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Part 4: The complex history of Islamic extremism and Russia’s contribution to the rise of Al Qaeda and ISIS

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This is part four of a ten-part series that explains the rise of modern Islamic extremism. From 1951 to 2021, a series of key geopolitical events, many independent of each other, caused the Islamic Revolution, the rise of Al Qaeda and ISIS, the creation and collapse of the caliphate, and the reconstitution of ISIS as ISKP. While Western influence and diplomatic blunders are well documented through this period, the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation are equally culpable. The editors would like to note that a vast majority of the 1.8 billion people who are adherents to some form of Islam are peaceful and reject all forms of religious violence.

Read Part Three: The complex history of Islamic extremism and Russia’s contribution to the rise of Al Qaeda and ISIS

State-sanctioned violence grows in Afghanistan as the Soviets prepare to withdraw

Moscow forces the replacement of their puppet leader in Afghanistan and struggles to find an exit 

When the Soviets assassinated Hafizullah Amin on December 27, 1979, and installed Babrak Karmal as their puppet leader, KGB head Yury Andropov advocated for Mohammad Najibullah to be installed as the head of the state security services of Afghanistan—the KHAD. After his appointment, Andropov immediately started an influence campaign to convince Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and Amin to support expanding Najibullah’s power, which earned him a seat in the Afghanistan Politburo.

When Najibullah took over the KHAD in 1980, he was responsible for 120 people. Six years later, the KHAD was an independent government Ministry with 30,000 highly paid employees trained by KGB advisors. Most of the KHAD budget came from the Soviet Union, and shortly after Andropov became the General Secretary of the Soviet Union in November 1983, he started laying the groundwork to replace Karmal with his protege, Najibullah.

During the six years Najibullah led the KHAD, the KGB funded and trained its staff. Over 16,000 extrajudicial executions were carried out, and 100,000 were imprisoned. The KHAD brutally tortured peasants and tribesmen, burned villages, killed livestock, and destroyed crops in an attempt to identify members of the mujahadeen. In the cities, anti-communists, intellectuals, professors, doctors, and educated professionals were threatened, assassinated, falsely imprisoned, and executed. Flush with funds from the Soviet Union and under Najibullah’s leadership, the KHAD was wildly corrupt.

When Mikhail Gorbachev became the Soviet Premier in 1985, he continued to follow the path created by Andropov, believing that after the Soviet withdrawal, Najibullah would be a stronger leader who would stay loyal to Moscow. The Main Defense Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet Union (GRU) disagreed. In their assessment, Najibullah would be even more polarizing than Karmal and would not be able to build a strong coalition with the various Afghan tribal warlords. Gorbachev was unmoved.

Soviet Union soldiers in Kabul, Afghanistan -1986
Credit – Photographer unknown – public domain

Moscow hoped that their newly installed leader could bring the fractured Afghanistan nation to reconciliation, ending eight years of violence, allowing the exit of Soviet troops, and keeping a pro-Soviet government in place. On May 4, 1986, Najibullah was made the General Secretary of the Afghanistan Politburo, with Karmal remaining as the Chairman of the Revolutionary Council. The assessment by the GRU that ethnic Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Pashtuns would resist cooperating with Najibullah, and the armed factions fighting against Soviet troops would reject him was accurate. Additionally, Karmal fought back, openly questioning Najibullah’s loyalty to Afghanistan, exposing his trail of corruption, and spreading misinformation.

Najibullah complained to Moscow that Karmal was interfering with his rule and asked for guidance, with Gorbachev deciding on a non-violent solution. In November 1986, Karmal was dismissed from the Revolutionary Council and exiled to Moscow. The Kremlin now saw the reconciliation strategy as a failure and decided that negotiating peace was the best option. Gorbachev also believed that due to the improving relationship with the United States, he could push for more favorable terms.

In March 1987, the first round of U.N.-sponsored peace talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan was held in Geneva, Switzerland, with the U.S. and the Soviet Union as guarantors. Pakistan negotiators refused to meet with the Afghanistan delegation because they did not recognize the Soviet-backed and controlled government as legitimate. The first round of negotiations failed, with Pakistan refusing to agree to a 16-month timetable for a controlled withdrawal of Soviet troops, demanding it be eight months. Additionally, the Soviets asked for the immediate end of U.S. arms shipments and financial support to the Afghan resistance as a condition for Soviet withdrawal. Washington refused.

In July, Najibullah made a secret trip to Moscow to meet with Gorbachev. The Soviet leader pressed him to make additional government reforms, hoping that the dead reconciliation plan could be brought back to life. Gorbachev’s council was undermined by the KGB, who advised against implementing some of his recommended reforms. Returning to Afghanistan, Najibullah announced that single-party rule would end. However, there were tight restrictions on what platforms would be acceptable. New parties were required to want to maintain relations with the Soviet Union, had to be Muslim, and had to oppose colonialism, imperialism, Zionism, racial discrimination, apartheid, and fascism. The mujahadeen and all but one armed faction fighting against the Soviet-backed Afghan government boycotted the August elections, but several new leftist parties were formed and were able to gain a handful of government seats.

In September, a second round of peace talks was held in Geneva. While progress was made in establishing the legitimacy of the Afghan government, no progress was made in establishing a timetable for the Soviet withdrawal, and the U.S. again refused to end military and financial aid before the Soviet troop withdrawal was complete.

In November, during the conference of the Afghanistan Politburo, Najibullah proposed accelerating the timetable for the Soviet withdrawal from 16 months to 12. A new constitution was approved, creating the office of the President. On November 30, Najibullah, running unopposed, was elected president of Afghanistan. Under the mandate of the new constitution, the Revolutionary Council would be dissolved and replaced with a General Assembly elected by the people.

On February 8, 1988, Soviet negotiators announced a conditional date of withdrawal from Afghanistan, hoping that the U.S. would agree to the immediate end of military and financial aid to the Afghanistan rebels. Washington rejected the proposal. With the domestic situation in the Soviet Union deteriorating, Gorbachev decided that an unfavorable peace deal was better than remaining in Afghanistan.

On April 14, Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Soviet Union, and the U.S. signed the Geneva Accords. Pakistan and Afghanistan agreed to non-interference and non-intervention, and Pakistan agreed to stop the flow of weapons across its border. The Soviet Union agreed that the withdrawal of the 40th Combined Arms Army would begin on May 15 and be completed by February 15, 1989. The U.S. did not have to end military and financial aid before the completion of the Soviet withdrawal.

On February 15, 1989, the last column of BTR-80 armored personnel carriers of the Soviet 40th Combined Arms Army crossed the Friendship Bridge into Soviet Uzbekistan. General Boris Gromov symbolically walked behind the troops, becoming the last Soviet soldier to withdraw from Afghanistan. Mobbed by reporters, he cursed profusely, later explaining that his anger was directed at “the leadership of the country, at those who start the wars while others have to clean up the mess.”

The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan elevates Osama bin Laden to a cult of personality

There are questions about how much combat Osama bin Laden was engaged in with the mujahedeen, but he did participate in a handful of tactical battles. During his time in Pakistan and Afghanistan, bin Laden used his wealth and influence to promote victories on the battlefield and recruit Arabs to the Islamic cause within Afghanistan. While bin Laden was media-shy, his talent as a leader was well-known in the Middle East, converting his influence into a cult of personality.

Osama bin Laden -1988
Credit – Photographer unknown – public domain

But bin Laden was looking ahead to the future. In 1988, shortly after the signing of the Geneva Accords, he quietly founded Al Qaeda. For him, Afghanistan was the end of the beginning. Al Qaeda would continue its violent jihad against what he perceived were the enemies of fundamentalist Islam and fight to establish Muslim states controlled by Sharia law.

Despite fighting against the Soviet Union, a lot of bin Laden’s beliefs were influenced by his exposure to Soviet propaganda, including late 19th Century Eastern European and Imperial Russia antisemitism. In the simplest of terms, bin Laden believed that Muslim Arabs faced four enemies: the Jews and Israel, the United States, “heretics,” and Shia Muslims, particularly Iranian Shias.

At the time of the Soviet withdrawal, bin Laden believed that the West had wronged Arabs and Muslims worldwide. The Al Qaeda charter established that the people of democratic nations directly participate in their government, making them legitimate military targets due to their complicity in their government decisions. Further, any “good Muslim” civilian who was killed due to their proximity to an attack would be blessed in death and go to paradise.

In 1989, bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia and was given a hero’s welcome along with his Al Qaeda Arab Legion. He continued to lead a triple life, running aspects of the family construction business, continuing to work with Pakistan and Saudi Arabian intelligence agencies, and indirectly and directly supporting jihadist activity in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

Bin Laden would return to Afghanistan to personally lead up to 800 Al Qaeda fighters in Operation Jalalabad, which was an attempt to install a pro-Pakistani mujahadeen government in Kabul. Although Soviet troops had withdrawn from Afghanistan, military aid to the Najibullah government continued. Moscow sent approximately $4 billion in weapons and ammunition, including OTR-21 Tochka-U short-range ballistic missile launchers with Scarab missiles and Su-27 multirole fighter aircraft.

Operation Jalalabad was a complete failure, with the Afghan army using its arsenal to stop the offensive. Up to 500 of bin Laden’s militants were killed, and he was forced to return to Saudi Arabia, further imbittered by another betrayal.

Once back in Saudi Arabia, bin Laden supported opposition movements against the Saudi royal family and ordered the executions of the leaders of the Soviet-backed Yemeni government. He also interfered with reunification talks in Yemen, which has led to decades of civil war, famine, and hundreds of thousands of deaths. The unrest continues to this day, with north Yemini rebels switching from Al Qaeda-oriented dogma to gaining support from the Islamic Republic Guard Corps (IRGC) of Iran. Today, the IRGC-backed Houthi rebels control approximately 30 percent of Yemen and have interfered with global shipping since November 2023 in support of the Hamas-initiated war against Israel.

The increasing influence of bin Laden and his meddling in Saudi government affairs drew the attention of King Fahd and the ire of the then-President of Saudi Arabia, Ali Abdullah Saleh. They now viewed bin Laden as more than a problem they could manage—he was becoming a threat.

The Saudis weren’t the only country warily watching bin Laden and the Al Qaeda Arab Legion. U.S. intelligence was also hearing chatter that his plans weren’t just contained to the Greater Middle East.

It was now 1990, and in less than two years, the first attempted Al Qaeda terror attack on U.S. soil would be stopped, and the Saudi government would send bin Laden into exile.

Over the last four chapters, we’ve outlined a number of events that individually, are completely disconnected. However, in 1991, all roads from the Soviet Union, the U.S., Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan converge to Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda. The only thing missing was the final spark. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was preparing to light that fire.

Tomorrow’s installment: Iraq invades Kuwait, sparking the First Gulf War. The Saudi Royal Family rejects a plan by Osama bin Laden, sending him into exile. The Soviet Union starts to collapse and the Kremlin starts another war.

Read Part Four: The complex history of Islamic extremism and Russia’s contribution to the rise of Al Qaeda and ISIS

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Part 2: The complex history of Islamic extremism and Russia’s contribution to the rise of Al Qaeda and ISIS

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This is part two of a ten-part series that explains the rise of modern Islamic extremism. From 1951 to 2021, a series of key geopolitical events, many independent of each other, caused the Islamic Revolution, the rise of Al Qaeda and ISIS, the creation and collapse of the caliphate, and the reconstitution of ISIS as the ISKP. While Western influence and diplomatic blunders are well documented through this period, the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation are equally culpable. The editors would like to note that a vast majority of the 1.8 billion people who are adherents to some form of Islam are peaceful and reject all forms of religious violence.

Read Part One: The complex history of Islamic extremism and Russia’s contribution to the rise of Al Qaeda and ISIS

Part Two – The Soviet’s coup d’etat and invasion of Afghanistan catches the attention of Osama bin Laden

The Kremlin fears the spread of radical fundamentalist Islam

On December 5, 1978, the Soviet Union and Afghanistan signed a 20-year “friendship treaty.” Moscow saw stable relations with Afghanistan as a key national security issue and had worked to improve bilateral relations since the end of World War II. The agreement included economic and military assistance and was meant to prop up the new government of Nur Muhammed Taraki after a violent coup d’etat.

Just as Western intelligence had failed to detect the coming Iranian Revolution, their Soviet counterparts failed to warn the Kremlin of the April 1978 Suar Revolution in Afghanistan, which overthrew President Sardar Mohammed Daoud. Daoud had come to power in a 1973 coup d’etat and was executed, as were over 2,000 military and government officials.

Hafizullah Amin and Taraki of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan led the brutal takeover and ended the 152-year Barakzai Dynasty. Taraki was named the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the de facto leader of Afghanistan, and replaced the single-party rule of Daoud with the single-party rule of the Communist Party. Initially, Amin and Taraki were aligned, but in less than a year, their relationship had turned hostile as Taraki made a series of politically and religiously unpopular decisions, and Soviet influence turned into interference.

By March 1979, just two months after the Shah of Iran abdicated, 25 of the 28 Afghanistan states were no longer considered safe. The new government was already unraveling, with Amin tugging at the threads. He maneuvered the Afghan Politburo to name him Prime Minister, eroding Chairman Taraki’s power.

Moscow saw Amin as a threat who leaned toward Pakistan, China, and the United States, with KGB operatives believing he was working with the CIA. As Prime Minister, Amin instituted extreme repression within Afghanistan in an attempt to stem protests and growing antigovernment violence. By July 1979, Soviet-controlled media was publicly declaring their non-support for Amin’s leadership.

Behind closed doors, the Kremlin was unimpressed with Amin and Taraki, believing that neither was capable of maintaining power. Moscow became increasingly worried that the Islamic Revolution in Iran could spread to the Muslim-dominated Caucasus and the southern Soviet republics. Brezhnev’s advisors were trying to convince him that intervention in Afghanistan would be required to prevent a similar revolution from happening in Central Asia and then spreading through Russia.

In June 1979, the first Soviet troops entered Afghanistan at Kabul’s request. The arrival of military equipment, including T-72 tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, occurred in the open, but the Soviet Union took the little green men approach with troops. A battalion of “unarmed” airborne soldiers (VDV) was deployed as “specialists and advisors.” A month later, Kabul asked for two more Soviet divisions, which Moscow ignored.

In the next four months, 160,000 Afghans fled to Pakistan to escape the growing political and religious violence. Despite a strained relationship with the Carter Administration, Pakistani leaders appealed for the U.S. to intervene indirectly by providing support to a growing number of Afghan Islamist rebels. Within the halls of Washington, D.C., the Domino Theory of the 1960s still guided foreign policy, and there were concerns that if the Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan, communism could spread to other nations.

Despite their misgivings about Taraki’s ability to rule, Moscow backed him in an attempt to remove Amin as Prime Minister. Amin was invited to Moscow in September, and after returning to Kabul on September 11, 1979, Taraki invited him to a September 13 meeting. Amin refused but ultimately bowed to Kremlin pressure. Arriving at the planned meeting on September 14, Amin barely escaped a Kremlin-backed assassination attempt. Diplomatically, the plan backfired, with the Afghanistan military rallying around Amin.

Taraki was arrested under the order of Amin, and the Kremlin considered a rescue plan but concluded that Afghanistan’s military leadership had coalesced around Amin. During an October 8 phone call with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, Amin asked what he should do with Taraki, and Brezhnev told him the decision was his to make. On the same day, Taraki was murdered by suffocation, and Amin believed that he had secured control of Afghanistan.

The Kremlin wasn’t being completely paranoid as they discussed how Amin was leaning toward the West. On October 15, Amin reached out to the U.S. State Department, stating he was interested in speaking to anyone at the U.S. mission. The interim Chargé d’Affaires to Afghanistan, James Bruce Amstutz, advised Washington not to have further discussions with Amin. He cited the murder of Taraki, rifts within the Afghanistan military, the crumbling security situation, the ongoing executions of political rivals, and the dangers of how the Kremlin could respond.

Amstutz’s warnings were ignored, and on October 27, Amin had a 40-minute meeting with U.S. diplomat Archer Blood. The meeting was uneventful, with Amin expressing his desire to improve U.S. and Afghanistan relations and trying to make a case to receive foreign aid. Blood expressed Washington’s concern about Kabul’s lack of attention to poppy growers and the drug trade, anti-West rhetoric, and the ongoing government-sanctioned violence. The meeting was not kept secret from the Soviets and was the leading news story in Afghanistan on the same day.

For KGB leader Yury Andropov, this was a bridge too far and only confirmed his belief that Amin was a U.S. foreign agent working for the CIA. Just as the U.K. had convinced the U.S. in 1953 that Iran would flip to lean toward Moscow, Andropov convinced Brezhnev that Afghanistan was ready to flip toward Washington. This was an unacceptable national security threat to the Soviet state.

The Kremlin started to set conditions for a coup d’etat and invasion of Afghanistan. On December 13, the KGB attempted to poison Amin and, days later, attempted to assassinate him. On Christmas Day, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, which Amin believed was meant to restore order and cement his control of the nation. A second Soviet attempt to poison him on December 26 also failed. Finally, on December 27, Soviet troops attacked the Presidential Palace, and Amin was killed by gunfire, believing up to the last moment, the troops had come to secure his power.

The Soviet invasion and violent overthrow of Amin shocked the world. The United States, Pakistan, and China condemned the aggression. Pakistan worried that after pacifying Afghanistan, the Soviets would invade their country to reach the Indian Ocean and establish warm water naval ports. China accused the Soviet Union of wanton expansionism and warned other developing nations that continued relationships with Moscow would lead to a similar fate.

The Soviet Union installed Babrak Karmal as a puppet leader. Days later, Karmal declared that Amin was a conspirator, criminal, and a spy of the United States. In neighboring Pakistan, the radicalization of a Saudi heir to a construction fortune, Osama bin Laden, was about to begin.

Osama bin Laden joins the fight against the Soviet invasion

Osama bin Mohammed bin Awad bin Laden was born on March 10, 1957. Raised in wealth and privilege as a member of the bin Laden family in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, parts of his formative years are cloudy. His father divorced his mother shortly after he was born. He was raised as a devout Sunni Muslim. When bin Laden’s father died, he inherited a small part of the family fortune, receiving an estimated $25 million ($124 million when adjusted for inflation).

Bin Laden attended Oxford University in England in 1971. It is unclear if he ever earned a degree, and if he did, what it was in and from which university. He also attended King Abdulaziz University and, over five to six years—ending in 1979—focused his studies on economics, business, and, in a non-academic setting, religion. When bin Laden left college, he traveled to Pakistan to support the Afghan rebels fighting against the Amin regime and eventually Soviet troops.

Declassified documents and multiple intelligence leaks, including from Julian Assange, revealed there was no clear evidence or documentation that bin Laden was directly trained or had direct contact with the CIA or the U.S. military. Islamabad insisted that U.S. funding, training, and equipping of the mujahadeen be channeled through Pakistan. It is clear that bin Laden served as an operative for Saudi Arabian and Pakistani intelligence and operated as a go-between for the U.S. It is also clear that bin Laden, whether by proxy or directly, was trained and equipped by the U.S., along with thousands of others. What has been lost to history is whether bin Laden traveled to Pakistan for his own interests or as an agent of the Saudi General Intelligence Presidency (GIP).

Although the Soviets had installed Karmal as their puppet leader in Afghanistan, there wasn’t unity within the Kremlin on how to proceed. Some intelligence officers and military leaders warned that bringing the remote and mountainous country under full Soviet control would take years, not months. The release of declassified records after the collapse of the Soviet Union revealed that there were individuals who had the clairvoyance to see Moscow was being dragged into a dangerous extended war.

It was now the spring of 1980. In Iran, Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini was tightening his grip. An April 24 attempt by the U.S. to rescue 52 diplomats being held hostage by Iranian students at the U.S. embassy in Tehran would end in catastrophe.

Khomeini didn’t limit his jingoism to the U.S. and its allies. He started to antagonize his equally ambitious and more secular neighbors in Iraq. Baghdad was also watching the Iranian Revolution and had two growing concerns. First, the spread of fundamentalist Islamic beliefs was viewed as a threat to state security. Second, Khomeini had just inherited one of the most powerful conventional militaries on the planet and had the means to execute his threats. Something would have to be done.

Tomorrow’s installment: Saddam Hussein rises to power and starts the Iraq-Iran War while the Soviet Union becomes stuck in an Afghanistan quagmire. The Cold War heats up with the election of Ronald Reagan. Soviet forces become increasingly brutal in Afghanistan, growing the influence of Osama bin Laden.

Read Part Three: The complex history of Islamic extremism and Russia’s contribution to the rise of Al Qaeda and ISIS

International News, National

The complex history of Islamic extremism and Russia’s contribution to the rise of Al Qaeda and ISIS

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This is part one of a ten-part series that explains the rise of modern Islamic extremism. From 1951 to 2021, a series of key geopolitical events, many independent of each other, caused the Islamic Revolution, the rise of Al Qaeda and ISIS, the creation and collapse of the caliphate, and the reconstitution of ISIS as the ISKP. While Western influence and diplomatic blunders are well documented through this period, the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation are equally culpable. The editors would like to note that a vast majority of the 1.8 billion people who are adherents to some form of Islam are peaceful and reject all forms of religious violence.

Part One – Russia’s 450-year war against Islam

Introduction

[WBHG News] As Russian officials pick through the remains of the Crocus City Hall concert venue and mall in Moscow, many are left wondering why ISKP (better known as ISIS-K) would want to attack Russia. Unlike the United States War on Terror, which dominated world headlines for more than two decades, Russia’s game of chess with Islamic factions has received far less coverage. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) offshoot ISKP, formed in 2015, has claimed responsibility for the March 22 attack, which killed 137 and wounded 182.

Since its inception, ISKP has been growing in influence, strength, and reach. Its power surged in late 2020 after the Trump Administration created the Doha Agreement with the Taliban, forcing the Afghanistan government to release 5,000 prisoners. ISIS-K has openly and repeatedly declared that the United States, Russia, China, Iran, and the Taliban, which now governs Afghanistan, are their enemies. While the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan government is making a legitimate attempt to govern, like its predecessors, it has been unable to stop the resurgence of religious violence.

ISKP terror cells have spread to Pakistan, eastern Iran, and Tajikistan, and as recently as March 7, 2024, the Federal Security Service of Russia (FSB) claimed it neutralized an ISKP cell from Tajikistan planning to attack a synagogue in Moscow.

The paths that led to the terror attack in Moscow started in Iran in 1951 and have involved every superpower on the planet, their allies, and numerous Middle Eastern nations. The complexity of this road makes it ripe for misunderstanding, which proliferates misinformation and disinformation. In repeated attempts to sanitize Russian history, the Kremlin helped create the environment that made the March 22 attack inevitable.

Troops of the Russian Imperial Army, 1914
Credit – Wikimedia Commons – IWM Public Domain Collection

Historically, Russia has fought wars on ideological and religious grounds against Muslim states since 1568, repeatedly fighting against the Turks. When Russia entered World War I, one of Tzar Nicholas II’s maximalist goals included complete control of the Black Sea and the Bosphorus Straight. Going against the advice of his advisors, the Russian Imperial Empire sided with the Allied Powers, while Turkey aligned with the Central Powers. Over 350 years of war between the Russian Empire and the Ottoman Empire would contribute to the downfall of both.

When Josef Stalin was brought to power in 1924, his policy of Russification included the repression of all religions. During the Great Purge of 1937, thousands of Muslim clerics and adherents were arrested, sent to gulags where they worked to death, tortured, and executed. After the German withdrawal from Crimea during World War II, Stalin ordered the deportation of up to 500,000 Crimean Tatars for perceived disloyalty to the Soviet state. Between 20 to 45 percent were killed in the 18 months that followed. Stalin ordered a second mass deportation in 1949, meant to displace the remaining native population.

Crimean Tatars under forced deportation by the Soviet Union in late 1948
Credit – Wikimedia Commons – Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance

While Stalin’s death saw an easing of religious repression by the Soviet state, Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev interfered with Middle Eastern geopolitics at an equivalent level to the Cold War Western powers.

Today, Russia and its supporters like to boast that the country has the largest Muslim population of any European nation. If you squint, this is a factual statement. However, most of Russia’s Muslims live in the Caucasus and the central and southern republics, far from the European continent. Estimates of the number of Russians who follow Islam vary from nine to 25 million, with most experts agreeing the number is between 15 and 20 million.

On the surface, the Kremlin claims it is a nation of tolerance, but in reality, 71 percent of Russia’s population adheres to the Russian Orthodox Church and has openly embraced a form of Christian nationalism. The Russian slur “Khachs” is used freely—a derogatory term for people from the Caucasus and others that have the stereotypical physical traits of a Muslim. Within the channels of Russian state media, propagandists have complained for years about the influx of migrant workers from the former southern republics of the Soviet Union and the spread of Islam.

In February 2023, when it was announced a mosque that could accommodate 60,000 worshippers in Moscow would be built by a lake considered holy by followers of the Russian Orthodox Church, protests erupted. In April of the same year, the protests expanded to threats, which drew the ire of Chechen warlord Colonel General Ramzan Kadyrov. It was reported that Russian autocrat Vladimir Putin interceded, negotiating with the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, former FSB agent Patriarch Kirill, and Kadyrov. An agreement was quietly reached to build a much smaller mosque on the outskirts of Moscow, defusing tension.

It is a common misconception that terrorism based on Islamic fundamentalist principles follows a singular dogma. The differences between terror organizations are as basic as Sunni versus Shia and as complex as the interpretation of singular passages in the Qu’ran. In the Sahel of Africa, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, rival factions of ISIS and Al Qaeda fight each other while fighting against Iranian-backed militias and terror organizations.

Moscow’s relationships of convenience with these various factions have made Russia a target for Islamic terrorism for decades. Iran’s support of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine by providing Russia with drones, technical support, military trainers, and ammunition makes it a target of ISIS-K. The split between Al Qaeda and ISIS and the factions backed by the Islamic Republic of Iran is simple—at the roots, it is the dogma that divides Sunnis and Shias.

This ten-part story explores how a chain of religious and geopolitical events spanning from 1951 to the present day led to the radicalization of Osama bin Laden, the rise of Al Qaeda, the split that formed ISIS, the creation of the caliphate and its fall, to its rebirth in ISIS-K. It is a story of how every nation that sought to seek soft power and influence during this period—the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation, the United States, the United Kingdom, and China—contributed to the escalating extremism.

The rise and fall of the Shah of Iran and the Iranian Revolution

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, better known historically as the Shah of Iran and part of the Persian Monarchy, was brought into power by a 1954 coup backed by the U.K. and supported by the U.S. The U.K. sought to remove Iranian leader Mohammad Mosaddegh, who rose to power in 1951, due to his nationalization of the oil industry in Iran, which led to the seizure of British Petroleum’s infrastructure and assets.

Initially, British policy was rejected by U.S. President Harry Truman. Washington condemned the British blockade of Iran, while London falsely claimed that Mosaddegh was aligning himself with the Soviet Union. By late 1952, the U.K. had already started its efforts to destabilize Iran and remove Mosaddegh from power. Declassified records show that in mid-1953, the Dwight D. Eisenhower Administration, somewhat reluctantly, joined the U.K. in fomenting unrest.

The installation of Pahlavi was meant to re-privatize the Iranian oil industry and return its control to British Petroleum by installing a leader the West believed would be easy to control. While the effort was successful, this single incident started a chain reaction that would lead to the Iranian Revolution and 45 years of Islamic extremism and violence that would kill millions.

The Shah of Iran and Queen Julianna of the Netherlands, 1959
Credit – Wikimedia Commons – Harry Pot / Anefo, CC0, via Wikimedia Commons

Although Pahlavi agreed to reprivatization, he would go on to become one of the dominant leaders of OPEC. Under his leadership, the Shah manipulated oil prices that caused multiple steep recessions in the West while boosting funding for the modernization of his nation. A number of the popular reforms instituted by Mosaddegh from 1951 to 1953 were reversed, causing discontent within the Iranian population and mistrust of the West.

While Pahlavi continued some of the economic and educational reforms started in 1951, most of the financial gains were invested in the military, state security, and public works projects that provided little benefit for the broader population. On the surface, Iran appeared to be an amazing success story of unity and growth. In reality, the Shah was creating an environment ripe for revolution, forcing increased repression to maintain control.

Protesters in Tehran carry the wounded and dead after the 1978 Jaleh Square Massacre
Credit – Public Domain

Over 20 years, Pahlavi transformed himself from a silver spoon kid whom the U.K. and U.S. believed they could control to a clever politician with broad regional influence to a brutal dictator. By 1977, with the promise of economic prosperity limited to a few, a nationalist movement based on the fundamentalist interpretation of Islam started to spiral out of control. In 1978, Iranian security forces killed dozens in Jaleh Square, an event called Black Friday. The massacre triggered the Iranian Revolution, forcing the January 16th abdication of the Shah and his family.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini became the Supreme Leader of Iran, and the monarchy was banned. Initially, Washington and London believed that the revolution had failed. Western intelligence experts were so disconnected they didn’t understand the gravity of the situation until military units and high-ranking officers of the Iranian military started backing Khomeini.

A world away in Moscow, Brezhnev and his advisors nervously watched the events unfold in Tehran. The Kremlin was already setting conditions for a coup in Afghanistan and now feared a similar embrace of Islamic fundamentalism was about to erupt within its sphere of influence. And just like the U.K. in 1951, the Soviet Union had already set into motion an almost identical set of mistakes.

Tomorrow’s installment: The Soviet coup and invasion of Afghanistan catches the attention of a Saudi Arabian heir to a construction fortune, who starts his journey of radicalization.

Read Part Two: The complex history of Islamic extremism and Russia’s contribution to the rise of Al Qaeda and ISIS

Breaking News, International News, National, Russia-Ukraine War

Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant is falling apart, and the world is ignoring the danger

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[WBHG 24 News] – The latest reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which has had a team of international inspectors at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant for 16 months, painted an alarming picture of leaking steam generation circuits and safety systems, inadequate staff, and no 2024 maintenance plan.

Europe’s largest nuclear power plant is located in occupied Enerhodar. Previously located on the banks of the Kakhovka Reservoir, the primary source of cooling water for ZNPP drained away in June 2023 after the Kakhovka Dam was destroyed. Russian forces captured the plant on March 3, 2022, during the opening days of the expanded war of aggression against Ukraine. Webcams showed Russian tanks firing on the power plant and shooting into administrative buildings during the brief siege.

After pictures, videos, and satellite images proved that Russian forces had militarized the plant in violation of international humanitarian law and the pillars of nuclear safety, the IAEA, backed by the United Nations, pressured Russia to establish an international group of permanent monitors. On September 1, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi and a team of experts, accompanied by Russian state media, arrived at the plant. There have been 15 rotations of monitors since.

Three reactors have various leaks, and Russia doesn’t plan to fix them

Currently, five of the six reactors at ZNPP are in cold shutdown, with Reactor 4 in hot shutdown to provide steam for plant operations and heat for the nearby town of Enerhodar.

On November 17, IAEA inspectors were told by Russian occupiers that boron had been detected in the secondary cooling circuit of Reactor 4, which was in hot shutdown at the time. Boron is added to the primary cooling and steam circuits of modern nuclear reactors as an extra safety measure. Boron isn’t supposed to be the secondary cooling system, but trace amounts are acceptable.

Four days later, the reactor was shut down, with Russia declaring the boron leak was within acceptable levels and would not be repaired. This was the second unscheduled shutdown of 2023. On August 10, Reactor 4 had to be shut down after a water leak was discovered in one of its steam generators. Plant technicians also found that the heat exchangers needed to be cleaned and did regular maintenance on the reactor’s transformers and emergency diesel generators.

On December 22, inspectors found boric acid deposits on valves, a pump, and on the floors of several rooms in the containment building of Reactor 6. Russian occupation officials said the leak was coming from a cracked boric acid storage tank and it would not be repaired. After IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi published the finding in a January 3 update, inspectors were barred from accessing parts of Reactor 6 for almost two weeks.

On February 1, the IAEA reported that boric acid leaks were also discovered in Reactor 1.

Unreliable external power connections

Although power plants generate electricity, power to run a power plant is provided by external sources. This provides a layer of safety by assuring that there is always electricity to support normal operations in the event of a facility shutdown. Although a nuclear reactor can be “shut down,” it still needs external power to continuously circulate cooling water in the reactors and on-site spent fuel storage. In the event of a total power failure, backup generators running on diesel fuel become the last line of defense. ZNPP has 20 generators and keeps enough diesel for a minimum of ten days of operation.

It’s estimated that if a ZNPP reactor is in cold shutdown, it can go more than three weeks without water circulation. But in hot shutdown, a meltdown can start 27 hours after the loss of all external power. In the worst-case scenario, the absolute last line of defense is when a nuclear plant operates in “island mode.” That’s when a reactor or reactors are used to generate onsite power to maintain plant operations. It’s inherently dangerous because it requires bringing a reactor online, leaving no margin for error if there are any additional failures. None of ZNPP’s reactors have produced electricity in the last 18 months.

Before Russia’s hostile takeover, ZNPP had ten redundant external power connections – four 750 kilovolt (kV) and six more 330 kV lines from the nearby Zaporizhzhia Thermal Power Plant (ZTPP), which Russia also occupies. Today, the plant only has two. Since the occupation, Europe’s largest nuclear power plant has lost all external power eight times, forced to rely on onsite diesel-powered emergency generators. But the problems don’t stop there.

On March 1, 2023, Russian shelling of the Nikopol Raion on the right bank of the Dnipro River damaged infrastructure that cut the 330 kV external power connection to ZNPP. Ukrainian officials told the IAEA that due to unrelenting Russian attacks on the area, it was impossible for technicians to repair the damage. The plant was now reliant on a single 750 kV power connection while Russia was attacking Ukraine’s energy infrastructure.

Power had come from the nearby ZTPP in the past, but Russian officials claimed that the switchyard between the two power plants was damaged. The IAEA repeatedly asked to inspect the area, with Russian operators denying access, promising that repairs were imminent.

Three months later, Grossi said, “Our experts must access the ZTPP to see for themselves what the current situation is like and whether it might be possible to restore backup power there.”

On June 11, he repeated his request to allow the on-site inspection team to visit the switchyard, and five days later, Grossi joined the IAEA staff during its rotation. The Russians permitted him to inspect the damage, and the connection was restored on July 1. However, there was a misconfiguration in the repairs. When power was cut to the 750 kV line, the 330 kV backup didn’t automatically roll over. The plant had to use onsite diesel generators while technicians solved the problem.

On November 15, Reactor 6 unexpectedly lost all power for 90 minutes, briefly shutting down the cooling circuits before it was switched to emergency power. The reason for the failure was not published.

On November 26, power was lost from the single 750 kV external connection due to a historically powerful storm that moved across the Black Sea. While power successfully rolled over to the backup 330 KV line, Reactor 4 didn’t energize, forcing plant operators to use the emergency onsite diesel generators. During the August 2022 unscheduled maintenance, the backup systems were also misconfigured.

The most recent incident was on December 2, when both external power lines failed. The 330 kV connection failed first due to an “external grid fault.” Five hours later, the 750 kV connection also disconnected. During the outage, power was lost to all four cooling pumps for Reactor 4, forcing operators to start moving it to cold shutdown, which could have left the plant with an inadequate supply of steam. Diesel generators were brought online, restoring power, and the 750 kV line was reconnected five hours later.

Blocked access, broken promises, and landmines

To successfully complete its role as a nuclear watchdog, IAEA inspectors need unfettered access to ZNPP. Russia has repeatedly hampered these efforts.

When high-resolution satellite images showed that Russian forces had built small arms gun emplacements on the roof of the reactors, the IAEA requested access to verify there were no violations of the pillars of nuclear safety and international humanitarian law. Russian occupiers stonewalled the IAEA for months, finally granting access to the roofs of Reactors 2, 3, and 4. Inspectors were supposed to be allowed on the other three units on December 19, but the inspection was canceled at the last minute due to “security reasons.”

Inspectors have also been blocked from consecutively walking through the six-turbine halls and maintenance areas. When the IAEA arrived at ZNPP on September 1, 2022, military vehicles were found in some of the maintenance areas, but there weren’t any offensive weapons or ammunition. A continuous walk-through would permit the IAEA to confirm that heavy weapons or ammunition are not stored in any of the turbine halls and that Russian occupiers aren’t playing a shell game. Despite repeated requests during individual inspections, the IAEA has not been allowed into all areas of the turbine halls since 2022.

Russia placed land and directional mines in restricted areas and on the perimeter of the plant after the occupation. Grossi stated that their presence violated the principles of nuclear safety but added none of the explosives were located in critical areas of the plant. In November, with Russia’s fall-winter offensive in full swing, the mines were removed, only to be replaced in late January.

Starting in December, Russian occupiers have blocked the IAEA from asking new workers at ZNPP about their training and credentials. Additionally, despite repeated requests, Russian operator Rosatom has refused to provide a comprehensive site maintenance plan for 2024.

Russian occupiers also disconnected the online radiation monitoring systems, forcing the IAEA team to take manual readings twice a day using a backpack system. The background radiation information is handed off to Russia, which shares the data twice a day.

A worsening staffing crisis

In January 2022, ZNPP had 11,500 employees, with most living in the nearby town of Enerhodar. While some fled at the start of Russia’s war of aggression, many stayed behind due to their sense of duty to nuclear safety. Since the Russian occupation, Ukrainian workers and their families have been interrogated, kidnapped, and tortured. Some have disappeared. In Enerhodar, residents living under occupation have reported extrajudicial arrests, disappearances, robberies, and evictions, mostly at the hands of Chechen forces.

After the illegal annexation of the Zaporizhzhia Oblast in October 2022, the Ukrainian staff working for Energoatom who had not aligned themselves with Russia were subjected to forced passportization and constant coercion to sign employment contracts with Rosatom. Some gave in, others fled, while others resisted. On January 25, in a report to the United Nations Security Council, Grossi said, “operating on significantly reduced staff, who are under unprecedented psychological pressure – which despite the reactors being shutdown is not sustainable.”

On February 1, the IAEA was notified that all remaining employees of ZNPP who had not accepted Russian citizenship and were still employees of Energoatom were barred from the plant. Russian occupiers told the onsite inspectors, “There are enough certified personnel at the plant, and all positions are fully filled.”

According to the IAEA, the plant is staffed at just 39% of its pre-occupation level, with 4,500 workers and 940 job applications under review. Russian occupiers closed the so-called “road of life” between Vasyivka and Kamyanske in December 2022 and never reopened it. For Energoatom employees and their families who are now jobless and want to leave the occupied territories, it will require a journey through Russia, where they risk filtration, interrogation, and arrest.

How dangerous is the situation

After briefing the U.N. Security Council last month, Grossi held a brief press conference.

January 26, 2024 – IAEA Secretary-General Rafael Grossi’s press conference at the United Nations

When asked on a scale of one to ten, “ten being the most dangerous and one being secure,” what would you rank Zaporizhzhia [NPP] right now, he said, “Well, as I was telling…her just a minute ago, I think there are days where you are near ten, and there are days that nothing seems to happen – and the problem is this. The complete uncertainty because this is a war.”

Grossi was also asked about the level of cooperation Ukraine and Russia were providing to the IAEA, telling reporters, “Yes. I would say, by and large, yes. Of course, there are – there are moments of frustration. Mine and theirs, I guess, because sometimes when I say things that they don’t appreciate, or that I or they would prefer me to say differently – there is tension – there but – this is a little bit – what the – is all about. And this happens to us when it comes to Iran. When it comes to the DPRK. People sometimes do not appreciate what we have to say, but we have to say it anyway.”

In June 2023, when the world had its eyes on ZNPP, nuclear experts told us it would be extremely difficult for there to be a Fukushima or Chornobyl-sized accident or a European continent-obliterating act of nuclear terrorism. ZNPP has Pressure Water Reactors, which are very similar to Western nuclear power plants and have little in common with the infamous Soviet-era RBMK reactors. The vessels for all six reactors were designed to survive the impact of a commercial airliner crashing into them. In a cold shutdown state, it would take weeks for the reactors to start to melt down, which would require the removal or arrest of the onsite IAEA inspectors and weeks of denials and cover-ups.

Scenario one – radioactive water or steam release

This was considered the second most likely accident or act of intentional sabotage. A release of radioactive steam or water would contaminate a limited area with mild to moderate levels of radiation. With the Kakhovka Reservoir drained away, the threat to the water supply is not as dire as it was at the start of 2023. This would also be the easiest accident to clean up.

Scenario two – breach or loss of coolant to spent fuel storage

ZNPP has onsite storage for spent nuclear fuel, which requires cooling and containment. In a worst-case scenario, the intentional destruction of containment would have a similar impact to a dirty bomb, spreading highly radioactive material over a relatively small area. Irradiated material would be carried by the wind, spreading mild to moderate radioactive over a larger area. Clean-up would be complex and expensive, and a small area, when compared to the two most infamous accidents of the nuclear age, could be left uninhabitable. If the spent fuel storage lost circulation or its coolant, the materials would heat up, eventually burning through their containment.

Scenario three – meltdown

While ZNPP doesn’t have all of the safety systems of its Western peers, the facility is well-engineered with the reactors encased in a protective vessel, the concrete and steel reinforced external containment building, redundant cooling systems, fire suppression systems, boron injection systems, and multiple backups. An accidental full meltdown is always theoretically possible but nearly impossible. Even in the event of a full meltdown of one or all the reactors, it would take an intentional act to breach the outer containment vessels. In the worst-case scenario, radiation would impact all of Ukraine, parts of Russia, and many areas of eastern and central Europe. However, claims that the plant would explode like 20 megaton hydrogen bombs are inaccurate.

Scenario four – economic terrorism

Faced with having to withdraw from ZNPP, experts told us the most likely scenario would be Russian occupiers intentionally contaminating the reactor vessels, rendering the plant unusable. While the radiation risk outside of the plant would be low, releasing large amounts of radiation in one, some, or all of the containment buildings would block access. It would also make attempts to repair ZNPP not only complex and dangerous but potentially economically unviable.

A very uncertain future

Director General Grossi is traveling to Kyiv on February 6 and will visit ZNPP for the fourth time the next day during the 16th rotation of the IAEA inspectors. After his visit, he plans to travel to Moscow for additional meetings with Russian officials.

The approach to maintenance, training, and staffing that Russian enterprise Rosatom is taking at ZNPP provides a glimpse into how Moscow runs its other nuclear facilities. With the world’s attention focused on the Middle East, there’s a ticking timebomb in the middle of Ukraine, and not enough people are paying attention.

Breaking News, Russia-Ukraine War

Unraveling Claims of Ukrainian Involvement: Donetsk Market Attack Points to Russian Origination

[WBHG News 24] – After a shocking incident in the occupied city of Donetsk that killed 28 and wounded 30 in the market area in the Kirovs’kyi District, evidence that has emerged surrounding the attack raises doubts about Russia’s claim of Ukrainian involvement. Russian state media, along with the self-proclaimed governor of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR), Denis Pushilin, alleged that Ukraine was responsible for shelling the area using 152 mm and 155 mm artillery, leaving 18 of the wounded hospitalized.

A thorough analysis by our international analyst team casts doubt on the accusations, revealing a complex web of evidence that challenges the narrative quickly created by Russian authorities. Our team reviewed dozens of publicly available videos and images shared by Russian channels, state media, and propagandists and conducted an audio analysis of the attack itself while it was still in progress. Although a conclusive war crime assessment requires an on-site investigation, the publicly available information suggests that Ukraine was likely not responsible for the attack.

Two things that hampered the investigation was an apparent effort by Russian state media and propagandists not to share images of impact craters, which is crucial for splash analysis. Despite these efforts, our team successfully geolocated hits at four locations and identified three impact craters, including one that provided information on the direction of the attack. Another critical revelation was the absence of key details from Russian officials, such as pictures of an official investigation or recovered shrapnel. This is highly unusual compared to other incidents, and the attack scene was hastily cleaned up before any apparent detailed investigation was made. Additionally, the nature of the craters photographed appear to be 82 or 120-millimeter mortars and don’t align with the artillery rounds mentioned by occupation governor Pushilin.

The impact crater at the base of a tree on Lyashenka Street near the bus stop indicates the shells were fired from the west-southwest, making it highly improbable that Ukrainian artillery was involved. The closest Ukrainian-controlled area in that direction is Pobieda, 17 kilometers away and only 2.5 kilometers from the line of conflict. The closest safe area for artillery to operate is another 7.9 kilometers west, near the village of Illinka.

If Ukraine were responsible, the closest safe firing location would be 24.9 kilometers away, and even in Pobieda, the Russian D-20 152-millimeter howitzer would be at its absolute maximum range. At 24.9 kilometers, the M-777 or NATO standard self-propelled artillery pieces would be at or just beyond their standard range. Because Russian officials did not share any images of shrapnel, we have no way to authenticate the munition used.

Along with the impact crater at the base of the tree on Lyashenka Street, a video recorded during the attack provided critical information on the potential distance from the area attacked and the firing point. The Russian video shared on the popular Telegram channel Typical Donetsk captured the sound of outgoing rounds that impacted 2.5 and 4.25 seconds later. If the rounds were fired from M-777 artillery with a muzzle velocity of 870 meters per second, the maximum linear distance the round could travel is 3,700 meters, deep within the city of Donetsk itself. Factoring for the arc an artillery shell travels and the minimum possible range of the M-777, the distance drops to 2,300 meters. That’s an impossibly short distance for the rounds to have been fired by Ukraine.

The timing of the attack is also suspect, occurring while Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov was en route to a UN Security Council meeting, and the U.S. Congress remains poised to discuss continued military support for Ukraine.

The available evidence suggests that the origin of the attack was in a forested area between the Kirovs’kyi and Petrovs’kyi Districts, approximately 2,000 to 3,000 meters west of the market area. Immediate claims that any combatant committed a war crime should receive a thorough investigation before news agencies directly quote national officials and report the claims as pure fact. The intricacies of this investigation underscore the importance of a thorough and unbiased examination of available evidence by subject matter experts.

A copy of the full analysis and technical information is available for download.

Russia-Ukraine War

Violence in Bashkortostan grows as Russian security forces clash with protesters

[WBHG News 24] – Despite -20°C weather and multiple arrests of activists on Tuesday, up to 10,000 protesters turned out to support activist Fail Alsynov in the Russian city of Baymak in the Republic of Bashkortostan.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs, Rosgvardia OMON, and the FSB struggled to control the crowd, which threw snowballs and ice and pushed back on shield-wielding police. Russian security forces responded with riot batons and tear gas in an attempt to disrupt the crowd. The protest turned increasingly violent, and Russian security forces were forced to retreat.

Environmental activist Alsynov was convicted to four years in prison on Wednesday for inciting hatred or enmity for using the phrase “kara halyk,” which roughly translates to black people in Russian. In Turkic-Bashkir, spoken in the Bashkortostan region of Russia, the phrase translates to poor people. Bashkir and Russian are the official languages of Bashkortostan, and Bashkir is taught in schools.

Alsynov was charged after making a speech opposed to a gold mine planned for the region, stating that the site would cause environmental damage and attract more “poor people” to the area. His supporters say the arrest has nothing to do with the gold mine or the speech and is revenge for previously blocking the construction of a soda ash mine. In that incident, the mine was to be built on a site considered sacred by ethnic Bashkirs.

The situation has deteriorated to the point that Russia is blocking channels on Telegram providing information about the protests. As protesters clashed with police, thousands chanted, “We are the poor people.”

Pictures and videos showed injured protesters and people suffering from tear gas exposure. One local activist released a video appealing for Russian soldiers from Bashkortostan fighting in Ukraine to return to “defend their land and people.”

The Republic has a population of about 3 million. Despite having only 2.1% of Russia’s population, it has experienced the fourth-highest military losses in the Russia-Ukraine War. Outside observers have accused the Kremlin of using the war to ethnically cleanse minority groups. Almost 70% of the population is Bashkirs or Tatars, and a majority practices Sunni Islam.

Despite being one of the most mineral and resource-rich regions in Russia, the average household income is just $409 a month, with figures inflated due to the significant number of residents who have joined the Russian Federation Armed Forces to escape poverty.

It is a rare display of significant unrest in Russia and support for an environmental activist.

Russia-Ukraine War

Russia-Ukraine War Summary for January 11, 2024

[WGBH News 24] Kyiv – While the Russian Fall/Winter 2023 offensive has culminated, there was significant activity on and off the battlefield. The daily summary is created using our daily Situation Report.

Analyst Team Daily Assessment:

  1. Conclusion of Fall/Winter Offensive: The Russian Fall/Winter Offensive of 2023, initiated on October 6, has concluded without achieving operational or strategic goals.
  2. U.S. Military Aid Unlikely: It is unlikely that the United States will provide additional military or financial aid to Ukraine in 2024, contributing to Ukraine’s critical ammunition shortages.
  3. Global Implications: The U.S. Congress’s continued impasse on providing aid to Ukraine and a passive response to Russian aggression may be contributing to Russia’s expanding alliances with North Korea and Iran.
  4. Ukrainian Forces’ Capability: Ukrainian forces face ammunition shortages, reducing their combat potential and hindering their ability to maintain defensive lines.
  5. Russian Objectives: Russian forces aim to capture Chasiv Yar, west of Bakhmut, and remain committed to capturing the Avdiivka salient, irrespective of costs.
  6. Trench Warfare: Trench warfare, similar to World War I, will continue through meteorological winter, which ends on February 29.
  7. Nuclear Accident Threat: While the likelihood of a nuclear accident at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant caused by Russian occupiers is low, it should be taken seriously. Our team remains deeply concerned by recent reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency.

On-the-Ground Updates:

  1. Kharkiv and Luhansk: In Kharkiv, Russia attempted to advance on Synkivka. The city of Kharkiv was attacked by S-300 or North Korean-sourced Kn-23 short-range ballistic missiles. An auto dealership, factory, and Park Hotel were struck, resulting in casualties.
  2. Northwest Donetsk: Ongoing positional fighting occurred in various areas, with reports of more intense fighting near Bohdanivka and Khromove, northwest of Bakhmut, and a Russian advance east of Ivanivske.
  3. Southwest Donetsk: Fighting persisted with no changes to the line of conflict, particularly in Novobakhmutivka and the Avdiivka Coke Plant compound.

Russian Front and Beyond:

  1. Russian Drone Attacks: Ukrainian drones reportedly attacked several Russian regions, causing damage to a pumping station near the city of Kaluga.
  2. Factory Fire in Moscow: An 8,000 square-meter Moscow plastics factory that produces polymers for Russian soldiers’ protective gear was heavily damaged by fire.
  3. Transnistria Border Incident: Ukraine was accused of firing on Transnistria using small arms and taking two people prisoner. The State Border Service of Ukraine denied the claim.

International Support and Diplomacy:

  1. U.S. National Security Council: The coordinator for Strategic Communications accused Russia of using North Korean-sourced missiles.
  2. European Aid: Lithuania announced a 200 million euro military aid package for Ukraine, and the EU Parliament continued discussions on providing macro-financial assistance despite Hungary’s opposition.

Military Developments and Human Rights:

  1. Senior Russian Officer Killed: Colonel Vadim Ismagilov of the Russian 3rd Radio Engineering Regiment was killed in occupied Crimea on January 4 during a Ukrainian missile strike.
  2. Russian Soldiers Captured: Ukrainian forces captured four Russian soldiers, including one from Somalia, with Russia turning to poorer nations to fill its ranks with foreign fighters.
  3. Three Arrested for Heating Failures Near Moscow: A Moscow court ordered the detention of three people, including two with connections to Russian President Vladimir Putin, for an accident at the Klimovsky Ammunition Factory that left over 21,000 people without heat.
  4. State Duma Deputy Calls for Investigation: After claims that Serbian volunteers are being abused by their Russian commanders, the first deputy chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee, State Duma Deputy Alexy Zhuravlev, has called for a criminal investigation.

Putin’s Political Purge:

  1. Russian Orthodox Church Controversy: A Moscow priest has been ordered to court for refusing to recite a prayer for the “Victory of Holy Russia.”
  2. Propaganda and Control: Several prominent Russian military bloggers and propagandists claim they are facing criminal investigations and an organized smear campaign for discrediting the Russian Federal Armed Forces, reflecting the Kremlin’s tightening control over the information space.

War Crimes and Human Rights:

  1. Legal Actions Against Russian Officer: Lieutenant Colonel Irek Magasumov is facing murder and hooliganism charges for the kidnapping, assault, and murder of a teenage girl and the theft of a car in occupied Luhansk.
  2. I Want to Find Project: Ukraine launched a project to help families find captured Russian military personnel through Telegram.
  3. Millions Need Humanitarian Aid: The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs reported that 40% of Ukraine’s population, 14.6 million people, will require humanitarian aid in 2024.
Russia-Ukraine War

Ukraine’s Ongoing Struggle: Russia’s Fall/Winter Offensive Culminates

[WBHG News 24] – Seattle, WA As the conflict between Ukraine and Russia persists, recent developments on the battlefield have raised questions about the trajectory of the war. While it may be premature to declare a conclusive victor, signs point to a shifting landscape that presents challenges for both sides.

The Russian fall/winter offensive, initiated on October 6, 2023, has recently shown signs of culminating, raising eyebrows among military analysts. The intensity of Russian attacks has notably decreased, with a 50% reduction in discrete attacks along the line of conflict. This decline, coupled with operational irregularities, suggests significant challenges for the Russian forces.

A key factor contributing to the slowing Russian offense is the staggering losses in heavy military equipment. An analysis of the Oryx Database, which still tracks the Russia-Ukriane War, documented 1,154 pieces of Russian heavy equipment lost from October 1, 2023, to January 2, 2024. Losses include more than 275 tanks, almost 600 armored vehicles, over 175 heavy artillery pieces, seven aircraft, 28 helicopters, and three warships. These losses paint a picture of unsustainable attrition, even factoring in Russia’s military-industrial resilience.

Ukraine, on the other hand, has managed to hold its ground against Russian advances, displaying remarkable toughness in the face of personnel and ammunition shortages. The Ukrainian military has successfully repelled Russian forces in multiple areas. Notably, the Russian offensive at Avdiivka has failed to achieve its operational goals, indicating a strategic setback for Moscow.

Despite these failures, it is essential to remain cautious. The term “culmination” does not equate to victory, and Russia still maintains a significant reserve force poised for potential renewed offensives. However, the current reliance on piecemeal attacks and light infantry reinforces the assessment that Russia is now struggling to sustain momentum.

The Ukrainian bridgeheads on the left bank of the Dnipro and Konka Rivers have become a major problem for Moscow. Despite facing losses, Ukraine has effectively prevented Russia from not only collapsing the bridgeheads but has slowly expanded the area it controls. The Ukrainian military’s success in this regard has come at a cost, but dozens of geolocated videos prove that Russia has lost over 150 vehicles and pieces of military hardware in the Kherson area of operation since October.

Ukraine’s change in tactics has been a notable factor in altering the dynamics of the ongoing war. Fighting a war of attrition, Ukrainian defenders are achieving a much higher kill ratio against Russian forces compared to January 2023. Ukrainian commanders adapted to Russia’s use of human wave attacks.

However, Ukraine is not without its own challenges. The late summer purge of leadership within the military’s commissariat and medical board, coupled with arrests for corruption, has disrupted mobilization and recruitment efforts. Undertrained troops are still being deployed to the frontlines, affecting morale and overall effectiveness.

Ukraine’s struggle with combined arms warfare at the battalion and brigade levels is also evident, highlighting the need for improved coordination of military resources. Additionally, the country faces the impossible task of matching the combined war production capacity of Russia, Iran, and North Korea independently.

The question of whether Ukraine is winning is complex. Russia only captured 182 square kilometers of territory in 2023, mostly before June 1. Continued Western support and boosted war production are crucial for Ukraine to achieve its main military goal of restoring its 1991 borders.

The broader implications of the conflict extend beyond the immediate battlefield. If Ukraine were to succumb to Russian forces, the ramifications could be dire for Europe. Russia’s control over Ukraine’s resources, military infrastructure, and population could reshape geopolitical dynamics, threatening neighboring countries and potentially triggering a broader conflict.

The international community must remain vigilant and consider the potential consequences of a shifting tide in the conflict, understanding that the outcome holds implications not only for Ukraine but for the stability of the entire European region.

You can read our full analysis on our Patreon, where we offer a seven day free trial membership, no credit card required. Your subscription helps support independent journalism.

International News, Russia-Ukraine War

The Most Successful Russian Military Leaders are Demoted, Detained, Dismissed, or Deceased

Since Russia expanded its war of aggression against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, The Russian Federation Armed Forces have only had a handful of operational successes turn into strategic victories. While Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu and Chief-of-Staff Valery Gerasimov have maintained their stature in the Kremlin despite repeated failures, there is a common thread among the men who have been able to achieve victories. Without exception, they are either demoted, detained, dismissed, or deceased.

Colonel General Mikhail Mizintsev

Accomplishment: The Capture of Mariupol

General Mizintsev is known as the Butcher of Mariupol and is responsible for 25,000 to 100,000 civilian deaths caused during the 86-day siege of the city. He is accused of setting up the filtration camp structure and ordering attacks on mutually agreed green corridors. On September 24, 2022, the future looked bright for Mizintsev when he was reassigned to Deputy Minister of Defense and charged with overseeing logistics.

Within the Kremlin, Mizintsev was already known to be an ally of Private Military Company Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin. In September, this wasn’t viewed as a liability, but as tension between the Kremlin and Prigozhin reached a boiling point, there were signs that Shoigu was leading a quiet purge of Wagner allies. Mizintsev was dismissed by Russian President Vladimir Putin on April 27, 2023, with no official reason given. There was immediate speculation that Mizintsev had been leaking information to Prigozhin for months about how the Minister of Defense was actively interfering with ammunition and weapons shipment to PMC Wagner. Additionally, there were unsubstantiated claims that Mizintsev had used his position to increase the Shoigu-restricted allocation of munitions to Wagner mercenaries in Bakhmut.

A week after being dismissed, Mitzintsev joined Wagner Group’s Council of Commanders and, on May 3, did a frontline inspection of supply, logistics, and Wagner mercenaries in Bakhmut. A day after his inspection, Mitzintsev reportedly briefed the Council of Commanders as the siege of Bakhmut entered its ninth month. Hours later, Prigozhin announced he was withdrawing from Bakhmut by May 10 due to a lack of ammunition and the failure of Russian military units to protect his flanks.

The status of Mizintsev is unclear. There were unsubstantiated claims that he was detained after the Prigozhin Insurrection of June 23 and has not been seen publicly since the failed revolt.

Lieutenant General Mikhal Zusko

Accomplishment: The capture of Kherson, the only large Ukrainian city captured intact

General Zusko led the 58th Combined Arms Army, which advanced from Crimea on February 24, 2022, and captured the city of Kherson on March 2 with the loss of less than 300 soldiers. The 58th CAA had assistance from Russian-aligned collaborators in Crimea and Kherson, who helped set conditions for the lightly contested advance. Shortly after capturing the critical Antonovskyy Bridge and occupying the city of Kherson, Zusko’s forces continued to advance, reaching the outskirts of the city of Mykolaiv and passing the administrative border of Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk, where Ukrainian forces established an effective defense. Zusko was rumored to have been arrested on March 31, 2022, accused of dereliction of duty due to mounting losses. It wasn’t verified until June 2022 that Zusko had been arrested for failing to capture Mykolaiv and was accused of providing Ukrainian military leaders with information on Russian positions due to his alleged use of unsecured communication channels.

General of the Army Alexander Dvornikov, Colonel General Gennady Zhidko, and Colonel General Alexander Lapin

Accomplishments: The capture of the Luhansk Oblast, including Severodonetsk and Lysychansk

The story of the three generals is intertwined due to their overlapping commands from April to October 2022.

The Kremlin ended its group command structure after Russia suffered strategic defeats at Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Kharkiv in late March 2022. On April 8, it named General Dvornikov the first theaterwide commander of Russian forces in Ukraine.

Reportedly, Dvornikov was ordered to capture the remainder of the Donbas – Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts – by May 9. What the Kremlin got on May 8 was news of a disastrous wet crossing attempt at the Siverskyi Donets River near Bilohorivka. At least 500 Russian troops were killed, and over 80 military vehicles were lost, mostly due to artillery. On the same day, Russian troops supported by the Private Military Company Wagner Group captured Popasna. The crossing at Bilohorivka was supposed to create the second part of a pincer surrounding Ukrainian forces defending Severodonetsk.

With the pincers broken, Dvornikov started a brutal war of attrition on May 10, which led to the capture of the Luhansk Oblast at the expense of the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of Russia, Syrian volunteer groups and Chechen Akhmat forces, which were all combat destroyed by the beginning of July. Chechen Akhmat and the 2nd Army Corps of the so-called Luhansk People’s Republic, now officially part of the Russian Ministry of Defense, never recovered.

Dvornikov fell out of public view in the third week of May, and between May 26 and June 22, Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed him as theaterwide commander, ending his 44-year military career. Although the capture of the Luhansk Oblast didn’t happen while he was the theaterwide commander, his tactics, which closely resembled World War II Russian Marshal Georgy Zhukov’s, did.

General Zhidko was named the new theaterwide commander of Russian troops, but it is unclear when his command officially started and ended. The first proof that Zhidko was the new theaterwide commander was on June 22, when he appeared with Shoigu. Zhidko was reportedly dismissed on July 12, but the Kremlin didn’t publicly name a new theaterwide commander until October 8. While he likely started theaterwide command around June 1, based on the official Kremlin announcements, Zhidko’s tenure as commander of all Russian troops may have been as short as 17 days. There were reports that he was dismissed from command due to a sharp increase in health issues related to chronic alcoholism. Zhidko, age 57, died on August 16, 2023, after a “long illness.”

Intertwined with Dvornikov and Zhidko was General Lapin. Lapin was the commander of the Central Military District of Russian Forces, serving as an area commander through April 8, 2022, before becoming a subordinate of Dvornikov, followed by Zhidko. On July 4, one day after Russia announced it had captured the Luhansk Oblast, Lapin was awarded the title of Hero of Russia by President Putin.

WBHG News analysts concluded in early June that Russia could capture the regions of Luhansk and Donetsk in the short term but lacked sufficient forces to hold territorial gains. As Russia’s combat potential decreased due to the nature of attritional warfare and the June arrival of NATO-provided guided multiple launch rocket systems (GMLRS), better known as HIMARS, Dvornikov or Zhidko pulled reserve forces of the Central Military District from Kharkiv and Donetsk into Luhansk. By early August of 2022, the units under Lapin’s command were exhausted, and near Izyum, equipment and ammunition shortages continued to worsen.

When Ukraine launched the Kharkiv Counteroffensive on September 5, Lapin was accused of abandoning his forces and incompetence by Chechen Colonel General Ramzan Kadyrov and PMC Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin. On Telegram, Kadyrov wrote, “If I had my way, I would demote Lapin to a private, deprive him of his awards and, with a machine gun in his hands, send him to the front line to wash away his shame with blood.” The Chechen warlord, who has never stepped foot in Ukraine, also accused Lapin of cowardice for commanding from the rear.

A divide within the Kremlin spilled out into public view. Some military leaders and analysts accused Kadyrov and Prigozhin of playing politics and positioning themselves to gain deeper control of the Ministry of Defense. Kadyrov and Prigozin leveraged Wagner Group’s bot farms and faux news organizations, a network of Russian milbloggers, and their own social media channels to run an organized smear campaign against Lapin and to advocate for General of the Army Sergey Surovikin to be named the new theaterwide commander. Although Lapin was never the theaterwide commander, Zhidko’s unclear status created a vacuum, contributing to Lapin receiving an oversized portion of the blame for the failures in Kharkiv, at Izyum, and the Russian retreat from Lyman.

On October 8, 2022, Surovikin was named the theaterwide commander, and on October 29, Lapin was dismissed by President Putin. The only commander to still have a career after his fall, the Gerasimov-connected Lapin was named the chief of staff of the Ground Forces of the Russian Federation on January 10, 2023.

General of the Army Sergey Surovikin

Accomplishments: Successful retrograde operation from western Kherson, building the defensive structures in occupied Crimea, Kherson, Zaporzhzhia, and southern Donetsk, instilling basic discipline into Russian troops

On the same day General Surovikin was named the commander of all Russian forces in Ukraine, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) blew up the Kerch (also known as the Crimean) Bridge. Two days later, Ukraine requested a total communications blackout in Kherson, and the second phase of the Kherson Counteroffensive started 48 hours later.

During his ascent, Surovikin negotiated to execute three campaigns: first, the withdrawal of Russian forces west of the Dnipro River in Kherson; second, executing the same air campaign he ran in 2017 against Syrian civilians, targeting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure; and third, taking the forces that withdraw from Kherson and achieving a strategic victory on another axis by December 31. In the public information space, state media started setting conditions with the Russian people to accept a withdrawal from Kherson as both a goodwill gesture and a move to more strategically advantageous positions.

On October 10, the first widescale Russian missile attack against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure was launched. Between November 8 and 11, Surovikin executed a masterful retrograde operation from Kherson, preserving up to 25,000 Russian troops and their equipment, slipping across the Dnipro River and suffering less than 500 casualties.

The biggest legacy of Surovikin’s command was ending the Kremlin policy of sending mobiks with no training to the frontline and instilling military discipline among the Russian troops in Ukraine. This was accomplished by brutally enforcing existing military rules and protocols and creating busy work. Thousands of mobiks were involved in constructing the Surovikin Line, a network of defenses with up to three echelons 35 kilometers deep across occupied Crimea, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and southwestern Donetsk. The static defenses have stymied Ukraine’s summer offensive, forcing Kyiv to change tactics twice since June 4 to overcome the Russian network of minefields, antitank traps, trenches, tunnels, and bunkers.

Surovikin also tried to end sending untrained and ill-equipped Russian troops to the frontlines. The quality of Russian forces had improved significantly, as have their tactics, but since August, there appears to be a return of sending poorly trained, mobilized soldiers into battle.

During his tenure as commander of all Russian forces in Ukraine, Surovikin kept his “day job” as commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS), which included air defense. On December 5, 2022, the Engel-2 and Dyagilevo military airfields deep within Russia were attacked by Ukraine. Two Tu-95 strategic bombers and one Tu-22M3 bomber were damaged, and up to six Russian servicemembers were killed. On December 26, Engels-2 was attacked for a second time. During this period, the relationship between the Kremlin and Prigozhin had become toxic, and Russian troops had been in retreat for months except at Bakhmut, where daily advances were measured in the 10s of meters. It had become clear there would be no major victory for Russia for New Year’s celebrations.

On January 11, 2023, Surovikin was relieved of command and named a Deputy of Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov. The next day, PMC Wagner claimed they had captured Soledar, with the Russian Ministry of Defense not crediting the Wagnerites in their daily morning report.

Surovikin’s alignment with PMC Wagner was well known, and the relationship between the Kremlin and Prigozhin was already souring in October 2022. In May 2023, when Priogzhin threatened to leave Bakhmut by May 10, there were accusations that Surovikin was warning Wagner’s leader that the Kremlin was actively working to dismantle his company.

During the failed Prigozhin Insurrection on June 23, 2023, Surovikin made a video appeal to Prigozhin to stop his actions while holding a submachine gun on his knee. Shortly after, Surovikin was arrested, reportedly briefly held at Lefotovo Prison, before being transferred to an apartment where he remains under house arrest. On August 22, 2023, he was officially dismissed as the commander of the Russian VKS, and his future is unclear.

PMC Wagner Group Leaders Yevgeny Prigozhin and Dmytry Utkin

Accomplishments: The capture of Popasna, Soledar, and Bakhmut and proved Russian penal units could be useful in battle

Private Military Company Wagner Group was asked to support the expansion of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine in March 2022, and up to 1,000 mercenaries arrived on March 19. Wagner Group’s first action was in the Hirske-Zolote region and took a leading role in the capture of Popasna. That Russian advance ultimately severed the T-513 Highway between Lysychansk and Bakhmut in early June 2022, strangling Ukrainian logistics.

Also in May, Wagner’s mercenaries joined the Russian forces advancing in the direction of Bakhmut and Soledar from the Svitlodarsk Bulge. In early June, Prigozhin convinced Russian President Vladimir Putin to allow him to create a battalion of penal soldiers assigned to PMC Wagner. One thousand convicts were recruited from Russian prisons and deployed east of Bakhmut in late June. The initial group suffered catastrophic losses of up to 90% killed and wounded, but the Kremlin believed the program was successful. Project K was born, and Prigozhin was given open access to Russia’s 335,000-plus prisoners. From July to December 2022, 49,000 criminals were recruited into the ranks of PMC Wagner. Recruiting of penal mercenaries peaked in October, but the numbers dropped sharply in November as word spread through the prison population of poor training, heavy losses, and penal units used for human wave attacks. In June 2023, the Council of Commanders reported that from March 2022 to May 2023, Wagner’s casualty rates were 82.5%.

While the September 2022 information war against General Lapin led by Prigozhin and Kadyrov was successful, politically, it was costly. The crumbs of goodwill between Prigozhin and Shoigu blew away like dust in the wind. Prigozhin was furious after the Russian Ministry of Defense snubbed Wagner Group in January 2023 and did not credit his mercenaries for the capture of Soledar. Hours later, the Kremlin released a clarifying statement, acknowledging that the ground fighting was accomplished by PMC Wagner and not just “volunteers.”

The political fallout was swift, and it became clear that President Putin was pulling away from his former caterer turned warlord. Shoigu effectively ended Project K, blocking PMC Wagner from further recruitment at Russian penal colonies. Wagner Group was already facing a recruiting crisis among its regular ranks because the pool they would normally recruit from – Russian soldiers – were dying at an alarming rate, didn’t want to return to Ukraine, and were facing stop-loss orders from the Kremlin, which was extending their service contracts. Days later, Shoigu created his own penal unit PMC called Storm-Z.

In February 2023, Prigozhin infamously threatened to leave Bakhmut, releasing a video with dozens of dead Wagnerites in the background, claiming their deaths were caused by the Russian Ministry of Defense withholding ammunition. Reactions in the Russian information space were mixed, with some Russian commanders claiming that Wagner was not being singled out for special treatment, stating that ammunition shortages were an issue theaterwide. Others criticized Prigozhin, asserting that PMC Wagner had been given preferential treatment at the expense of other axes and that the successes in Bakhmut were not due to superior training and tactics but an excess of ammunition that had been normalized. Others defended the mercenary leader, pointing out that the Wagnerites were the only force achieving operational success in Ukraine.

Prigozhin and Kadyrov hinted that the Chechen military leader provided some ammunition to Wagner Group in mid-February. In late February, the stalemate appeared to break when a lull in Russian artillery fire missions in the Bakhmut and Soledar areas of operation ended.

On May 5, Prigozhin made another video again standing in front of dozens of corpses, claiming they were Wagner mercenaries unnecessarily killed. He infamously growled, “Shoigu! Gerasimov! Where’s the fucking ammo,” claiming the Kremlin had cut off his ammunition supplies and that elite Russian forces who were supposed to defend his flanks in Bakhmut were doing nothing. Prigozhin declared that if he didn’t get sufficient ammunition within 48 hours and Russian forces defending his flanks didn’t rejoin the battle, he would withdraw his forces.

WBHG News analysts noted that the April deal between the Russian Ministry of Defense and PMC Wagner, which transferred the defense of the flanks to Russian units while Wagnerites continued fighting within Bakhmut, was meant to destroy Wagner. The Kremlin only tasked Russian forces to hold the existing defense lines and focused on using artillery to protect themselves as Wagner mercenaries fought house-to-house in bloody attritional warfare. Moscow was repeating its policy of using indigenous and proxy forces to fight in the most difficult areas while preserving their own units, and Prigozhin could not or refused to see the true nature of the agreement.

It is also important to note that unlike in February 2023, when there was a noticeable decrease in Russian artillery fire, there was no such decrease in May. Prigozhin wasn’t facing an ammunition shortage. He was facing a staffing crisis caused by an appalling casualty rate and his inability to recruit new penal mercenaries.

The mercenaries that joined the ranks of Wagner Group in October and November who weren’t dead or badly wounded were reaching the end of their six-month contracts. While some analysts believed that Prigozhin would arbitrarily extend their contracts beyond six months, the team at WBHG News accurately predicted that would not happen. Prigozhin was a former convict who deeply believed convicted criminals could create a new life after prison. Prigozhin understood that if he didn’t honor his contracts with the penal mercenaries he always called “his boys,” he would break one of the foundations of the unwritten Russian convict code.

After Prigozhin’s May 5 video, General Kadyrov, who days earlier had called Prigozhin “his good friend” and said that the pair had planned surprises for Ukraine, lashed out at his former partner and questioned his loyalty to Russia. Two days later, while taking another swipe at Prigozhin and his “ego,” Kadyrov claimed that the pair had agreed for Chechen Akhmat to take over the offensive in Bakhmut. In a video posted on his Telegram channel, Kadyrov showed his letter to the Kremlin sent on May 7, which Moscow rejected.

On May 8, Prigozhin announced that the Russian Ministry of Defense told him that if his forces left on May 10, he and his mercenaries would be arrested for treason. Trapped militarily, legally, and politically, he announced the Wagnerites would stay until Bakhmut was captured. At the time of his capitulation, Wagner Group controlled 93% to 95% of the city. On May 20, Prigozhin announced the mission was accomplished, even if the victory claim was dubious. There has never been a picture of Russian troops in the Litak region of Bakhmut, the last Ukrainian stronghold in the southwest corner, and very few pictures and videos from Russian state media, troops, or Wagnerites west of the railroad tracks that split the city.

On June 1, Wagner started its withdrawal, and on June 10, the city was handed over to Russian forces. The Kremlin announced that all Private Military Companies would no longer be commanded independently and would have to sign contracts with the Ministry of Defense by June 20, accepting to be under the command of the Russian Federation Armed Forces effective July 1. Up to two dozen PMCs fighting on behalf of Russia had been created since the start of 2023, and the mandate also impacted General Kadyrov. Kadyrov made a clean break from Prigozhin politically, throwing his loyalty back to Shoigu as he announced he was the first leader to sign a transfer of control with the Kremlin.

Prigozhin refused, and as the June 20 deadline passed, it was clear that a clash between PMC Wagner and the Kremlin was inevitable. Late on June 21, he released a rambling video accusing the Kremlin of lying about attacks on civilians in the Donbas, claiming the war against Ukraine was escalated so that oligarchs had more access to natural resources and that the entire invasion of Ukraine was based on a lie. If Prigozhin was the leader of a nation, his words were tantamount to the breaking of diplomatic relations and a prelude to a declaration of war.

On June 22, Prigozhin made a dubious claim that his camps in occupied Luhansk were attacked by Russian missiles, causing over a thousand casualties. A video released as proof across multiple Wagner Telegram channels did not support his claim. Twelve hours later, Prigozhin and Wagner founder Dmitry Utkin led an insurrection specifically targeting Shoigu and Gerasimov while pledging their loyalty to President Putin.

Wagner mercenaries took control of Rostov-on-Don and surrounded the Southern Military District headquarters, barely firing a shot. Utkin led a brigade of Wagnerites in a convoy that advanced 670 kilometers in 12 hours toward Moscow. The so-called “March for Freedom” ended as quickly as it started, with Prigozhin asking his followers to stand down on June 24.

In the end, 15 to 22 Russian soldiers died, and seven helicopters and an Il-22M command and control plane were shot down. Part of a refinery was in flames, one highway bridge was destroyed, and at least three civilians were killed on June 24 when the Russian VKS started to bomb highways indiscriminately.

President Putin was invisible through the insurrection, but after it ended, he called the attempted rebellion treason and promised swift justice. Just 48 hours later, it was announced that Prigozhin would not face criminal charges, and two days later, Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko announced he had created a peace deal between himself, Prigozhin, and Putin. PMC Wagner would relocate to Belarus, where Prigozhin would live in exile. WBHG News analysts never believed this was a firm deal and warned that previous history shows that anyone disloyal to Putin had ended up imprisoned, dead, or hiding after surviving an assassination attempt. Even among Putin’s former closest allies, there had never been an exception to this, and in 2018, Putin told a reporter that “betrayal” was unforgivable.

In early July, a camp to accommodate up to 8,500 Wagner mercenaries was built in Tsel, Belarus, and on July 15, Prigozhin posted a selfie showing himself in his underwear at the Belarus encampment. On July 19, PMC Wagner released a video showing Prigozhin and Utkin addressing a group of Wagnerites about the organization’s future, with the media-shy Utkin declaring in English, “Welcome to Hell!”

But just under the surface, the claims that 25,000 Wagner mercenaries would occupy Belarus to supplement Lukashenko’s army were questionable, and by mid-August, it was clear that if there ever was a three-way deal, it was over. All recruiting was suspended on July 30, with Prigozhin claiming they had “plenty” of mercenaries in their ranks. Wagnerites that had arrived two weeks earlier were leaving Belarus due to deployments in Libya, recruitment efforts by other PMCs, or a lack of pay as Wagner’s finances fell apart.

Prigozhin also stunned analysts and his detractors when he appeared in St. Petersburg, Russia, on July 28 at the periphery of the Russia-Africa Summit. The sting of the non-response from the Kremlin over the dead Russian airman was barely a month old, and some publicly wondered how Prigozhin, who was supposedly exiled, could be walking around in St. Petersburg as a free man.

On August 23, just hours after General Surovikin was formerly dismissed as the commander of the Russian VKS, Prigozhin’s Embraer Legacy 600 private jet was either shot down or destroyed by an explosive device over the Tver region of Russia while it was en route from Moscow to St. Petersburg. It is reported that Prigozhin, who carefully guarded his travel plans, decided at the last minute not to swap to the second private jet operated by PMC Wagner, an Embraer Legacy 650, that was also bound for St. Petersburg.

Ten people were killed, including the pilot, co-pilot, and a flight attendant operating on a one-day contract because she needed to travel to St. Petersburg. Among the seven members of PMC Wagner that were killed,

  • Yevgeny Prigozhin – figurehead and leader focusing on media, social media, psychological operations, and commercial catering
  • Dmitry Utkin – creator of the name “Wagner,” known white nationalist, and the military leader of PMC Wagner
  • Valery Chekalov – Head of logistics operating under the title of “business advisor”

None of the dead have been officially identified, but President Putin referred to Prigozhin in the past tense in a formal statement, as did Kadyrov. The Wagner Group’s Council of Commanders declared they would not make a formal statement until after the Kremlin provided its official reason for the downing of the airplane.

Of the eight Russian military and mercenary leaders who achieved key objectives since February 24, 2022, three are dead, two are held in custody, one is missing, one was dismissed, and one, General Lapin, was reassigned. Putin’s protection of Shoigu and Gerasimov is unwavering despite their unwavering loyalty, despite the documented corruption and repeated mistakes. For any other Russian or Russian-aligned senior military leader who finds success on the battlefield in Ukraine, it comes with the occupational hazard of falling out of favor or, worse, from the sky.

Breaking News, Local, National

FBI Interviews Sarah Bils, the Donbass Devushka, as the DOJ and NCIS Probes Her Past

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[Oak Harbor, Wash.] – WBHG/MTN – Former United States Navy Chief Petty Officer Sarah Bils, better known as the Russian propagandist Donbass Devushka, was interviewed by FBI agents at her Oak Harbor, Washington home on Sunday, according to a report by Newsmax, and is also under investigation by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS).

An open-source intelligence investigation spearheaded by NAFO, a loosely affiliated group of pro-Ukrainian social media users who are united in their fight against Russian disinformation, identified Bils as the person behind a Twitter and Telegram disinformation empire that started in 2014 while she was in the U.S. Navy, and exploded after Russia expanded its war of aggression against Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Malcontent News was the first to report on Ms. Bils’s alter ego and was able to verify the self-declared “Russian Jew” Donbas maiden was actually born in Voorhees, New Jersey, according to her 2011 marriage license.

On Monday, Bils told the Wall Street Journal, after an exclusive interview with the newspaper on Saturday, that she was “forthright and honest with the FBI and NCIS in regards to what my clearances were and what I had access to, which was literally nothing.” The FBI interviewed her on Sunday.

In early April, investigators with Bellingcat determined the Donbass Devushka Telegram channel was the first to publicly leak edited secret and top secret documents from the Pentagon allegedly distributed by U.S. Air National Guardsman Jack Teixeria on a private Discord server called Thug Shaker Central. Teixeria, who has no connection to Bils, was arrested without incident by federal officials on April 13.

On Monday, an unnamed source with the U.S. Department of Justice said that “she is actively under federal investigation, but the circumstances of the content of the investigation is unclear at this time.”

Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh was peppered with questions about Bils during a Monday press briefing. When asked if the Department of Defense was aware that the former Navy chief petty officer had been posting Russian propaganda since 2014 and if she had been under investigation prior to the revelation of the document leak, Ms. Singh replied, “Because this investigation is ongoing, I would refer you to the DOJ for that.”

Ms. Singh did confirm that Bils had not been under investigation by the U.S. Navy “while she was in uniform,” adding, “as far as I am aware,” and referencing additional questions to the Department of the Navy. On Tuesday, an NCIS spokesperson told the South Whidbey Record that the NCIS “is continuing to work jointly on an investigation of her activities with the Department of Justice.”

On April 5, four poorly edited top secret Pentagon documents were posted on her Telegram channel, with Bils claiming that she was not responsible for the post, that it was done by another admin who was “disciplined,” and the documents removed. However, on April 14, the documents, which have since been deleted, were still available contrary to her claims during her Wall Street Journal interview.

Over the last two days, a clearer picture of Bils’s life has started to form. At the end of 2020, she was promoted to E7, chief petty officer, which is a senior non-commissioned officer rank. But just under the surface, her life was falling apart. She was already involved in a bitter divorce battle over custody of her daughter, and in court papers reviewed by the South Whidbey Record, Bils declared she was suffering from depression, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and a “substance abuse disorder.”

In 2021, court papers show the U.S. Navy sent Bils to a substance abuse treatment program in Utah. In September 2021, she was in a serious car accident where she rear-ended another vehicle while traveling at a high rate of speed. Drugs and alcohol were not a factor in the daytime crash, and Bils was cited by the Washington State Patrol for speeding. According to her mother, the Donbass Devushka was seriously injured in the crash, and she traveled to Washington to help her daughter recover.

Two days after the accident, Bils posted on Twitter that she totaled her car and lost custody of her child. She was honorably discharged from the Navy on November 27, 2022, with a demotion to E5, petty officer second class. In the U.S. Navy, a petty officer is a non-commissioned officer and would be equal to a sergeant in the Army, Air Force, Marines, and Space Force.

Bils had previously filed for divorce in 2014 and requested a temporary restraining order, which was delivered to her husband by the Island County Sheriff on June 13, 2014. The 14-day temporary order was not extended by the court. In 2016, Bils withdrew her petition for divorce.

Since she left the Navy, Bils has made various claims on why she was discharged, including telling the Wall Street Journal that she was suffering from PTSD, writing on social media it was due to her “leftist views,” and, in another Twitter thread, claimed she stopped showing up for duty. In a series of Tweets on Monday, which are currently protected from public view, Bils, or one of up to 15 people that she claims helps run her social media empire, posted a Tweetstorm defending her actions, declaring that no laws had been violated, while calling out numerous news agencies for sharing and analyzing the top secret documents released by Teixeria. At the time of publication, the Donbass Devushka Telegram channel remained active, posting dozens of times a day.

The investigation by the FBI and NCIS comes at a time when the U.S. government appears to be cracking down on Russian influence in American politics. In a separate case, the DOJ announced on Tuesday that four U.S. citizens and three Russian nationals have been charged with “conspiring to covertly sow discord in U.S. society, spread Russian propaganda, and interfere illegally in U.S. elections.” A federal grand jury alleges that Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) agents recruited, funded, and discredited U.S. political groups to act as unregistered Moscow agents. Omali Yeshitela, Penny Joanne Hess, Jesse Nevel, and Augustus Romain Jr. of St. Petersburg, Florida, have been charged with violating the 1938 Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), and each faces up to five years in prison.

Moscow resident Aleksandr Viktorovich Ionov was one of the three Russians charged with a FARA violation. He’s accused of using foreign influence to “create the appearance of American popular support for Russia’s annexation of territories in Ukraine.”

Malcontent News’s research for our initial report on Bils included potential legal consequences; a legal expert advised that an area of potential trouble for the Donbass Devushka lies with FARA.

FARA requires certain agents of foreign principals who are engaged in political activities or other activities specified under the statute to make periodic public disclosure of their relationship with the foreign principal, as well as activities, receipts and disbursements in support of those activities.  Disclosure of the required information facilitates evaluation by the government and the American people of the activities of such persons in light of their function as foreign agents. 

United states department of justice

Bils’s social media work is endorsed by the Telegram channel Rybar, which has over 1.1 million followers and is one of the most influential Russian military-aligned social media brands on the planet. Rybar is led by computer programmer Denis Shchukin and former Russian Ministry of Defense press officer Mikhail Zvinchuk, according to Kung Chan of the Chinese thinktank ANBOUND. The pair are alleged to be connected to the FSB, although they insist that they receive minimal funding from the Russian government and have an operating budget of $20,000 a month.

On social media, the Donbass Devushka frequently praises and defends the Private Military Company (PMC) Wagner Group led by Russian oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhin. In November 2022, Prigozhin opened a new headquarters for PMC Wagner in St. Petersburg, Russia, which included plans for material and financial support for journalists and bloggers. Prigozhin has bragged publicly about interfering in the 2016 and 2020 United States elections and was using his company, Concord Management and Consulting, as early as 2014 to manipulate U.S. elections. 2014 is the same year Bils became more active in posting anti-Ukrainian and anti-United States content, and is the same year the DOJ alleges Ionov first violated FARA.

Bils has periodically complained about financial trouble on social media; for years she solicited donations of cash and cryptocurrency through CashApp and Buy Me a Coffee, claiming the money was going to support Russian causes. Online and in her interview with the Wall Street Journal, she claimed that no money went to Russia, and what little funds were raised went to cover her personal technology and equipment costs.

A critical question that the Department of Defense needs to answer is how an individual with a documented history of substance abuse, mental illness, financial problems, and a troubled marriage involving custody battles and restraining orders was able to maintain their top security clearance.

Bils has blocked us on social media and did not respond to a request for comment.

Mental illness and substance abuse are sensitive topics that can release strong emotions. If you are depressed, despondent, or having suicidal thoughts, there is help available. In the United States, you can dial 988 to reach the Suicide and Crisis Hotline. You can also call 800-273-8255 24 hours a day. If you’d rather not talk to a person, you can text 741741, and for U.S. veterans, you can text 838255.

Editor’s Note: It is Malcontent News’s editorial policy to use an individual’s most current legal name. Sarah Bils changed her legal name to Lyudmila Mikhailova Karakova on March 31, 2023. Given the particular circumstances of this story, we chose to use her previous name for clarity.