove Mosaddegh from power. Declassified records show that in mid-1953, the Dwight D. Eisenhower Administration, somewhat reluctantly, joined the U.K. in fomenting unrest.

The installation of Pahlavi was meant to re-privatize the Iranian oil industry and return its control to British Petroleum by installing a leader the West believed would be easy to control. While the effort was successful, this single incident started a chain reaction that would lead to the Iranian Revolution and 45 years of Islamic extremism and violence that would kill millions.

The Shah of Iran and Queen Julianna of the Netherlands, 1959
Credit – Wikimedia Commons – Harry Pot / Anefo, CC0, via Wikimedia Commons

Although Pahlavi agreed to reprivatization, he would go on to become one of the dominant leaders of OPEC. Under his leadership, the Shah manipulated oil prices that caused multiple steep recessions in the West while boosting funding for the modernization of his nation. A number of the popular reforms instituted by Mosaddegh from 1951 to 1953 were reversed, causing discontent within the Iranian population and mistrust of the West.

While Pahlavi continued some of the economic and educational reforms started in 1951, most of the financial gains were invested in the military, state security, and public works projects that provided little benefit for the broader population. On the surface, Iran appeared to be an amazing success story of unity and growth. In reality, the Shah was creating an environment ripe for revolution, forcing increased repression to maintain control.

Protesters in Tehran carry the wounded and dead after the 1978 Jaleh Square Massacre
Credit – Public Domain

Over 20 years, Pahlavi transformed himself from a silver spoon kid whom the U.K. and U.S. believed they could control to a clever politician with broad regional influence to a brutal dictator. By 1977, with the promise of economic prosperity limited to a few, a nationalist movement based on the fundamentalist interpretation of Islam started to spiral out of control. In 1978, Iranian security forces killed dozens in Jaleh Square, an event called Black Friday. The massacre triggered the Iranian Revolution, forcing the January 16th abdication of the Shah and his family.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini became the Supreme Leader of Iran, and the monarchy was banned. Initially, Washington and London believed that the revolution had failed. Western intelligence experts were so disconnected they didn’t understand the gravity of the situation until military units and high-ranking officers of the Iranian military started backing Khomeini.

A world away in Moscow, Brezhnev and his advisors nervously watched the events unfold in Tehran. The Kremlin was already setting conditions for a coup in Afghanistan and now feared a similar embrace of Islamic fundamentalism was about to erupt within its sphere of influence. And just like the U.K. in 1951, the Soviet Union had already set into motion an almost identical set of mistakes.

Tomorrow’s installment: The Soviet coup and invasion of Afghanistan catches the attention of a Saudi Arabian heir to a construction fortune, who starts his journey of radicalization.

Read Part Two: The complex history of Islamic extremism and Russia’s contribution to the rise of Al Qaeda and ISIS

Breaking News, International News, National, Russia-Ukraine War

Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant is falling apart, and the world is ignoring the danger

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[WBHG 24 News] – The latest reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which has had a team of international inspectors at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant for 16 months, painted an alarming picture of leaking steam generation circuits and safety systems, inadequate staff, and no 2024 maintenance plan.

Europe’s largest nuclear power plant is located in occupied Enerhodar. Previously located on the banks of the Kakhovka Reservoir, the primary source of cooling water for ZNPP drained away in June 2023 after the Kakhovka Dam was destroyed. Russian forces captured the plant on March 3, 2022, during the opening days of the expanded war of aggression against Ukraine. Webcams showed Russian tanks firing on the power plant and shooting into administrative buildings during the brief siege.

After pictures, videos, and satellite images proved that Russian forces had militarized the plant in violation of international humanitarian law and the pillars of nuclear safety, the IAEA, backed by the United Nations, pressured Russia to establish an international group of permanent monitors. On September 1, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi and a team of experts, accompanied by Russian state media, arrived at the plant. There have been 15 rotations of monitors since.

Three reactors have various leaks, and Russia doesn’t plan to fix them

Currently, five of the six reactors at ZNPP are in cold shutdown, with Reactor 4 in hot shutdown to provide steam for plant operations and heat for the nearby town of Enerhodar.

On November 17, IAEA inspectors were told by Russian occupiers that boron had been detected in the secondary cooling circuit of Reactor 4, which was in hot shutdown at the time. Boron is added to the primary cooling and steam circuits of modern nuclear reactors as an extra safety measure. Boron isn’t supposed to be the secondary cooling system, but trace amounts are acceptable.

Four days later, the reactor was shut down, with Russia declaring the boron leak was within acceptable levels and would not be repaired. This was the second unscheduled shutdown of 2023. On August 10, Reactor 4 had to be shut down after a water leak was discovered in one of its steam generators. Plant technicians also found that the heat exchangers needed to be cleaned and did regular maintenance on the reactor’s transformers and emergency diesel generators.

On December 22, inspectors found boric acid deposits on valves, a pump, and on the floors of several rooms in the containment building of Reactor 6. Russian occupation officials said the leak was coming from a cracked boric acid storage tank and it would not be repaired. After IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi published the finding in a January 3 update, inspectors were barred from accessing parts of Reactor 6 for almost two weeks.

On February 1, the IAEA reported that boric acid leaks were also discovered in Reactor 1.

Unreliable external power connections

Although power plants generate electricity, power to run a power plant is provided by external sources. This provides a layer of safety by assuring that there is always electricity to support normal operations in the event of a facility shutdown. Although a nuclear reactor can be “shut down,” it still needs external power to continuously circulate cooling water in the reactors and on-site spent fuel storage. In the event of a total power failure, backup generators running on diesel fuel become the last line of defense. ZNPP has 20 generators and keeps enough diesel for a minimum of ten days of operation.

It’s estimated that if a ZNPP reactor is in cold shutdown, it can go more than three weeks without water circulation. But in hot shutdown, a meltdown can start 27 hours after the loss of all external power. In the worst-case scenario, the absolute last line of defense is when a nuclear plant operates in “island mode.” That’s when a reactor or reactors are used to generate onsite power to maintain plant operations. It’s inherently dangerous because it requires bringing a reactor online, leaving no margin for error if there are any additional failures. None of ZNPP’s reactors have produced electricity in the last 18 months.

Before Russia’s hostile takeover, ZNPP had ten redundant external power connections – four 750 kilovolt (kV) and six more 330 kV lines from the nearby Zaporizhzhia Thermal Power Plant (ZTPP), which Russia also occupies. Today, the plant only has two. Since the occupation, Europe’s largest nuclear power plant has lost all external power eight times, forced to rely on onsite diesel-powered emergency generators. But the problems don’t stop there.

On March 1, 2023, Russian shelling of the Nikopol Raion on the right bank of the Dnipro River damaged infrastructure that cut the 330 kV external power connection to ZNPP. Ukrainian officials told the IAEA that due to unrelenting Russian attacks on the area, it was impossible for technicians to repair the damage. The plant was now reliant on a single 750 kV power connection while Russia was attacking Ukraine’s energy infrastructure.

Power had come from the nearby ZTPP in the past, but Russian officials claimed that the switchyard between the two power plants was damaged. The IAEA repeatedly asked to inspect the area, with Russian operators denying access, promising that repairs were imminent.

Three months later, Grossi said, “Our experts must access the ZTPP to see for themselves what the current situation is like and whether it might be possible to restore backup power there.”

On June 11, he repeated his request to allow the on-site inspection team to visit the switchyard, and five days later, Grossi joined the IAEA staff during its rotation. The Russians permitted him to inspect the damage, and the connection was restored on July 1. However, there was a misconfiguration in the repairs. When power was cut to the 750 kV line, the 330 kV backup didn’t automatically roll over. The plant had to use onsite diesel generators while technicians solved the problem.

On November 15, Reactor 6 unexpectedly lost all power for 90 minutes, briefly shutting down the cooling circuits before it was switched to emergency power. The reason for the failure was not published.

On November 26, power was lost from the single 750 kV external connection due to a historically powerful storm that moved across the Black Sea. While power successfully rolled over to the backup 330 KV line, Reactor 4 didn’t energize, forcing plant operators to use the emergency onsite diesel generators. During the August 2022 unscheduled maintenance, the backup systems were also misconfigured.

The most recent incident was on December 2, when both external power lines failed. The 330 kV connection failed first due to an “external grid fault.” Five hours later, the 750 kV connection also disconnected. During the outage, power was lost to all four cooling pumps for Reactor 4, forcing operators to start moving it to cold shutdown, which could have left the plant with an inadequate supply of steam. Diesel generators were brought online, restoring power, and the 750 kV line was reconnected five hours later.

Blocked access, broken promises, and landmines

To successfully complete its role as a nuclear watchdog, IAEA inspectors need unfettered access to ZNPP. Russia has repeatedly hampered these efforts.

When high-resolution satellite images showed that Russian forces had built small arms gun emplacements on the roof of the reactors, the IAEA requested access to verify there were no violations of the pillars of nuclear safety and international humanitarian law. Russian occupiers stonewalled the IAEA for months, finally granting access to the roofs of Reactors 2, 3, and 4. Inspectors were supposed to be allowed on the other three units on December 19, but the inspection was canceled at the last minute due to “security reasons.”

Inspectors have also been blocked from consecutively walking through the six-turbine halls and maintenance areas. When the IAEA arrived at ZNPP on September 1, 2022, military vehicles were found in some of the maintenance areas, but there weren’t any offensive weapons or ammunition. A continuous walk-through would permit the IAEA to confirm that heavy weapons or ammunition are not stored in any of the turbine halls and that Russian occupiers aren’t playing a shell game. Despite repeated requests during individual inspections, the IAEA has not been allowed into all areas of the turbine halls since 2022.

Russia placed land and directional mines in restricted areas and on the perimeter of the plant after the occupation. Grossi stated that their presence violated the principles of nuclear safety but added none of the explosives were located in critical areas of the plant. In November, with Russia’s fall-winter offensive in full swing, the mines were removed, only to be replaced in late January.

Starting in December, Russian occupiers have blocked the IAEA from asking new workers at ZNPP about their training and credentials. Additionally, despite repeated requests, Russian operator Rosatom has refused to provide a comprehensive site maintenance plan for 2024.

Russian occupiers also disconnected the online radiation monitoring systems, forcing the IAEA team to take manual readings twice a day using a backpack system. The background radiation information is handed off to Russia, which shares the data twice a day.

A worsening staffing crisis

In January 2022, ZNPP had 11,500 employees, with most living in the nearby town of Enerhodar. While some fled at the start of Russia’s war of aggression, many stayed behind due to their sense of duty to nuclear safety. Since the Russian occupation, Ukrainian workers and their families have been interrogated, kidnapped, and tortured. Some have disappeared. In Enerhodar, residents living under occupation have reported extrajudicial arrests, disappearances, robberies, and evictions, mostly at the hands of Chechen forces.

After the illegal annexation of the Zaporizhzhia Oblast in October 2022, the Ukrainian staff working for Energoatom who had not aligned themselves with Russia were subjected to forced passportization and constant coercion to sign employment contracts with Rosatom. Some gave in, others fled, while others resisted. On January 25, in a report to the United Nations Security Council, Grossi said, “operating on significantly reduced staff, who are under unprecedented psychological pressure – which despite the reactors being shutdown is not sustainable.”

On February 1, the IAEA was notified that all remaining employees of ZNPP who had not accepted Russian citizenship and were still employees of Energoatom were barred from the plant. Russian occupiers told the onsite inspectors, “There are enough certified personnel at the plant, and all positions are fully filled.”

According to the IAEA, the plant is staffed at just 39% of its pre-occupation level, with 4,500 workers and 940 job applications under review. Russian occupiers closed the so-called “road of life” between Vasyivka and Kamyanske in December 2022 and never reopened it. For Energoatom employees and their families who are now jobless and want to leave the occupied territories, it will require a journey through Russia, where they risk filtration, interrogation, and arrest.

How dangerous is the situation

After briefing the U.N. Security Council last month, Grossi held a brief press conference.

January 26, 2024 – IAEA Secretary-General Rafael Grossi’s press conference at the United Nations

When asked on a scale of one to ten, “ten being the most dangerous and one being secure,” what would you rank Zaporizhzhia [NPP] right now, he said, “Well, as I was telling…her just a minute ago, I think there are days where you are near ten, and there are days that nothing seems to happen – and the problem is this. The complete uncertainty because this is a war.”

Grossi was also asked about the level of cooperation Ukraine and Russia were providing to the IAEA, telling reporters, “Yes. I would say, by and large, yes. Of course, there are – there are moments of frustration. Mine and theirs, I guess, because sometimes when I say things that they don’t appreciate, or that I or they would prefer me to say differently – there is tension – there but – this is a little bit – what the – is all about. And this happens to us when it comes to Iran. When it comes to the DPRK. People sometimes do not appreciate what we have to say, but we have to say it anyway.”

In June 2023, when the world had its eyes on ZNPP, nuclear experts told us it would be extremely difficult for there to be a Fukushima or Chornobyl-sized accident or a European continent-obliterating act of nuclear terrorism. ZNPP has Pressure Water Reactors, which are very similar to Western nuclear power plants and have little in common with the infamous Soviet-era RBMK reactors. The vessels for all six reactors were designed to survive the impact of a commercial airliner crashing into them. In a cold shutdown state, it would take weeks for the reactors to start to melt down, which would require the removal or arrest of the onsite IAEA inspectors and weeks of denials and cover-ups.

Scenario one – radioactive water or steam release

This was considered the second most likely accident or act of intentional sabotage. A release of radioactive steam or water would contaminate a limited area with mild to moderate levels of radiation. With the Kakhovka Reservoir drained away, the threat to the water supply is not as dire as it was at the start of 2023. This would also be the easiest accident to clean up.

Scenario two – breach or loss of coolant to spent fuel storage

ZNPP has onsite storage for spent nuclear fuel, which requires cooling and containment. In a worst-case scenario, the intentional destruction of containment would have a similar impact to a dirty bomb, spreading highly radioactive material over a relatively small area. Irradiated material would be carried by the wind, spreading mild to moderate radioactive over a larger area. Clean-up would be complex and expensive, and a small area, when compared to the two most infamous accidents of the nuclear age, could be left uninhabitable. If the spent fuel storage lost circulation or its coolant, the materials would heat up, eventually burning through their containment.

Scenario three – meltdown

While ZNPP doesn’t have all of the safety systems of its Western peers, the facility is well-engineered with the reactors encased in a protective vessel, the concrete and steel reinforced external containment building, redundant cooling systems, fire suppression systems, boron injection systems, and multiple backups. An accidental full meltdown is always theoretically possible but nearly impossible. Even in the event of a full meltdown of one or all the reactors, it would take an intentional act to breach the outer containment vessels. In the worst-case scenario, radiation would impact all of Ukraine, parts of Russia, and many areas of eastern and central Europe. However, claims that the plant would explode like 20 megaton hydrogen bombs are inaccurate.

Scenario four – economic terrorism

Faced with having to withdraw from ZNPP, experts told us the most likely scenario would be Russian occupiers intentionally contaminating the reactor vessels, rendering the plant unusable. While the radiation risk outside of the plant would be low, releasing large amounts of radiation in one, some, or all of the containment buildings would block access. It would also make attempts to repair ZNPP not only complex and dangerous but potentially economically unviable.

A very uncertain future

Director General Grossi is traveling to Kyiv on February 6 and will visit ZNPP for the fourth time the next day during the 16th rotation of the IAEA inspectors. After his visit, he plans to travel to Moscow for additional meetings with Russian officials.

The approach to maintenance, training, and staffing that Russian enterprise Rosatom is taking at ZNPP provides a glimpse into how Moscow runs its other nuclear facilities. With the world’s attention focused on the Middle East, there’s a ticking timebomb in the middle of Ukraine, and not enough people are paying attention.

Breaking News, International News

Azerbaijan Starts Military Operation in the Disputed Karabakh Against Ethnic Armenians

The Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense announced the start of a military operation in Karabakh following a series of alleged attacks by Armenia forces, with the aim of disarming the breakaway Republic of Artsakh.

Fighting has continued throughout the day, with 7,000 civilians being evacuated from the regions of Artsakh/Nagorno-Karabakh. At least 25 people have been killed in the fighting, with videos showing civilian areas being hit by artillery rounds and mortars.

The Azerbaijani Armed Forces released a series of videos showing Armenian air defenses, radar, and communication sites being destroyed by drones. Power in the city of Stepanakert was knocked out, with residents in panic as the sound of continuous artillery fire rubbled.

Azerbaijan officials claim that landmines placed on roads killed civilians and soldiers on September 19, sparking the “anti-terror operation.” Armenia vehemently denies the claim.

At the start of the hostilities, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense released a statement saying, “In the last few months, the Armenian armed forces units in the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan systematically fired at the positions of the Azerbaijani Army from various calibers of weapons, continued mining of our territories, engineering improvements of the combat positions, as well as increasing the number of trenches and shelters, caused an increase in tension.”

The Ministry claimed that a land mine killed employees of the State Agency of Zaerbaijan Highways, and in a separate incident, military personnel were killed and injured “as a result of a mine planted by the intelligence-sabotage groups,” adding that Russia and Türkiye were notified about the military action.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia released a statement saying that “Azerbaijan unleashed another large-scale aggression against the people of Nagorno-Karabakh, aimed at completing its policy of ethnic cleansing” that is “guided by a sense of impunity.”

Armenian officials condemned the ongoing blockade of the Lachin Corridor, which has isolated up to 120,000 ethnic Armenians, bringing thousands to the brink of starvation. The Ministry accused Azerbaijan of conducting false flag attacks to justify large-scale military operations, adding, “the news about mining and sabotage operations are false and fabricated.”

In the same statement, Armenia appealed to its international partners, the UN Security Council, and the Russian peacekeeping force in Nagorno-Karabakh to put “an end to Azerbaijan’s aggression.”

A History of Religious Violence and Genocide

Historically, the Artsakh/Nagorno-Karabakh region has been a homeland for ethnic Armenians. In 1805, Russian troops occupied Artsakh, annexing the territory from Iran in 1812. During the First Balkan War of 1912, Christian Armenians were accused of atrocities against Muslims, laying the foundation for future violence. A 1913 coup in the Ottoman Empire installed a one-party, fiercely anti-Christian government, which started a policy of forced relocations. Constantinople (now Istanbul) began “Muslimifcation” of the regions bordering Imperial Russia to disrupt what they believed was a growing separatist movement.

On October 29, 1914, the Ottoman Empire aligned with the Central Powers and entered World War I by attacking Russia’s Black Sea ports. Ottoman armies invaded Russia through modern-day Azerbaijan and Armenia, and the offensive was a military disaster. Retreating Ottaman-Turks massacred Christian Armenians and burned towns to the ground. This started a two-year genocide that killed up to 1.5 million ethnic Armenians through executions, starvation, and forced labor.

A brief period of independence from 1918 to 1920 ended with the invasion of the Soviet Red Army, and in 1922, Armenia and Azerbaijan became part of the Soviet Union.

When Josef Stalin became the leader of the Soviet Union in 1924, he implemented policies that harshly repressed religion. A heavy hand with a crushing grip closed the fractures between Christians and Muslims, but the wounds remained unhealed.

For its historical part, Türkiye has never recognized the Armenian Genocide.

How Azerbaijan and Armenia Got to Today

As the Soviet Union crumbled, the first clashes over control of the region erupted in 1988. In 1991, the Republic of Artsakh, located in a mountainous region of the South Caucus, declared its independence from the Soviet Union. A regional ceasefire was negotiated in 1994, with the Artsakh/Nagorno-Karabakh continuing to operate as an independent region within the borders of Azerbaijan, heavily supported by Armenia.

Today, the Nagorno-Karabakh uses the Armenian dram as its currency, holds elections for an independent government, and is supported militarily by Armenian “volunteers.” Despite these connections, the Armenian government has never formally declared Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Armenia territory.

In a series of skirmishes, clashes, and a four-day war in 2016, various peace agreements and annexations left Nagorno-Karabakh isolated from the internationally recognized border of Azerbaijan and Armenia. Access to the region is dependent on a single road – the Lachin Corridor.

The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War started on September 27, 2020, leaving 7,000 dead before a Russian Federation brokered ceasefire was reached on November 10. Part of the agreement placed Russian peacekeepers in Azerbaijan to act as observers, prevent further hostilities, and keep the Lachin Corridor open.

The geopolitics of the region is complex, with Azerbaijan backed by Turkey. Armenia is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Russia’s version of NATO, which includes Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.

The Beginning of the end of the CSTO Alliance

On September 12, 2022, Azerbaijan launched an unprovoked attack on Armenia, and on September 13, it shelled a base housing Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) peacekeeper troops, damaging barracks and vehicles. On September 14, Armenia tried to execute Article IV of the CSTO Alliance, requesting direct military intervention. The Kremlin rejected the petition and offered to send additional observers. From September 12 to 29, the clashes left up to 300 people dead, including civilians.

On the same day that Armenia requested assistance from the Alliance, CSTO members Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan entered into a four-day border clash that left over 150 dead, including civilians, with both combatants accusing each other of war crimes.

With two members fighting, up to 90% of Russian ground forces fighting in Ukraine or supporting the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine, and Belarus entangled with Russia, Kazakhstan was the only CSTO member not already at war, supporting a war, or ready to fight a war with another CSTO member.

It was under this backdrop that Armenia hosted the CSTO Alliance Summit in Yerevan on November 23-24. At the end of the summit, Armenia refused to sign a draft declaration due to the absence of a statement addressing Azerbaijan’s aggression.

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian said, “Under these conditions, the lack of a clear political assessment of the situation and the failure to make the above decision may not only mean the CSTO’s refusal from allied obligations but may also be interpreted by Azerbaijan as a green light from the CSTO for further aggression against Armenia.”

With the CSTO leaders sitting at a round table and the signing ceremony broadcasted on live TV, Pashinian declared the summit over and walked out of the room. Russian President Vladimir Putin was so stunned the pen fell out of his hand.

Russia Wanted More from the 2020 Ceasefire

Moscow started flexing its political will in the region, fomenting the ethnic Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh to declare independence and the desire to become part of the Russian Federation.

Following the same playbook used in Georgia and Ukraine, Russia started offering passports to Armenians, and on February 22, 2022, the first deputy chairman of the State Duma Committee on CIS Affairs, Konstantin Zatulin, said the same process used to create the illegitimate so-called Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republic in Ukraine, could work in Artsakh/Nagorno-Karabakh. He suggested that the pro-Russian elements of the Karabakh could form a People’s Republic aligned with Moscow, which would facilitate future annexation.

On April 13, Russian propagandist and ethnic Armenian Margarita Simonyan, editor-in-chief of Russian state-controlled broadcaster RT, shared a post on Telegram supporting the formation of a so-called Karabakh People’s Republic.

Russia’s attempt to occupy Ukraine in February 2022 collapsed in a humiliating defeat, suffering the loss of tens of thousands of troops and hundreds of pieces of some of its best military hardware in just five weeks. To continue its war of aggression and reconstitute military units, Russia started drawing down its peacekeepers and military hardware from regions around the world, including Nagorno-Karabakh and the Lachin Corridor. In December 2022, Azerbaijan blockaded the mountain roadway.

What’s the World is Saying

French President Emmanuel Macron called for an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council, and the European Council condemned the hostilities. In a separate statement, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock accused Azerbaijan of breaking the 2020 peace agreement. United States Secretary of State Antony Blinken said there is “deep concern for the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh and underscored that the United States is calling on Azerbaijan to immediately cease hostilities and return to dialogue immediately.”

The Foreign Ministry of Russia called for an end of hostilities. “In connection with the sharp escalation of the armed confrontation in Nagorno Karabakh, we urge the conflicting parties to immediately stop the bloodshed, stop hostilities, and eliminate civilian casualties.”

The statement from Moscow falsely alleges that Yerevan has made a territorial claim to Nagoro-Karabakh. On May 25, in a televised address that included Azeri President Ilham Aliyev and Pashinian, Putin said, “In my opinion, on the whole, despite difficulties and problems, and there are enough of them, the situation is nonetheless moving towards a settlement,” adding that, “officials from Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia would continue to meet to ensure that “all unresolved issues will be cleared away.”

During those talks, Pashinian offered a shocking list of concessions, including the ratification of the Armenia-Azerbajian border and recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as Azerbaijani territory. Pashinian singular condition was security guarantees to the 120,000 ethnic Armenians in the region. As recently as August, Putin expressed hope a resolution would be reached and called for patience.

The Foreign Ministry of Türkiye said that Azerbaijan was left with no options, declaring, “As a result of its rightful and legitimate concerns about the situation on the ground that it voiced repeatedly not being alleviated in nearly three since the end of the Second Karabakh War, Azerbaijan was forced to take measures it deems necessary on its sovereign territory.”

Another Genocide

The nine-month blockade has left Nagorno-Karabakh without food, fuel, and medical supplies. Residents line up for bread, with people standing in line for hours to receive one loaf per day. On August 15, 2023, Artsakh’s Human Rights Defender, Gegham Stepanyan, reported the first person had died from malnutrition due to the blockade. The next day, the United Nations demanded that the Lachin Corridor be opened immediately to allow relief aid to pass, which Azerbaijan ignored. On September 11, the BBC independently verified that eight residents had died from hunger.

Because Armenia has never made an official claim that Nagorno-Karabakh is its national territory, for right or wrong, international law will likely view the ongoing fighting as an Azerbaijan internal issue.

Ominously, the Azerbaijan state news agency, quoting a presidential spokesperson, said, “Nevertheless, for the antiterror measures to stop, the illegal Armenian military formations must raise the white flag, all the weapons must be handed over, and the illegal regime must be dissolved. Otherwise, the antiterror measures will be continued until the end.”

Azerbaijan forces did reopen the Lachin Corridor, but embattled civilians report the road is being shelled by artillery, making it impassable.

In a Facebook Live address, Prime Minister Pashinyan asserted that Armenia is not currently involved in the situation in Artsakh, sparking mass protests.

Armenia’s Fragile Future

Thousands have gathered in Yerevan calling for the resignation of Pashinyan, despite his calls to remain calm and to resist “provocations aimed at destabilizing the nation.”

Ignoring his request, tensions are rapidly rising, and Pashinian condemned protesters demanding a coup. Security forces have deployed flashbang grenades and potentially teargas.

Protesters also surrounded the Russian Embassy, demanding intervention in Azerbaijan as part of the 2020 peace accord, chanting, “shame,” “killers,” and curses at Russian President Putin and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. The Russian Foreign Ministry urged the Armenian government to end the protest.

On social media, a flood of Russian disinformation has started, referring to Armenia as “temporarily occupied” and calling Pashinyan a CIA-installed puppet. There are hints that Russia is attempting to take advantage of the situation, with the Russian Deputy Chairman of the Security Council and former President, Dmitry Medvedev, writing, “One day, one of my colleagues from a fraternal country told me: ‘Well, I’m a stranger to you, you won’t accept me.’ I answered what I had to: ‘We will judge not by biography, but by actions.’ Then he lost the war, but strangely stayed in place. Then he decided to blame Russia for his mediocre defeat. Then he gave up part of the territory of his country. Then he decided to flirt with NATO, and his wife defiantly went to our enemies with cookies. Guess what fate awaits him.”

After Armenia requested Russia to honor the 2020 peace agreement, propagandist Simonyan wrote on Telegram, “Pashinyan demands (!) that Russian peacekeepers protect [Artsakh]. And what about NATO? Not? Doesn’t protect?”

We had assessed the CSTO Alliance had reached the beginning of the end last year, with Russia’s September 2022 refusal to provide military aid to Armenia, Pashinian’s dramatic end to the CSTO Summit, and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan almost reaching all-out war.

In May 2023, Pashinyan declared Armenia would remain in CSTO, and Armenia has been accused of supporting Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine by being one of the main conduits for the transit of sanctioned goods. But Yerevan is keeping an eye on the West for its future.

In 2022, United States House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) became the highest-level U.S. official to ever visit Yerevan on official business. On March 24, Türkiye and Armenia opened two border crossings that had been closed since 1993, and on September 11, Armenia and the U.S. launched a ten-day joint military exercise involving 85 U.S. troops. The Armenian Defense Ministry said the drills are meant to increase the interoperability of units participating in international peacekeeping missions and exchanging tactical skills.

Armenia has had a dedicated peacekeeping brigade since 2001. The 12th Peacekeeping has deployed to Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Kazakhstan. In 2019, Armenia responded to a Russian request to deploy explosive ordnance disposal engineers, medics, and security officers to Aleppo, Syria.

Putin’s Dilemma has no Good Answer, and Thousands Could Die

Militarily, the CSTO Alliance is the Russian Federation’s might covering several other nations. Prior to 2022, this was a convenient relationship. The Kremlin could exert its power, and the CSTO members had a nuclear-armed force that the world perceived was still a global superpower. The price of entry was loyalty to President Putin.

Russian losses in Ukraine could be as many as 260,000 troops since February 24, 2022, and there is significant evidence that up to 45% of all Russian military land war hardware is damaged, destroyed, or needs extensive reconditioning due to neglect. The state of the Russian Federation Armed Forces was worse in September 2023 than it was in 2022 when it declined Armenia’s Article IV request.

The bitter truth for Moscow is it can’t intervene in Artsakh/Nagorno-Karabakh even if it wanted to, and the peacekeeping force it deployed in November 2020 has been impotent. Unable to project military power, the Kremlin is settling on a disinformation campaign that the NATO Alliance supports Armenia, and the country is being betrayed. Since President Putin rose to power, nations embedded in Russia’s sphere of influence that have shown interest in broadening their alliances have been met with destabilization efforts and military intervention.

Complicating the situation for Putin, Russia’s dismantling of Private Military Company Wagner Group is backfiring in Africa. The West African branch of al Qaeda, called Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), has recently launched a series of brutal attacks on the remaining Wagner mercenaries, the troops of the interim government of Mali, and non-Muslim civilians. PMC Wagner mercenaries have publicly accused the Russian Ministry of Defense of sabotaging military aircraft and sharing the mercenary group’s tactical plans.

Russia appears to be preempting an Armenian Article IV declaration while ignoring its existing obligations to maintain a viable peacekeeping force in Azerbaijan. Putin is in an incredibly difficult position and could find himself trying to hold back an ongoing Ukrainian offensive while sinking into a Sahel and Caucus quagmire of his own making.

Regardless of the geopolitical swamp that has brewed for over 120 years and extends across three continents, thousands of ethnic Armenians are trapped in Artsakh and face starvation, repression, and death.

International News, Russia-Ukraine War

Russian President Igor Strelkov Girkin?

Hours after appearing in a Moscow courtroom, former FSB Colonel and convicted war criminal Igor Strelkov Girkin announced his support of an effort to nominate him as a candidate in the upcoming 2024 presidential elections in Russia. Girkin, also known by his alias of Strelkov, given to him by his former employer, the Federal Security Service of Russia (FSB), was arrested on June 21 and charged with extremism for a post he made on Telegram in May 2022.

If convicted of his current charges, he faces up to eight years in a penal colony in a justice system with a 99% conviction rate. On August 3, Girkin’s case was declared a “state secret,” enabling Moscow to hold his trial in secret.

A brutal critic of how the Kremlin has been running its so-called “special military operation” after Russia’s 2023 winter offensive failed, Girkin formed the Angry Patriots Club, comprised of extremists, even by Russian standards. The Angry Patriots want to declare martial law, fully mobilize the Russian population, and shift to a wartime economy to ensure the destruction of Ukraine and its people—some advocate using any means to destroy Ukraine, including nuclear weapons.

Apparently posting from his cell at the infamous Lefortovo Prison, Girkin released his reasons for accepting the nomination effort, attacking the policies of incumbent Russian President Vladimir Putin using sarcasm to dance around Russia’s so-called “don’t say war” laws.

“The president refuses to lead military operations [and] considers himself incompetent in military affairs,” Girkini wrote, adding, “I consider myself more competent in military affairs than the incumbent president and definitely more than the incumbent defense minister, so I could fulfill the duty of the supreme commander-in-chief as required by the Constitution of the Russian Federation.”

He went on to call Putin “extremely gullible” and “too kind,” using the Russian leader’s words against him, stating that Putin has been led by the nose by Western leaders for decades. While throwing barbs at his potential political opponent in the upcoming 2024 elections in Russia, Girkin also went after the Russian oligarch class, largely created during the criminal era in the post-Soviet 1990s.

“Vladimir Vladimirovich is a highly moral person, always true to his word and firmly fulfilling the promises given to those who brought him to power in the late nineties. I have promised nothing to anyone and can, therefore, ignore all the personal guarantees of all the presidents of the Russian Federation from 1991 to the present if I consider that this is useful for the people and the state.”

On August 29, a bearded and defiant-looking Girkin was brought to a Moscow court to determine if the charges against him were valid. It was determined there was enough probable cause to continue to hold him until the next hearing scheduled for September 18.

Although he is being kept at FSB-run Lefortovo, Girkin is getting preferential treatment. He is held in a cell designed for two people with a partial kitchenette and a television. Earlier in August, his wife, Miroslava Reginskaya, claimed that his health was declining and that her husband was being denied medication for his heart condition and had not been seen by a doctor. Just before his August 29 hearing, she provided an update stating that he was given a physical, his health had improved, and some of his personal effects were returned to him.

One of Russia’s original “little green men” in Ukraine, Girkin was the first Minister of Defense for the illegitimate so-called Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) and has bragged about committing and ordering war crimes. He was convicted by a Dutch court on November 17, 2022, as one of three men responsible for the July 17, 2014, downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17, which killed 298 people.

For some Russians, he is a hero, while others consider him incompetent after he led a disastrous Kremlin-backed advance on Slovyansk and Kramatorsk in the summer of 2014. After the 1st Army Corps of the DNR collapsed in August 2014, Moscow decided to remove Girkin, who was using his assumed name of Strelkov then. Another one of Russia’s little green Seymon Pegov, who now leads the Russian military blog WarGonzo, has criticized Girkin for years, claiming that he and his unit were abandoned in Slovyansk when Girkin fled hiding in the trunk of a car.

After returning to Russia, Girkin became a prolific blogger and a vocal critic of Russian policies while espousing nationalist and antisemitic talking points. He tried to slip into occupied Crimea in August 2022 but was detained by border guards and refused entry. In October, he became a volunteer mobik for a unit in the DNR but left a month later. He claimed he had been deceived and that his contract was only for one day, leaving him exposed legally as an unlawful combatant. When Girkin left Ukraine for the second time, there was a $100,000 bounty for his capture.

Over the winter, he got into a public spat with the now-deceased Private Military Company Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, criticizing his “attention-seeking,” using dead Russian soldiers as “props,” and publicly complaining about ammunition shortages. Prigozhin offered Girkin the opportunity to sign a contract with PMC Wagner, first as an entry-level mercenary and later as the equivalent of a field officer. Ultimately, he refused, claiming that Prigozhin and the Wagner Group had insulted him and questioned his loyalty to Russia.

Girkin isn’t the first high-profile prisoner in the Russian penal system to have apparent ready access to the Internet. Anti-corruption activist and lawyer Alexei Navalny has also been able to post criticism of Putin despite being incarcerated.

The Kremlin has not released a statement about the potential candidacy of Girkin or the legalities of his potential run for president.

International News, Russia-Ukraine War

The Most Successful Russian Military Leaders are Demoted, Detained, Dismissed, or Deceased

Since Russia expanded its war of aggression against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, The Russian Federation Armed Forces have only had a handful of operational successes turn into strategic victories. While Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu and Chief-of-Staff Valery Gerasimov have maintained their stature in the Kremlin despite repeated failures, there is a common thread among the men who have been able to achieve victories. Without exception, they are either demoted, detained, dismissed, or deceased.

Colonel General Mikhail Mizintsev

Accomplishment: The Capture of Mariupol

General Mizintsev is known as the Butcher of Mariupol and is responsible for 25,000 to 100,000 civilian deaths caused during the 86-day siege of the city. He is accused of setting up the filtration camp structure and ordering attacks on mutually agreed green corridors. On September 24, 2022, the future looked bright for Mizintsev when he was reassigned to Deputy Minister of Defense and charged with overseeing logistics.

Within the Kremlin, Mizintsev was already known to be an ally of Private Military Company Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin. In September, this wasn’t viewed as a liability, but as tension between the Kremlin and Prigozhin reached a boiling point, there were signs that Shoigu was leading a quiet purge of Wagner allies. Mizintsev was dismissed by Russian President Vladimir Putin on April 27, 2023, with no official reason given. There was immediate speculation that Mizintsev had been leaking information to Prigozhin for months about how the Minister of Defense was actively interfering with ammunition and weapons shipment to PMC Wagner. Additionally, there were unsubstantiated claims that Mizintsev had used his position to increase the Shoigu-restricted allocation of munitions to Wagner mercenaries in Bakhmut.

A week after being dismissed, Mitzintsev joined Wagner Group’s Council of Commanders and, on May 3, did a frontline inspection of supply, logistics, and Wagner mercenaries in Bakhmut. A day after his inspection, Mitzintsev reportedly briefed the Council of Commanders as the siege of Bakhmut entered its ninth month. Hours later, Prigozhin announced he was withdrawing from Bakhmut by May 10 due to a lack of ammunition and the failure of Russian military units to protect his flanks.

The status of Mizintsev is unclear. There were unsubstantiated claims that he was detained after the Prigozhin Insurrection of June 23 and has not been seen publicly since the failed revolt.

Lieutenant General Mikhal Zusko

Accomplishment: The capture of Kherson, the only large Ukrainian city captured intact

General Zusko led the 58th Combined Arms Army, which advanced from Crimea on February 24, 2022, and captured the city of Kherson on March 2 with the loss of less than 300 soldiers. The 58th CAA had assistance from Russian-aligned collaborators in Crimea and Kherson, who helped set conditions for the lightly contested advance. Shortly after capturing the critical Antonovskyy Bridge and occupying the city of Kherson, Zusko’s forces continued to advance, reaching the outskirts of the city of Mykolaiv and passing the administrative border of Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk, where Ukrainian forces established an effective defense. Zusko was rumored to have been arrested on March 31, 2022, accused of dereliction of duty due to mounting losses. It wasn’t verified until June 2022 that Zusko had been arrested for failing to capture Mykolaiv and was accused of providing Ukrainian military leaders with information on Russian positions due to his alleged use of unsecured communication channels.

General of the Army Alexander Dvornikov, Colonel General Gennady Zhidko, and Colonel General Alexander Lapin

Accomplishments: The capture of the Luhansk Oblast, including Severodonetsk and Lysychansk

The story of the three generals is intertwined due to their overlapping commands from April to October 2022.

The Kremlin ended its group command structure after Russia suffered strategic defeats at Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Kharkiv in late March 2022. On April 8, it named General Dvornikov the first theaterwide commander of Russian forces in Ukraine.

Reportedly, Dvornikov was ordered to capture the remainder of the Donbas – Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts – by May 9. What the Kremlin got on May 8 was news of a disastrous wet crossing attempt at the Siverskyi Donets River near Bilohorivka. At least 500 Russian troops were killed, and over 80 military vehicles were lost, mostly due to artillery. On the same day, Russian troops supported by the Private Military Company Wagner Group captured Popasna. The crossing at Bilohorivka was supposed to create the second part of a pincer surrounding Ukrainian forces defending Severodonetsk.

With the pincers broken, Dvornikov started a brutal war of attrition on May 10, which led to the capture of the Luhansk Oblast at the expense of the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of Russia, Syrian volunteer groups and Chechen Akhmat forces, which were all combat destroyed by the beginning of July. Chechen Akhmat and the 2nd Army Corps of the so-called Luhansk People’s Republic, now officially part of the Russian Ministry of Defense, never recovered.

Dvornikov fell out of public view in the third week of May, and between May 26 and June 22, Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed him as theaterwide commander, ending his 44-year military career. Although the capture of the Luhansk Oblast didn’t happen while he was the theaterwide commander, his tactics, which closely resembled World War II Russian Marshal Georgy Zhukov’s, did.

General Zhidko was named the new theaterwide commander of Russian troops, but it is unclear when his command officially started and ended. The first proof that Zhidko was the new theaterwide commander was on June 22, when he appeared with Shoigu. Zhidko was reportedly dismissed on July 12, but the Kremlin didn’t publicly name a new theaterwide commander until October 8. While he likely started theaterwide command around June 1, based on the official Kremlin announcements, Zhidko’s tenure as commander of all Russian troops may have been as short as 17 days. There were reports that he was dismissed from command due to a sharp increase in health issues related to chronic alcoholism. Zhidko, age 57, died on August 16, 2023, after a “long illness.”

Intertwined with Dvornikov and Zhidko was General Lapin. Lapin was the commander of the Central Military District of Russian Forces, serving as an area commander through April 8, 2022, before becoming a subordinate of Dvornikov, followed by Zhidko. On July 4, one day after Russia announced it had captured the Luhansk Oblast, Lapin was awarded the title of Hero of Russia by President Putin.

WBHG News analysts concluded in early June that Russia could capture the regions of Luhansk and Donetsk in the short term but lacked sufficient forces to hold territorial gains. As Russia’s combat potential decreased due to the nature of attritional warfare and the June arrival of NATO-provided guided multiple launch rocket systems (GMLRS), better known as HIMARS, Dvornikov or Zhidko pulled reserve forces of the Central Military District from Kharkiv and Donetsk into Luhansk. By early August of 2022, the units under Lapin’s command were exhausted, and near Izyum, equipment and ammunition shortages continued to worsen.

When Ukraine launched the Kharkiv Counteroffensive on September 5, Lapin was accused of abandoning his forces and incompetence by Chechen Colonel General Ramzan Kadyrov and PMC Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin. On Telegram, Kadyrov wrote, “If I had my way, I would demote Lapin to a private, deprive him of his awards and, with a machine gun in his hands, send him to the front line to wash away his shame with blood.” The Chechen warlord, who has never stepped foot in Ukraine, also accused Lapin of cowardice for commanding from the rear.

A divide within the Kremlin spilled out into public view. Some military leaders and analysts accused Kadyrov and Prigozhin of playing politics and positioning themselves to gain deeper control of the Ministry of Defense. Kadyrov and Prigozin leveraged Wagner Group’s bot farms and faux news organizations, a network of Russian milbloggers, and their own social media channels to run an organized smear campaign against Lapin and to advocate for General of the Army Sergey Surovikin to be named the new theaterwide commander. Although Lapin was never the theaterwide commander, Zhidko’s unclear status created a vacuum, contributing to Lapin receiving an oversized portion of the blame for the failures in Kharkiv, at Izyum, and the Russian retreat from Lyman.

On October 8, 2022, Surovikin was named the theaterwide commander, and on October 29, Lapin was dismissed by President Putin. The only commander to still have a career after his fall, the Gerasimov-connected Lapin was named the chief of staff of the Ground Forces of the Russian Federation on January 10, 2023.

General of the Army Sergey Surovikin

Accomplishments: Successful retrograde operation from western Kherson, building the defensive structures in occupied Crimea, Kherson, Zaporzhzhia, and southern Donetsk, instilling basic discipline into Russian troops

On the same day General Surovikin was named the commander of all Russian forces in Ukraine, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) blew up the Kerch (also known as the Crimean) Bridge. Two days later, Ukraine requested a total communications blackout in Kherson, and the second phase of the Kherson Counteroffensive started 48 hours later.

During his ascent, Surovikin negotiated to execute three campaigns: first, the withdrawal of Russian forces west of the Dnipro River in Kherson; second, executing the same air campaign he ran in 2017 against Syrian civilians, targeting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure; and third, taking the forces that withdraw from Kherson and achieving a strategic victory on another axis by December 31. In the public information space, state media started setting conditions with the Russian people to accept a withdrawal from Kherson as both a goodwill gesture and a move to more strategically advantageous positions.

On October 10, the first widescale Russian missile attack against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure was launched. Between November 8 and 11, Surovikin executed a masterful retrograde operation from Kherson, preserving up to 25,000 Russian troops and their equipment, slipping across the Dnipro River and suffering less than 500 casualties.

The biggest legacy of Surovikin’s command was ending the Kremlin policy of sending mobiks with no training to the frontline and instilling military discipline among the Russian troops in Ukraine. This was accomplished by brutally enforcing existing military rules and protocols and creating busy work. Thousands of mobiks were involved in constructing the Surovikin Line, a network of defenses with up to three echelons 35 kilometers deep across occupied Crimea, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and southwestern Donetsk. The static defenses have stymied Ukraine’s summer offensive, forcing Kyiv to change tactics twice since June 4 to overcome the Russian network of minefields, antitank traps, trenches, tunnels, and bunkers.

Surovikin also tried to end sending untrained and ill-equipped Russian troops to the frontlines. The quality of Russian forces had improved significantly, as have their tactics, but since August, there appears to be a return of sending poorly trained, mobilized soldiers into battle.

During his tenure as commander of all Russian forces in Ukraine, Surovikin kept his “day job” as commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS), which included air defense. On December 5, 2022, the Engel-2 and Dyagilevo military airfields deep within Russia were attacked by Ukraine. Two Tu-95 strategic bombers and one Tu-22M3 bomber were damaged, and up to six Russian servicemembers were killed. On December 26, Engels-2 was attacked for a second time. During this period, the relationship between the Kremlin and Prigozhin had become toxic, and Russian troops had been in retreat for months except at Bakhmut, where daily advances were measured in the 10s of meters. It had become clear there would be no major victory for Russia for New Year’s celebrations.

On January 11, 2023, Surovikin was relieved of command and named a Deputy of Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov. The next day, PMC Wagner claimed they had captured Soledar, with the Russian Ministry of Defense not crediting the Wagnerites in their daily morning report.

Surovikin’s alignment with PMC Wagner was well known, and the relationship between the Kremlin and Prigozhin was already souring in October 2022. In May 2023, when Priogzhin threatened to leave Bakhmut by May 10, there were accusations that Surovikin was warning Wagner’s leader that the Kremlin was actively working to dismantle his company.

During the failed Prigozhin Insurrection on June 23, 2023, Surovikin made a video appeal to Prigozhin to stop his actions while holding a submachine gun on his knee. Shortly after, Surovikin was arrested, reportedly briefly held at Lefotovo Prison, before being transferred to an apartment where he remains under house arrest. On August 22, 2023, he was officially dismissed as the commander of the Russian VKS, and his future is unclear.

PMC Wagner Group Leaders Yevgeny Prigozhin and Dmytry Utkin

Accomplishments: The capture of Popasna, Soledar, and Bakhmut and proved Russian penal units could be useful in battle

Private Military Company Wagner Group was asked to support the expansion of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine in March 2022, and up to 1,000 mercenaries arrived on March 19. Wagner Group’s first action was in the Hirske-Zolote region and took a leading role in the capture of Popasna. That Russian advance ultimately severed the T-513 Highway between Lysychansk and Bakhmut in early June 2022, strangling Ukrainian logistics.

Also in May, Wagner’s mercenaries joined the Russian forces advancing in the direction of Bakhmut and Soledar from the Svitlodarsk Bulge. In early June, Prigozhin convinced Russian President Vladimir Putin to allow him to create a battalion of penal soldiers assigned to PMC Wagner. One thousand convicts were recruited from Russian prisons and deployed east of Bakhmut in late June. The initial group suffered catastrophic losses of up to 90% killed and wounded, but the Kremlin believed the program was successful. Project K was born, and Prigozhin was given open access to Russia’s 335,000-plus prisoners. From July to December 2022, 49,000 criminals were recruited into the ranks of PMC Wagner. Recruiting of penal mercenaries peaked in October, but the numbers dropped sharply in November as word spread through the prison population of poor training, heavy losses, and penal units used for human wave attacks. In June 2023, the Council of Commanders reported that from March 2022 to May 2023, Wagner’s casualty rates were 82.5%.

While the September 2022 information war against General Lapin led by Prigozhin and Kadyrov was successful, politically, it was costly. The crumbs of goodwill between Prigozhin and Shoigu blew away like dust in the wind. Prigozhin was furious after the Russian Ministry of Defense snubbed Wagner Group in January 2023 and did not credit his mercenaries for the capture of Soledar. Hours later, the Kremlin released a clarifying statement, acknowledging that the ground fighting was accomplished by PMC Wagner and not just “volunteers.”

The political fallout was swift, and it became clear that President Putin was pulling away from his former caterer turned warlord. Shoigu effectively ended Project K, blocking PMC Wagner from further recruitment at Russian penal colonies. Wagner Group was already facing a recruiting crisis among its regular ranks because the pool they would normally recruit from – Russian soldiers – were dying at an alarming rate, didn’t want to return to Ukraine, and were facing stop-loss orders from the Kremlin, which was extending their service contracts. Days later, Shoigu created his own penal unit PMC called Storm-Z.

In February 2023, Prigozhin infamously threatened to leave Bakhmut, releasing a video with dozens of dead Wagnerites in the background, claiming their deaths were caused by the Russian Ministry of Defense withholding ammunition. Reactions in the Russian information space were mixed, with some Russian commanders claiming that Wagner was not being singled out for special treatment, stating that ammunition shortages were an issue theaterwide. Others criticized Prigozhin, asserting that PMC Wagner had been given preferential treatment at the expense of other axes and that the successes in Bakhmut were not due to superior training and tactics but an excess of ammunition that had been normalized. Others defended the mercenary leader, pointing out that the Wagnerites were the only force achieving operational success in Ukraine.

Prigozhin and Kadyrov hinted that the Chechen military leader provided some ammunition to Wagner Group in mid-February. In late February, the stalemate appeared to break when a lull in Russian artillery fire missions in the Bakhmut and Soledar areas of operation ended.

On May 5, Prigozhin made another video again standing in front of dozens of corpses, claiming they were Wagner mercenaries unnecessarily killed. He infamously growled, “Shoigu! Gerasimov! Where’s the fucking ammo,” claiming the Kremlin had cut off his ammunition supplies and that elite Russian forces who were supposed to defend his flanks in Bakhmut were doing nothing. Prigozhin declared that if he didn’t get sufficient ammunition within 48 hours and Russian forces defending his flanks didn’t rejoin the battle, he would withdraw his forces.

WBHG News analysts noted that the April deal between the Russian Ministry of Defense and PMC Wagner, which transferred the defense of the flanks to Russian units while Wagnerites continued fighting within Bakhmut, was meant to destroy Wagner. The Kremlin only tasked Russian forces to hold the existing defense lines and focused on using artillery to protect themselves as Wagner mercenaries fought house-to-house in bloody attritional warfare. Moscow was repeating its policy of using indigenous and proxy forces to fight in the most difficult areas while preserving their own units, and Prigozhin could not or refused to see the true nature of the agreement.

It is also important to note that unlike in February 2023, when there was a noticeable decrease in Russian artillery fire, there was no such decrease in May. Prigozhin wasn’t facing an ammunition shortage. He was facing a staffing crisis caused by an appalling casualty rate and his inability to recruit new penal mercenaries.

The mercenaries that joined the ranks of Wagner Group in October and November who weren’t dead or badly wounded were reaching the end of their six-month contracts. While some analysts believed that Prigozhin would arbitrarily extend their contracts beyond six months, the team at WBHG News accurately predicted that would not happen. Prigozhin was a former convict who deeply believed convicted criminals could create a new life after prison. Prigozhin understood that if he didn’t honor his contracts with the penal mercenaries he always called “his boys,” he would break one of the foundations of the unwritten Russian convict code.

After Prigozhin’s May 5 video, General Kadyrov, who days earlier had called Prigozhin “his good friend” and said that the pair had planned surprises for Ukraine, lashed out at his former partner and questioned his loyalty to Russia. Two days later, while taking another swipe at Prigozhin and his “ego,” Kadyrov claimed that the pair had agreed for Chechen Akhmat to take over the offensive in Bakhmut. In a video posted on his Telegram channel, Kadyrov showed his letter to the Kremlin sent on May 7, which Moscow rejected.

On May 8, Prigozhin announced that the Russian Ministry of Defense told him that if his forces left on May 10, he and his mercenaries would be arrested for treason. Trapped militarily, legally, and politically, he announced the Wagnerites would stay until Bakhmut was captured. At the time of his capitulation, Wagner Group controlled 93% to 95% of the city. On May 20, Prigozhin announced the mission was accomplished, even if the victory claim was dubious. There has never been a picture of Russian troops in the Litak region of Bakhmut, the last Ukrainian stronghold in the southwest corner, and very few pictures and videos from Russian state media, troops, or Wagnerites west of the railroad tracks that split the city.

On June 1, Wagner started its withdrawal, and on June 10, the city was handed over to Russian forces. The Kremlin announced that all Private Military Companies would no longer be commanded independently and would have to sign contracts with the Ministry of Defense by June 20, accepting to be under the command of the Russian Federation Armed Forces effective July 1. Up to two dozen PMCs fighting on behalf of Russia had been created since the start of 2023, and the mandate also impacted General Kadyrov. Kadyrov made a clean break from Prigozhin politically, throwing his loyalty back to Shoigu as he announced he was the first leader to sign a transfer of control with the Kremlin.

Prigozhin refused, and as the June 20 deadline passed, it was clear that a clash between PMC Wagner and the Kremlin was inevitable. Late on June 21, he released a rambling video accusing the Kremlin of lying about attacks on civilians in the Donbas, claiming the war against Ukraine was escalated so that oligarchs had more access to natural resources and that the entire invasion of Ukraine was based on a lie. If Prigozhin was the leader of a nation, his words were tantamount to the breaking of diplomatic relations and a prelude to a declaration of war.

On June 22, Prigozhin made a dubious claim that his camps in occupied Luhansk were attacked by Russian missiles, causing over a thousand casualties. A video released as proof across multiple Wagner Telegram channels did not support his claim. Twelve hours later, Prigozhin and Wagner founder Dmitry Utkin led an insurrection specifically targeting Shoigu and Gerasimov while pledging their loyalty to President Putin.

Wagner mercenaries took control of Rostov-on-Don and surrounded the Southern Military District headquarters, barely firing a shot. Utkin led a brigade of Wagnerites in a convoy that advanced 670 kilometers in 12 hours toward Moscow. The so-called “March for Freedom” ended as quickly as it started, with Prigozhin asking his followers to stand down on June 24.

In the end, 15 to 22 Russian soldiers died, and seven helicopters and an Il-22M command and control plane were shot down. Part of a refinery was in flames, one highway bridge was destroyed, and at least three civilians were killed on June 24 when the Russian VKS started to bomb highways indiscriminately.

President Putin was invisible through the insurrection, but after it ended, he called the attempted rebellion treason and promised swift justice. Just 48 hours later, it was announced that Prigozhin would not face criminal charges, and two days later, Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko announced he had created a peace deal between himself, Prigozhin, and Putin. PMC Wagner would relocate to Belarus, where Prigozhin would live in exile. WBHG News analysts never believed this was a firm deal and warned that previous history shows that anyone disloyal to Putin had ended up imprisoned, dead, or hiding after surviving an assassination attempt. Even among Putin’s former closest allies, there had never been an exception to this, and in 2018, Putin told a reporter that “betrayal” was unforgivable.

In early July, a camp to accommodate up to 8,500 Wagner mercenaries was built in Tsel, Belarus, and on July 15, Prigozhin posted a selfie showing himself in his underwear at the Belarus encampment. On July 19, PMC Wagner released a video showing Prigozhin and Utkin addressing a group of Wagnerites about the organization’s future, with the media-shy Utkin declaring in English, “Welcome to Hell!”

But just under the surface, the claims that 25,000 Wagner mercenaries would occupy Belarus to supplement Lukashenko’s army were questionable, and by mid-August, it was clear that if there ever was a three-way deal, it was over. All recruiting was suspended on July 30, with Prigozhin claiming they had “plenty” of mercenaries in their ranks. Wagnerites that had arrived two weeks earlier were leaving Belarus due to deployments in Libya, recruitment efforts by other PMCs, or a lack of pay as Wagner’s finances fell apart.

Prigozhin also stunned analysts and his detractors when he appeared in St. Petersburg, Russia, on July 28 at the periphery of the Russia-Africa Summit. The sting of the non-response from the Kremlin over the dead Russian airman was barely a month old, and some publicly wondered how Prigozhin, who was supposedly exiled, could be walking around in St. Petersburg as a free man.

On August 23, just hours after General Surovikin was formerly dismissed as the commander of the Russian VKS, Prigozhin’s Embraer Legacy 600 private jet was either shot down or destroyed by an explosive device over the Tver region of Russia while it was en route from Moscow to St. Petersburg. It is reported that Prigozhin, who carefully guarded his travel plans, decided at the last minute not to swap to the second private jet operated by PMC Wagner, an Embraer Legacy 650, that was also bound for St. Petersburg.

Ten people were killed, including the pilot, co-pilot, and a flight attendant operating on a one-day contract because she needed to travel to St. Petersburg. Among the seven members of PMC Wagner that were killed,

  • Yevgeny Prigozhin – figurehead and leader focusing on media, social media, psychological operations, and commercial catering
  • Dmitry Utkin – creator of the name “Wagner,” known white nationalist, and the military leader of PMC Wagner
  • Valery Chekalov – Head of logistics operating under the title of “business advisor”

None of the dead have been officially identified, but President Putin referred to Prigozhin in the past tense in a formal statement, as did Kadyrov. The Wagner Group’s Council of Commanders declared they would not make a formal statement until after the Kremlin provided its official reason for the downing of the airplane.

Of the eight Russian military and mercenary leaders who achieved key objectives since February 24, 2022, three are dead, two are held in custody, one is missing, one was dismissed, and one, General Lapin, was reassigned. Putin’s protection of Shoigu and Gerasimov is unwavering despite their unwavering loyalty, despite the documented corruption and repeated mistakes. For any other Russian or Russian-aligned senior military leader who finds success on the battlefield in Ukraine, it comes with the occupational hazard of falling out of favor or, worse, from the sky.